122. Telegram Secto 10214 From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Embassy in Brazil1
10214. Subject: Action Memo: Proposed Reply to FM Silveira. Ref: A) Tosec 100276 (Notal), B) Tosec 100274 repeat of Brasília 7462.
1. Please deliver the following message to Silveira from Secretary Kissinger:
2. Begin text: Dear Antonio: Your letter of August 20 was slightly delayed in its transmittal to me here in Jerusalem. I share your feeling that our exchanges are a source of personal satisfaction, and I am answering immediately because, beyond the personal dimension, our two countries are too important to the emerging global order, and our futures are too closely joined to allow any possible misunderstanding or misinterpretations to cloud our relations.
A fundamental theme running through your letter deals with the relationship between our policy of détente with the Soviet Union and our posture toward the developing world. I think it important, Antonio, that I seek to clarify the distinction I see between these two central aspects of American foreign policy.
As for détente, the United States shares two things with the Soviet Union: The power to destroy the world and the traumatic memory of two world wars in this century. No government can responsibly do less than to try to chain that power and learn from that past. These issues may have originated in the old world but that fact makes them no less important to all of us and to world peace. Massive military forces still confront each other in Europe.
The Helsinki Conference was indeed an epilogue—an epilogue to World War II. But it was by no means easily reached. It would be disingenuous of me to suggest we did not have to engage in exchanges with the Soviet Union in the effort to hammer out an outline for the accord. But the conference was the culmination of three years of painstaking negotiations among all the states involved leading toward a better definition of East-West relations. Each country, large and small, had points it wished to advance and important interests it had to protect. These had to be accommodated or there would have been no final agreement. It is difficult to interpret this [Page 339] broad effort as an exercise in condominium. Certainly the participants did not look on it as such. But détente is a limited process with limited ends. The Helsinki Conference as you emphatically point out does not represent the full range of problems affecting the world today. Who could question that this open country with its varied population and its market for ideas and products extending across the world could be insensitive to or isolated from the dramatic changes underway in the Southern Hemisphere. The great importance I place on my forthcoming address before the UN Special Session demonstrates the profound preoccupation over economic problems that we share with the “emerging protagonists” from the Third World.
But I cannot, Antonio, in all candor agree that there is in any of our policies that have evolved toward the Third World over the past months a “natural tendency of two leader nations to govern the world jointly.” The crucial debate now before us is over trade relations, commodities and a re-examination of international monetary arrangements. Yet, the Soviet Union and other Communist nations are not only not influential on US policies in this regard but they have virtually opted out of the debate. The Soviets played neither an interested nor active role in the World Food Conference, the World Population Conference, Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly nor the Preparatory Conference in Paris. In these fora where North/South issues have been examined seriously we have played an active and concerned role. An obsession with East/West relations in no way motivated the attention and initiatives we brought to those meetings. How do we approach these North/South issues? Though you could not say so, I believe that Brazil should be one of the leading forces in any search for a truly global order. Brazil’s own importance and our shared understanding that mutual recrimination will not aid the political environment required for a successful outcome make this inevitable. I was heartened by your references to this point in your São Paulo speech and I look forward with great interest to your address in New York.
Now to Cuba. Some countries may have acted at San Jose in the mistaken belief that détente requires normalization with Cuba. We did not. Neither détente, nor our relations with the Soviets, nor any desire to improve relations with Cuba governed our actions at San Jose. If anything our motives are to reduce Soviet influence in Cuba. In San Jose we joined in a freedom of action formula that had majority support. This formula was a Latin American initiative which we supported in order to remove an irritant in hemispheric relations and preserve indeed revive hemispheric support for the Rio Treaty. Last week without abandoning our embargo on direct trade with Cuba we modified those of our own sanctions which would have conflicted with the decision taken at San Jose. The determining criterion of our policy [Page 340] was therefore entirely hemispheric without concern for extraneous considerations like détente.
Opinions will obviously vary about the nature of the Cuban subversive threat. My own judgment is that an increasing number of American states no longer see Cuba as a serious threat. Whether or not there has been a real and enduring change in Cuban intentions and capability for subversion, there is more confidence on the part of the states themselves about their ability to deal with whatever threat does exist. Your point about the “emergence of new protagonists coming from the Southern Hemisphere” is again relevant here. For despite the manifold problems which confront us all, I do sense in most Latin American countries an increasing sense of responsibility for their own advancement and security and in many cases an increased sense of confidence in their own ability to exercise that responsibility. The strengthening and re-affirmation of the Rio Treaty at San Jose provides further reassurance in this regard. The treaty of course remains our ultimate safeguard against any recrudescence of the Cuban threat to which we must certainly remain alert. I also share your doubt whether Cuba is disposed to cooperate in the hemisphere and to undertake firm commitments to its neighbors. We will be looking for evidence of Cuba’s readiness to undertake its international and hemispheric responsibilities. Our posture toward Cuba and toward its role in the hemisphere will be conditioned by our evaluation of their behavior.
You have raised the question of our own relations with Cuba. As I have indicated our lifting of sanctions against third countries has not eased our embargo on direct trade with Cuba. Should Cuba adopt a more cooperative approach in the future we may eventually consider changes in our posture, but such changes will be based on a reciprocal process in which Cuba will have to demonstrate its readiness to fulfill its obligations to us. Should such an evolution begin you will be among the first to know, directly from me.
Finally, Antonio, I am concerned about the question of the broader hemispheric dialogue which you raise in your letter. I share your view that the current climate is not conducive to a resuscitation of the new dialogue in a formal sense. But I remain as interested as I always have been in the problem of improved communication within the hemisphere. And I have been greatly heartened by the high quality of dialogue that we witnessed at the recent OAS General Assembly and at the San Jose meeting on the Rio Treaty. Yet it seems to me that on the issues that transcend hemispheric concerns, the Latin American nations themselves need to come to some agreement on how a regional dialogue can be folded into the global debate.
On this issue, as on others, I as always welcome your views. I believe that close consultation between us and our governments will [Page 341] be an indispensable requisite to any progress we make on the problems which confront both of our nations. Warmest regards, Henry. End text.
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Summary: In a letter to Silveira, Kissinger discussed détente, sanctions on Cuba, and the dialogue among the nations of the hemisphere.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840099–1284. Confidential; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to the Department.
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