217. Telegram 2261 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
2261. Subject: Codel Moffett: Aftermath. Refs: (A) State 064985; (B) Santiago 2172.
1. In efforts to place Codel visit controversy in perspective for interested parties on the Hill. Following points may be useful to Department.
2. Human Rights: Abuse of human rights is not issue. USG recognizes that abuses exist and has registered its disapproval. Question is what is most effective method of bringing GOC conduct to acceptable standards. Codel endorses meat-axe tactic: sanction GOC by ban on [Page 595] military cooperation and reduction or elimination of economic aid. This course risks driving GOC into shell. Closing itself off from those who have best chance of influencing it, and increasing repression even more. Alternative course followed since coup with increasing sharpness, is more subtle effort to modulate political, economic and military support to encourage GOC to improve human rights conditions. Congressional restrictions, not total ban supported by Codel, have served to underline urgency of problem of human rights abuses and strengthened our arguments. Further drastic restrictions at this time are unlikely to help, could be counterproductive, and are not as flexible as carrot/stick approach Executive can apply.
3. Codel expertise: We question whether flying visit by Congressmen with no prior experience with Chile, no Spanish, clearly defined and held views, and inclination to listen primarily to views of only one side, is best basis for Congressional action. Sophomoric attempt to penetrate Villa Grimaldi, as well as elementary discourtesy in Etzaguirre case if not Benavides, left impression with GOC and many Chileans which can only make it more difficult to convince them of seriousness of US Congress and objectivity of other delegations which may wish to come to Chile for genuinely objective look. Codel damaged the prestige of the House in Chile and leadership, e.g., Doc Morgan, should be made aware of it.
4. Conduct of Codel: It may have damaged more than helped the causes we all wish to advance. Embassy has already pointed out possible deleterious effect on parole program and vicariate of solidarity effort. But Codel visit—by their attitudes and own statements, as well as GOC attempts to exploit it—also exposed individuals to reprisal from GOC. Not only church and other private people who cooperated with them, but even prisoners they saw in detention, can now look for less cooperation and clemency from GOC.
5. Internal Security: Most observers agree Chileans give the current regime credit for re-creating “domestic tranquility.” The near anarchy of the last months of the Allende Government is still in people’s minds. So is the current disorder in Argentina. Many Chileans saw no alternative to military takeover and, by and large, still applaud the junta for ending chaos. We and many others contend that the price, in terms of abuses of human rights, has been and continues to be too high. We believe that after two and one half years it is high time to restore more normal conditions. Our views on this aspect of the problem are well known, publicly and privately.
6. Sale of Matériel: Bulk of weapons and other military supplies and training sought in US by GOC are not counter-insurgency or crowd control instruments—this point was clearly made to Codel. F–5’s and anti-tank missiles are not needed and cannot be used effectively to [Page 596] combat underground cells of the MIH or Communist Party or street demonstrations, much less PDC critics. GOC access to US military equipment is justified by such objective considerations as the need for some deterrent capability against the disproportionate weapons strength of Peru, and the need to modernize the rapidly deteriorating inventory of equipment felt by any military establishment to defend its country.
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Summary: Popper reported that a U.S. Congressional delegation to Chile thought that terminating military assistance and reducing economic aid was the best way to force the Chilean Government to improve human rights in the country. The Embassy, however, thought that maintaining some assistance and encouraging the Junta to improve human rights was a better tactic.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760103–0412. Confidential; Immediate. The Congressional delegation included Reps. Toby Moffett (D–Connecticut), George Miller (D–California), and Tom Harkin (D–Iowa); the delegation was in Chile March 11–15. (Telegram 38229 to Santiago, February 18; ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D760060–0085) On March 16, the Embassy reported that the CODEL’s criticism of the Junta would likely complicate the Embassy’s efforts to mitigate human rights abuses in Chile. (Telegram 2172 from Santiago, March 16; ibid., D760101–0899)
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