200. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee1 2
SUBJECT:
- Feasibility of Covert Operations Against Cuba
1. This memorandum describes the history of CIA-sponsored covert operations against Cuba since the Bay of Pigs, gives a brief description of our current operations, and comments on the feasibility of additional operations including an assessment of Cuban exiles and their operational utility.
2. Background.
a. Operational Experience. The Agency began its own infiltration missions into Cuba after the Bay of Pigs in an attempt to contact and sustain resistance groups identified by exiles. [text not declassified] were used by agents until tightening internal security demanded sophisticated equipment and support programs. These were acquired and used under various covers [Page 2] during 1963 for intelligence and sabotage missions during the last half of 1963. [text not declassified]
Operations after 1963 were in support of intelligence collection (infiltration and exfilitration of agents) and were successful for some time. A 303-approved operation to support the autonomous activities of Manuel ARTIME, a young military activist, was conducted from June 1963 until June 1965; this involved an expense of about [text not declassified] and a force of four hundred exiles trained in Central America. [text not declassified]
Another CIA-supported autonomous operation, designed to infiltrate a charismatic anti-Castro resistance leader, failed in 1963–1964 after an investment of [text not declassified] Economic warfare operations, principally the introduction of subtly sabotaged goods [Page 3] into Cuban trade channels, were conducted from 1964 to 1966. Exile-oriented broadcasts from Swan Island were beamed to the Cuban population until May of 1968.
A program to provide, false information to the Cuban Government begun in 1963 continues today. [text not declassified] Maritime infiltration continued through 1967 but were exclusively for intelligence collection operations.
b. Accomplishments. More than four hundred maritime infiltration operations were successfully executed during the 1961–1967 period. While only a few were sabotage missions, an objective review indicates that the successes were outweighed by the negative reaction. It can be argued that the raids consolidated internal support of Fidel Castro to a degree [Page 4] far surpassing the damage done to the Cuban physical plant. The internal resistance groups claimed by exiles were in fact chimerical. The occasional destruction of a sugar mill or damaging of a patrol craft was counterbalanced by an increase in international sympathy for the Cuban regime. In any event, these operations were discontinued in December of 1963 and support to the autonomous Artime operation was terminated in June 1965.
Maritime infiltrations limited to intelligence collection were very successful through 1965, but began to produce less in 1966 due to increased internal vigilance, and were discontinued in December 1967 with the approval of the 303 Committee. This action by the 303 Committee authorized retention of an emergency maritime exfiltration capability. The economic sabotage program had limited success and was discontinued in late 1966; the Swan Island radio was closed in May of 1968; the false information program prospered.
[Page 5]3. Current Situation Inside Cuba. After a decade of existence there are no visible cracks in the Cuban power structure, and Cuban internal security is almost hermetic. Fidel Castro has destroyed the upper class; the middle class is apathetic, its will to resist vitiated by the emotional escape valve of the daily exodus of refugees; a large percentage of the lower classes, many of whom have benefited substantially from the Cuban revolution, support Castro and the lesser percentage who oppose him are not capable of an organized opposition. Some of the latter, in fact, might rally to his defense in the face of an external threat.
Soviet advisors have assisted the external security service to achieve an unexpected degree of sophistication. The internal security service is a monolith of efficient repression, literally operating on a block-by-block system of informants. Cuban and Soviet communications networks are good. Military hardware, supplied by the Soviets, includes radar, aircraft and [Page 6] swift patrol vessels. This equipment and its trained personnel in conjunction with solid support from the regime in key power groups—military, youth and peasants—makes Cuba an extremely formidable target for externally-directed paramilitary operations.
4. Current Operations Against Cuba. Despite the definition of Cuba as a denied are from the operational viewpoint, the totality of intelligence and counter-intelligence data on Cuba is considerable. The stream of refugees [text not declassified] provides plentiful and current basic information. On-island agents report by [ text not declassified] regularly [text not declassified] has been providing reliable information on Cuban international affairs for several years. [text not declassified] has updated information on Cuban-Soviet relations, Cuban policy for the export of the revolution, and the support apparatus in Europe which handles the travel of Latin American subversives.
[Page 7][text not declassified] Information on Cuban subversive activities in Latin America and Africa is provided by a large number of CIA penetrations of national Communist parties. These sources of information are complemented by extensive [text not declassified] and overflight photography. Psychological operations against Cuba presently include a developmental radio project, a Latin American news feature service, singleton propaganda agents, and the continuing false information program referred to previously.
5. Feasibility of Additional Operations. Although the United States could theoretically seek Castro’s fall by organizing a popular uprising, or by supporting an exile invasion, the magnitude of the support required to achieve the objective would make it impossible to conduct such operations covertly.
a. Harassment. If judge politically useful, experience has indicated that it is possible to mount a series of reasonably covert and inexpensive [Page 8] harassment operations against coastal targets designed to cause wasteful military and militia alerts, possibly some confusion as to United States intentions and, especially, diversion of labor from sugar harvesting. A variety of low-budget techniques can be used for this purpose, including false radio messages, deceptive radar emanations and stimulation of rumors. These psychological gambits would be exploited by occasional maritime incursions for the purpose of [text not declassified] and other such provocations, but this would require a modest expansion of present equipment and personnel. The feasibility of the idea is based on the fact that a steadily deteriorating economic situation is Castro’s greatest problem, and he has emotionally pledged the honor of the Cuban revolution on the reiterated but dubious promise of a 1970 sugar crop of ten million pounds.
b. The Exile Potential. There are now over four hundred thousand Cuban exiles in the U.S. [Page 9] Exile groups—a large number of them—are anxious to find a patron for anti-Castro operations ranging from propaganda broadcasting to armed invasion. Unfortunately these groups have suffered from the same decline in operational effectiveness which typically affects exile movements with the passage of time. The advantage in their use is the cover provided by ostensible autonomous organizations. This can be achieved by the clandestine funding of a single leader who obtains his own support and action apparent.
Poor security is characteristic of Cuban exiles. The risk in their use, from the security standpoint, lies somewhere between extremely high and unacceptable. In addition, a serious political disadvantage is the dogmatic and adamant belief of large numbers of the Cuban populace that any exile success against the Cuban regime would automatically lead to a turning back of the revolutionary clock to a Batista-style dictatorship.
Perhaps the most responsible of the exile groups is the Executive Council of Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) in Miami, [text not declassified]
[Page 10]d. International Reactions. While these reactions are not completely predictable, the weight of present evidence indicates that most Latin American nations would be reluctant to condone paramilitary actions, against Cuba. Many Latin American countries, since the failure of Che Guevara in Bolivia, consider the Cuban threat lessened.
European nations refuse to be associated even with economic pressures against Cuba. It is quite possible that other nations would react unfavorably to an action program designed to inhibit the internal economic development of Cuba, particularly since the United States has publicly stated that its cardinal concerns are the Soviet military presence in Cuba and Cuba’s export of the revolution.
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba 69–70–71. Secret; Eyes Only. In an April 28 covering memorandum to Johnson, Meyer indicated that ARA and INR found the main thrust of the memorandum acceptable. Meyer recommended that Johnson endorse it. During a weekly meeting with the Department of State, April 25, CIA indicated that “Kissinger had asked the Director to study the feasibility of stepping up action programs against Cuba, with the emphasis on the covert actions, and also to discuss the use of Cuban exiles.” (Ibid., Latin America General, 1969–1970)↩
- The memorandum discussed the feasibility of covert operations against Cuba, including historical background, an overview of current operations, and a discussion of additional options for covert actions↩