Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

32. Telegram 120106 From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, May 28, 1975, 0052Z.

120106. For Ambassador or Chargé only. Following repeat State 120106 action Secretary 22 May. Quote. State 120106/Tosec 010230. Subject: Briefing Memorandum—OAS General Assembly Wrapup—Dialogue Restored. For the Secretary from Rogers and Mailliard

1. We had a remarkably successful OASGA. Why was it so innovative and constructive, what opportunities does it give us, and what are the restraints and debits?

2. In sum, procedural innovations, the evident willingness of the U.S. and you personally to devote attention to the Latins, a consensual approach among the Ministers, and a marked attenuation of the qte we-they unqte syndrome combined to bring about a restored dialogue and a constructive address to the issues. To this we add Lievano’s competence and helpfulness and a smidgen of luck.

3. The procedural innovations of the closed door conversations, the elimination of the windy rhetoric and its consequent political and monetary cost, the stimulus to efficiency of a shortened General Assembly, and the presence of a number of Foreign Ministers throughout provided an atmosphere for the other factors to operate relatively unhampered.

—The OAS qte private conversations unqte offer two advantages over the qte New Dialogue unqte format. The constitutional requirement for annual assemblies cannot be blocked at the whim of one or two of the member states (as was the case of the BA MFM). There is no automatic qte we-they unqte syndrome (and no Latin qte spokesman unqte), except where the nature of the issue itself (e.g. Panama and the Trade Act) produces something approaching a common position among the Latins.

—Among the Latins, the impression is that this Assembly folded the dialogue into the OAS on a de facto basis. Only an unwillingness to offend the Argentines prevented other Latins from saying so in public. We should do nothing either to encourage or discourage rescheduling a BA MFM just now, but let nature take its course.

—Even though the conversations dragged on a bit too long, we should move heaven and earth to retain this format.

—Whether OAS procedural innovations are transferable to world bodies is questionable, as a dialogue among 120-odd participants is inherently less feasible than among 24. But it might be worthwhile examining even this question.

4. A decent amount of attention at the highest levels by the U.S. to the Latins and to the claims of Latin policy will not by itself resolve the issues but it helps. The President’s reception, your active participation in the conversations and accessibility for bilaterals, the luncheon and the Sequoia restored the atmosphere of Tlatelolco which had slipped away from us as a result of the Trade Act fracas, the Quito MFM and the several postponements of your trip. This is no mean accomplishment, but it will require nurturing in the months ahead.

5. Only the Canal and the Trade Act were truly qte we-they unqte issues; the others produced complex positions and shifting coalitions. A resumé on several major issues follows:

—Panama Canal—The Latins, and the Panamanians in particular, were very satisfied with the evident will of the administration, as exemplified in your statement, the joint declaration and our approval of the resolution, to bring a Canal Treaty to a successful conclusion. But failure later, as you know, would severely damage our relations with the hemisphere.

—The Trade Act—Again, the clear demonstration by the President and you of the administration’s backing for removal of the OPEC restrictions against Venezuela and Ecuador led to passage of two resolutions which we could vote for. The process of catharsis in the Permanent Council and technical analysis in the Inter-American Economic and Social Council had cleared the way for a dispassionate address to the issue in the Assembly, suggesting that a staged approach to sticky issues may prove useful in defusing them. But even so, were it not for the private conversations and the critical intervention of Lievano to form a working group to hammer out something, as the Salvadoran Foreign Minister said openly, that the U.S. could support, we might have faced at least one resolution we could not accept. Again, we need a major effort from the administration to get the Green amendment through Congress, given the rough committee hearing on the amendment, or the Trade Act will return to haunt us.

—Chilean Human Rights—As reported earlier, this was a most important accomplishment. The outcome encouraged Chile to better performance, while reaffirming the role of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and decreasing Chile’s sense of isolation and paranoia. Mexico tacitly acquiesced without making a major fuss, in part because they knew Chile would respond in kind with accusations against the Mexican leadership.

—Cuba—We went up and down the hill several times with Rabasa on his Cuba resolution, even producing a joint Mexico/Brazil/U.S. draft of a statement for possible use by the Chairman in lieu of a resolution stating that qte a significant majority unqte favored, once a protocol of amendment was approved at San Jose, freeing nations to renew relations. But Rabasa, probably after conversations with Mexico City, in the end pushed his resolution to a vote for domestic political purposes. Our abstention, explained in terms of the legal absurdity of the resolution, produced no criticism, largely because key countries expect us to cooperate in removing the sanctions at San Jose and because of the public impression that we will do so.

—OAS Reform—In working group Uruguay, Mexico, Costa Rica and the U.S. devised a sensible calendar for dealing with the major OAS reform issues, beginning with a late July Rio Treaty Conference in San Jose.

—In late summer or early fall, the Permanent Council will begin preparing final recommendations for OAS Charter and structural reform and then move to the tougher North/South issues of cooperation for development and collective economic security. The crunch on these third world issues will probably come toward the end of the year, Peru having quickly ceded on any aspirations to do something now about collective economic security. By then, as I have said, we will have floated some significant U.S. proposals.

—The end is to be a special General Assembly early in 1976 or perhaps concurrently with the annual General Assembly later in the spring to act on the Council’s recommendations. We prefer and rather expect the reform assembly to take place in Latin America.

—OAS Secretary General—By far the better man won and our vote was important. There are costs—not so much in the Dominican Foreign Minister’s unhappiness—but in Brazil’s pique. At the same time, Brazil pushed a candidate whom most, including the GOB, realized was unqualified. Its adamant opposition to Argentina has gained for Brazil criticism of the sort which is often our lot. We see no indication it will affect our bilateral relations and Silveira has as yet sent no personal signal to you or to me. Brazil is telling everyone it will take an extremely low profile in the OAS from now on, although it is hard to see how it could get much lower.

6. Venezuela took a constructive attitude throughout; only Ecuador pushed hard for a stronger Trade Act resolution. Uruguay’s Blanco displayed his usual common sense. We and the Panamanians cooperated on a number of non-Canal matters, and the U.S. received kudos for pitching in to help make this Assembly a success. Peru, after its signal failure to impose a qte we-they unqte format for the conversations, behaved in a cooperative fashion and we had useful exploratory talks on collective economic security with them.

7. In sum, this meeting did narrow the gap, however temporarily, between rhetoric and performance on both sides. For the U.S., opportunities flow from restored dialogue and the spirit of consensus which imbued this meeting, a spirit that can be used in the months ahead on the more intractable Third World issues which were deferred rather than resolved. The Latins, from their several perspectives, will also be assessing this meeting and their reaction will be helpful in judging how deeply the realism displayed here has taken root. At the same time, if we cannot follow through on Panama, the Trade Act and Cuba, we could be back where we were before, and even much worse. Ingersoll.

Unquote.

1. Summary: The Department assessed the OAS General Assembly session in Washington, concluding that the meeting had been “remarkably successful” in reestablishing a productive dialogue between the United States and Latin America.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750185–0917. Confidential; Exdis; Ambassador or Chargé only. Repeated to USCINCSO. Drafted by Noonan, cleared by Ford, and approved by Ryan. Sent to Kissinger in Ankara as telegram 120106/Tosec 10230 on May 22.