216. Memorandum From the Country Officer for Chile (Fimbres) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)1
SUBJECT
- Unilateral Steps with Respect to Human Rights in Chile
We had hoped that in conjunction with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and the upcoming OASGA we could take a more active role in pressing the Chileans on this issue. But events of the last few days suggest that the IAHRC by self-destructing may have gone the way of Allana Working Group in terms of GOC acceptability. We are asking for the Embassy’s further assessment in this regard, particularly if a pre-OASGA visit would be acceptable to the GOC. (See attached cable.)
Assuming an IAHRC visit will not be acceptable, we may have to seize the nettle ourselves. This is not a very desirable alternative and prospects for success at best are uncertain. However, in the present environment, it may be a choice between a unilateral démarche and inaction.
We can consider several approaches. Two of these relate to a letter from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Carvajal. We could use as a setting the hopefully successful outcome of Buchanan’s language in the Security Assistance Bill. The letter would refer to Executive efforts to keep the door open to Chile. It would underline that the new U.S. [Page 593] law: 1) does not shut the military pipeline and sales; 2) opens the possibility of future credits on the basis of a U.S. presidential determination of progress on return to traditional legality. At the same time the Secretary could reiterate his hopes for attending the OASGA and refer to his comment to Buchanan that human rights is a critical issue in our bilateral relations. He could also note the series of measures (e.g. Decree 1?) and establishment of a human rights commission taken by the GOC and urge their full implementation.
Recommendation
That if the House prevails on the Chile language, we prepare a letter along the lines described above recommending the Secretary’s signature.
Advantages
—It would be a clear indication that the Secretary’s presence at the GA would be directly related to a returning trend to civility in Chile;
—It would put the Chileans on notice that our weighing in on behalf of the Buchanan amendment committed us to seek every opportunity to convey to them the strong concerns in the U.S. on this problem;
—The letter together with Popper’s accompanying remarks would be a clear signal to the GOC that the USG was speaking with one voice;
—It is consistent with our abstention on the OASGA site.
Disadvantages
—The Secretary may want to go to Santiago (period)
—Linking the Secretary’s presence to this issue ignores other reasons USOAS may have for his participation;
—Our efforts could provoke a hostile reaction and cause Pinochet to pull up the drawbridge.
Recommendation
We prepare a letter as described above but excluding language which ties the Secretary’s presence at the OASGA with movement on bringing to an end the post-Allende emergency period.
Advantages
—It gives the Secretary freedom of action;
—It lets us pursue at the Secretary’s level other interests we have in the OASGA.
Disadvantages
—We throw away our trump card. With the OASGA only three months away there would be little time to use it later.
[Page 594]—It reduces the letter and our démarche to a general plea to reason on the part of the Chileans.
Recommendation
No letter. But a démarche by Popper to Pinochet suggesting the Chileans move further down the road toward normal civil rights during the next three months.
Advantage
—It does not put the Secretary on the line either with respect to the OASGA or the internal Chilean situation.
Disadvantages
—This is least likely to elicit a positive response from the GOC.
—Pinochet might consider Popper as speaking on his own despite the Secretary’s remarks to Buchanan.
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Summary: With plans for a visit to Chile by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission in doubt, Fimbres recommended unilateral steps that the United States might take.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830106–1703. Confidential. Drafted by Fimbres on March 9; cleared by White. Sent through Ryan. None of the recommendations is checked. In an attached March 9 memorandum to Rogers, not published, Mailliard stated that USOAS did not believe that the U.S. Government should make “any strong unilateral démarches” on human rights. Instead, Mailliard suggested that Popper might “go to the Chilean Government with a checklist to ask if they have considered the various contingencies connected with their hosting the [OAS] General Assembly.” Mailliard also suggested that the junta might be asked to consider the possibility of responding to the IAHRC report by inviting the commission to visit Chile. In a second attachment, telegram 57655 to Santiago, March 9, the Department concluded that Orfila’s idea of creating a special human rights body to visit Santiago would not prosper, and suggested that the Embassy inform the junta it might receive the IAHRC report and invite it or a sub-group to visit Chile and review areas where it thought the report was inaccurate. In telegram 55095 to Santiago, March 6, the Department noted press reports that three members of the IAHRC had announced their decision not to run for reelection in light of OAS inaction on their Chile report. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D760086–0717)
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