121. Telegram 201480/Tosec 100086 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger1
201480/Tosec 100086. Subject: Letter to Secretary From Brazilian Foreign Minister. Ref: State 201066, Tosec 100070.
1. Following letter from Foreign Minister Silveira to Secretary Kissinger delivered late afternoon Friday, August 22 by Brazilian Embassy.
2. Begin text: My dear Henry: I have just received your letter of today’s date, in which you apprise me of the measures that the United State Government will be adopting as from tomorrow, for the lifting of certain restrictions to the trade with Cuba. Although the measures pertain, for the time being, only to trade conducted by subsidiaries located in third countries, they still cannot fail to produce an impact on the bilateral relations between the United States and Cuba, to the extent that they will provide an opening for a Cuban reaction indicating, as you said, whether the Cubans “are prepared for serious talks”. I thank you for the information, which will certainly be useful for keeping posted on the policy of the countries that voted at San Jose in favor of the lifting of the sanctions against Cuba.
3. Both at Quito and in Washington, I had the opportunity to refer once again to the fact that, in my view, the Cuban problem was being dealt with in the OAS under the prism of the global policy of the “détente” rather than under the more proper one of continental relations. The two subjects are, to a certain point, interconnected but from Brazil’s viewpoint the primarily continental perspective of the Cuban problem should never have been lost from sight. To us, the fundamental questions are, in this order, 1) Does Cuba no longer constitute a threat to the security of the other members of the TIAR, ceasing to intervene directly or indirectly in their internal affairs? 2) Is Cuba disposed to cooperate with the other countries of the inter-American system, undertaking firm commitments in this connection?
[Page 336]4. I am not unaware of the great significance of the Helsinki meeting and of the positive aspects of the policy of “détente”, which you so ably summarized in your letter of July 27. You know my viewpoints on the “détente”, which do not necessarily coincide with yours. I understand the American and the Soviet objectives in pursuing the “détente” in their bilateral relations, and I admit that the countries both of the Western and Eastern blocs can benefit from the détente, at least while it creates perspectives of immediate peace and of a greater possibility of cooperation in the efforts for economic and social development. What it should not be, however, is a policy of simplification of the world reality, accentuating the natural tendency of the two leader nations to govern the world jointly. Helsinki, notwithstanding the presence of 35 Chiefs of State, is in my view reminiscent of many other meetings in the past, and, in some form, it was still the continuation of a world history focused on the Northern Hemisphere as the starting point. In this sense, I think that it was more of an epilogue than a prologue, for I already do not see how it will be possible to ignore the emergence of new protagonists, coming from the Southern Hemisphere, in the history that is to be written from now to the end of the century. I do not refer specifically to any particular country. I do think of the past reality of the developing world, with its dissatisfactions, its ambitions, its justifiable requirements, its frustrations and its reactions.
5. I intend to address myself to this topic in my speech at the Special Assembly, of which I will send you the text as soon as it has been completed. I deem it important that all of us, responsible governments of developed and developing countries alike, join efforts in finding constructive way out of the current impasse in the overall relations between the Northern and Southern Hemisphere. The exasperation with which some industrialized countries view the demagogic behavior of some developing countries is but the same feeling of exasperation these less developed countries harbor against what they see as a lack of understanding on the part of the developed countries towards problems originating in an inequitable economic order on the international level. Mutual recrimination only aggravates the impasse.
6. Although I do not believe that the Department of State has let itself be influenced by the New York Times report from Associated Press that I had proposed a “formal” resumption of the new dialogue, I wish to reiterate that the willingness on the part of the Brazilian Government to carry on a dialogue is a constant, not a contingent attitude. But, being realistic and pragmatic, we certainly would not formally propose something about which previous soundings had not produced positive results. As regards the new dialogue, no sounding out has been effected, nor do I believe that there exists now a climate conducive to such.
7. I do not wish to conclude this letter without referring to the recent decree by the Brazilian Government on the adoption of retalia [Page 337] tory measures against countries that discriminatorily restrict the entry of Brazilian products. Upon the publication of the decree, there followed a diplomatic action by Ambassador Crimmins to Itamaraty (the only one to do so), in which, besides requesting clarifications, the Ambassador expressed his surprise at the fact that such a measure had been adopted without previous consultation with Washington.
8. I must admit my surprise at both his diplomatic action and his comment, to which, incidentally, we have given no publicity. The Erga Omnes measure adopted by Brazil has general application and is not specifically directed at any one country and it is even somewhat intriguing that the U.S. Government has volunteered as its target. As a matter of fact, we have problems of access to the markets of many developed countries, not only to the U.S. market. As to the comment that there had been no consultation with Washington, I consider it appropriate to point out that since the measure was not specifically aimed at the United States, there was no reason for consulting with the United States Government. Even if this had been the case, it is not the practice on the part of the United States to engage in previous individual consultations before adopting measures of a general nature that might affect our trade. This notwithstanding, we have repeatedly maintained consultations with the U.S. Government on the problems of our bilateral economic relations, during which the question of access (to the U.S. market) has been discussed. Just recently, although the U.S. Embassy had clearly indicated that Undersecretary Robinson did not wish consultations on countervailing duties, the major implications of this problem were dealt with. On that, as well as on other occasions, we have repeatedly observed the inequality between the freedom assumed by the developed countries in defence of their economy through schemes such as alleged “market disruptions” and denied to the developing countries in protecting their considerably more fragile economic structures.
9. This letter turned out to be long and varied in its content, but I wanted to bring our correspondence up to date.
10. Though we cannot afford the luxury of purely intellectual pleasures, I want to tell you, quite candidly, that the frank and honest letters we exchange have been, amidst the perplexing problems that beset us, a source of satisfaction in my work as Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Relations.
11. I wish you success in your current endeavors in the Near East. Warm regards, Antonio End text.
12. Draft reply in preparation. Maw
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Summary: In a letter to Kissinger, Silveira discussed Cuba, détente, and trade policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Kissinger was in the Middle East from August 21 to 31, shuttling between Alexandria and Jerusalem. Repeated to Brasília and to Eleuthera for Rogers on August 25. Kissinger’s July 27 letter to Silveira was transmitted in telegram 177906 to Brasília, July 27. (Ibid.) In telegram 7462 from Brasília, August 27, the Embassy outlined topics for a response to Silveira’s letter, highlighting détente, North-South relations, trade relations, consultative mechanisms, and Cuba policy. (Ibid., D750296–0734)
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