Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

31. Briefing Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (Mailliard) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, April 29, 1975.

Scope Paper—OAS General Assembly

May 8–19, 1975

The Setting

The OAS General Assembly, by a process of elimination, has become the first opportunity in 13 months for substantive interaction with your Latin colleagues. And it becomes a good opportunity to renew the Spirit of Tlatelolco without waiting upon the uncertainties of rescheduling the BA MFM.

A Different—Hopefully Better—OASGA

This will not be the same OASGA through which you suffered at Atlanta. The frankness and informality of the “new dialogue” MFMs have commended themselves to most. We have tentative agreement to adapt some of the procedures of the new dialogue to the OASGA, making it a potentially useful device for a constructive address by the Ministers to hemispheric problems.

—Elimination of the “General Debate,” where Foreign Ministers listened to each other posture for home consumption in lengthy public speeches. (At all events, we shall hear some rhetoric; it would take the optimism of King Canute to think we could end it entirely.)

—Two days of private “conversations”—perhaps more if you and your colleagues deem it necessary—somewhat in the style of Tlatelolco behind closed doors and with no verbatim record.

—A public formalization of any agreements reached in private.

—Shortening of the Assembly’s period by four days to end on May 19, barring complications.

If this experiment prospers, we expect agreement to institutionalize the private sessions at future OASGAs, thereby folding the most useful aspects of the “new dialogue” into the OAS.

The Issues

The General Assembly faces the usual lengthy agenda. There are 37 items. Most do not require Ministerial attention. We have initiated consultations looking toward a measure of advance agreement on structuring the informal agenda for the private “conversations.”

Cuba and Panama, not on the formal agenda, will almost certainly be discussed.

—Of the agenda items, five probably command Ministerial attention, the most important being the broad-gauge item on Reform of the Inter-American System. The Trade Act, the Uruguayan item on Commodity Prices (including oil), Chilean Human Rights and the Election of the OAS Secretary General comprise the other major items.

The Historical Moment

Probably the Latins have been the least shaken by Vietnam. In the first place, they never understood why we paid so much attention to Southeast Asia and so little to our neighbors. And the Latins, part of the West as well as the Third World, aim largely at redistributive politics rather than the destruction of our world position. Aside from Cuba (“ideological pluralism” writ small) the main Latin concerns are economic. The OASGA provides a hemispheric prism on global issues subsumed under the catch phrase, “the New International Economic Order.”

Ambivalence probably marks Latin reaction to Vietnam. They hope we will now pay decent attention to them. They fear that our attentions will repeat historical interventionist patterns. At the same time, some will fear that the Soviets may perceive weakness in the U.S., prompting Soviet efforts to expand their influence.

For the U.S., the Assembly poses risk and opportunity. A successful General Assembly, beyond its effects on the Latin relationship, will provide a tangible demonstration that the U.S. is alive and well on the international scene. A failure may be perceived as evidence we have been shaken by events in Vietnam to the point where our general policy has lost coherence.

The Gap Between Rhetoric and Performance

From Tlatelolco onward U.S. rhetoric has outpaced U.S. performance. Many of the issues that give us the most trouble with the Latins are “North/South” issues, such as expropriations questions, LOS related matters, “collective economic security” and “cooperation for development.” U.S. rhetoric has articulated a special importance for Latin America. Yet the new dialogue has not moved the USG to change on major issues of Latin concern (e.g. the IDB veto). Largely this is because we have found it necessary to deal with these rather intractable North/South issues in the global framework.

A Strategy for the OASGA

Nonetheless, within current policy restraints on Third World issues, we think it possible to devise a strategy that could renew some of the Spirit of Tlatelolco and make progress in certain specific areas.

The strategy is to narrow the gap between performance and rhetoric by improving performance on matters of concern to the Latins while cooling the rhetoric. (Your Houston speech set a better tone in this respect)

—Thus, no new initiatives on issues unrelated to the central concerns of the OASGA.

—Instead, progress on non-Third World issues now.

A. Cuba—An accommodation, along generally acceptable lines, that will end the divisive issue of OAS sanctions and remove it from the Inter-American agenda, while leaving us free to handle bilateral questions with Cuba as we choose.

B. Panama—We expect a spokesman from those nations at the Presidential meeting in Panama—Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela—will raise the issue in the style of Tlatelolco and Washington. We propose you reaffirm our intention to conclude a Canal Treaty as soon as possible and indicate we are serious about making a determined effort with Congress and the American people.

On certain other hemispheric issues we propose a discreet but constructive approach.

A. Chile and Human Rights—Uphold the autonomy and role of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission while couching our remarks in a way that encourages Chile toward better performance in this area rather than creating further paranoia.

B. OAS Secretary General—Maintain a constructive neutrality looking toward a measure of consensus on a candidate who will be generally acceptable in the hemisphere.

On Third World related issues:

A. The Trade Act—Demonstration of continued progress toward the goal of congressional amendment of the OPEC restriction.

B. The Effect of Commodity Pricing on Development—Steer a middle course between the extremes of offending Venezuela or ignoring the real effect of petroleum prices on development.

On Reform of the Inter-American System. This is the principal item on the OASGA agenda and the code phrase for the over-arching question of how to structure the Inter-American relationship. It encompasses both traditional political issues and Third World issues.

Structural and procedural aspects, though important, are secondary. The report of the OAS Special Committee provides the vehicle for discussion. The principal issues are:

—Rio Treaty Reform

— OAS Charter Reform, particularly the “Principles,” including such sticky ones as “sovereignty over natural resources.”

—Collective Economic Security, where we are in a lonely, but eminently correct, position.

—The Development Council and related institutional reforms.

—The Site of the OAS

The Structure of Your Participation

We have keyed our recommendations for your participation to the private “dialogue/conversations” sessions. We hope you and your colleagues can reach agreement behind the scenes on how to handle the major issues, leaving the details and the remainder of the agenda for the deputies.

We envisage in the style of Tlatelolco, that your initial remarks on the broad gauge issue of the Inter-American relationship would take about 10 minutes. These talking points would encompass general views plus specific suggestions on wrapping up the Rio Treaty, the proposal for a single Development Council, and our willingness—if others wish—to see the OAS move to LA. They would also contain a demurral on the draft convention on collective economic security.

Talking points for other principal issues, such as Cuba and the Trade Act, would be brief. Brief contingency talking points on such matters as the Houston Agricultural Initiative, the IDB veto, and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties are also in preparation.

1. Summary: Mailliard briefed Kissinger on the issues likely to arise at the May 8–19 OAS General Assembly session in Washington and proposed a U.S. strategy for the meeting.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Lot 78D217, Briefing Memoranda, 1975. Confidential. Drafted by McNeil on April 28. Sent through Rogers.