Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

430. Memorandum From William Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 16, 1973.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Toward The Bahamas and Base Rights Negotiations

Background

In August 1971, the Senior Review Group (SRG) considered a paper (Response to NSSM 117) reviewing U.S. policies and programs in the Caribbean. One issue considered was U.S. policy in view of British disengagement from the Caribbean and, specifically, from The Bahamas. The recommendations relating to the Bahamas approved by the SRG were:

—try to keep the British engaged in the Bahamas as long as possible; and

—postpone decisions on U.S. bases in the Bahamas until after Bahamian independence has been achieved. The possibility of seeking some kind of special association with the Bahamas, with some delegation of sovereignty to the U.S., was specifically discarded as being unacceptable to the Bahamas and involving unnecessary cost to U.S. interests.

In April 1972, then-Secretary Laird asked for a “thorough, evaluation of alternatives to early, full Bahamian independence” through the NSC system. Defense laid out its position and recommendation in the paper at Tab A “U.S. Policy Toward The Bahamas.” The DOD paper considers U.S. security interests in The Bahamas and ways of protecting them. The basic issue it poses is “whether the requisite degree of cooperation desired by the U.S. can be assured through full Bahamian independence or whether some kind of formal association with the U.S. would be better.” Its recommendation: that the U.S. initiate preliminary talks with The Bahamas and the British, as necessary, to explore the feasibility of some form of association to maximize protection of U.S. long-term security interests in The Bahamas. Failing attainment of such a relationship, a treaty relationship (probably a mutual defense agreement) would be an acceptable fallback.

The NSC Inter-Departmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) prepared a paper (at Tab B) setting forth options for U.S. policy on how best to protect our security interests in The Bahamas; it focuses on the problem of assuring continued use of our bases in The Bahamas following Bahamian independence. It agrees with DOD on the desirability of initiating early talks with the Bahamian Government. We now have agency positions on both papers and on the options contained in them (Tab C).

Since submission of the DOD paper several events have occurred.

—Prime Minister Pindling won an overwhelming parliamentary majority on an “independence now” platform;

—Pindling and the British have agreed on a firm schedule leading to Bahamian independence on July 10, 1973;

—the Pindling government has requested that we begin preliminary talks on base rights prior to formal Bahamian independence;

—the U.S. Government has talked with the British on the implications of Bahamian independence and agreed to further talks in early April to be followed by tripartite discussions (U.S., UK, Bahamas).

All agree that U.S. security interests in the Bahamas are significant due to their geographic proximity and to the strategic nature of our installations. A description of our military bases in The Bahamas is at Tab D. U.S. security interests in The Bahamas are:

—maintenance of a politically and economically stable Bahamas favorably disposed to the U.S.;

—maintenance of U.S. base rights and facilities in The Bahamas;

—denial of bases to unfriendly foreign powers and interdiction of subversive infiltration; and

—unimpeded navigation and overflight by U.S. military forces on the high seas and in international air space in the area.

The options suggested in the DOD paper have been overtaken by events. It is no longer feasible to try to delay independence for The Bahamas until we can negotiate a new relationship.

The IG/ARA paper sets forth the following basic options for U.S.-Bahamian relations:

I. U.S. agreement with a sovereign and fully independent Bahamas

A. Bilateral negotiations to extend agreements now in force (with UK), with payment of a reasonable remuneration for use of bases.

—this is probably acceptable to The Bahamas and to the U.S. Congress but may be economically costly.

B. Negotiation of new base agreements with the U.S. extending a bilateral defense commitment and with no base payments.

—economical but Bahamas are unlikely to accept agreement with no tangible remuneration.

C. Negotiation of new base agreement with a U.S. bilateral defense commitment and reasonable base payments.

—could be costly, might encounter some congressional opposition, but would probably be acceptable to The Bahamas.

D. Negotiation of a comprehensive agreement including base rights and subjects such as protection of U.S. investment, freedom of navigation guarantees, law enforcement cooperation. Would provide for remuneration.

—would establish close U.S.-Bahamian ties, increase U.S. leverage in The Bahamas, but likely to increase the price demanded by Bahamas if accepted at all.

Failure to achieve agreement on any of the above might force us to consider relocation of bases on U.S. territory. This would entail: balance of payments advantages, expensive relocation costs and degradation with significant strategic implications in facilities, particularly the advanced submarine and underseas surveillance programs.

II. Relationship with a Bahamas with Limited Sovereignty

A. Independent Bahamas, with U.S. having all rights necessary to guarantee Bahamian security (similar to Canal Zone situation).

—would satisfy security requirements; likely to be costly but could minimize future Bahamian requests for economic assistance; unlikely to be acceptable to Bahamas; congressional opposition likely.

B. Association with U.S. assuming responsibility for defense and foreign affairs.

—no chance of Bahamian acceptance; costly; congressional opposition likely.

C. Association with U.S. similar to Puerto Rican Commonwealth.

—firm security arrangement but highly unlikely to be acceptable to Bahamas; congressional opposition likely.

Agency positions are as follows:

A. Timing:—State, Defense and CIA agree that we should respond to the Bahamian request and begin preliminary talks with the Bahamian Government, and the British, on the nature of our future relationship—and specifically on arrangements for continued U.S. use of our bases. In view of the early date of independence and the importance of our interests in the Bahamas, I agree.

B. Parameters:—State, Defense and CIA now agree our talks should aim at some form of agreement with a fully independent Bahamas (Options I A, B, C, and D). State and CIA favor option I A—seeking Bahamian extension of the agreements now in force (with the UK) with a reasonable payment by the U.S. for use of the bases. As a fallback State feels we should be prepared to accept variants I B or I C or, finally I D. CIA comments that these latter options would involve protracted negotiations with a new and inexperienced government and are, therefore, less desirable.

Defense favors “retention of existing rights at least expense” through acceptance of any of the variants of Option I. Presumedly Defense would prefer the most comprehensive agreement possible but at the least cost. In addition, Defense, while recognizing the impracticability of such an arrangement now, recommends leaving open the possibility of establishing some form of association should there be Bahamian overtures in that direction.

We need the President’s approval to initiate preliminary talks and to require Defense and State to develop a detailed negotiating position for his approval prior to holding formal negotiations. They need guidance for developing those positions. I recommend that we approve development of a negotiating position that would seek to extend our present arrangements for base use (Option I A), with variants I B (new agreement with a U.S. defense commitment and no base payments) or I C (new agreement with U.S. bilateral defense commitment and reasonable base payments) as fallback positions.

Should we be unable to negotiate an arrangement within these parameters I recommend that the subject be submitted for further consideration before we decide to seek a comprehensive agreement involving subjects such as U.S. investment, law enforcement cooperation and the like. It is clear that the more comprehensive any agreement with The Bahamas, the more tangible benefits The Bahamas will expect, and the more opposition we can expect in The Bahamas and in the Congress. I also recommend that we specifically rule out at this time any effort to seek some form of association involving diminished sovereignty for The Bahamas. Any such proposal would be entirely unacceptable to The Bahamas and could jeopardize chances of achieving an agreement to safeguard our immediate security interests.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

2. If he approves the recommendation, that you sign the instruction to State and Defense at Tab II.

1. Summary: With Bahamian independence approaching, this memorandum recommended that the United States seek an extension of the existing U.S.–UK base agreement while offering the Bahamian Government reasonable remuneration for use of the facilities.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files, Box H–181, NSSM Files, NSSM 117. Secret. Sent for action. In the margins, Kissinger wrote, “I approve for Pres. (There is no real choice.) Redo NSDM. Give new response [?] date of July 1.” Attached but not published is a March 16 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger outlining the Department of State’s position on The Bahamas. Tabs B, C, D, I, and II are not attached and not found. In an April 12, 1972, memorandum to Kissinger, Laird suggested “some kind of Bahamas association with the U.S.” as an alternative to full independence. (Ibid.) In an April 18, 1972, memorandum to Kissinger, Jorden called the association idea a “non-starter” but recommended that Kissinger not reject Laird’s suggestion out of hand. (Ibid.) In a March 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy and Jorden noted Richardson’s request for a Senior Review Group meeting on The Bahamas; an attached note from Scowcroft to Kennedy conveyed Kissinger’s request that the issue be resolved without the necessity of a meeting. (Ibid.)