199. Memorandum of Conversation1 2
SUBJECT:
- CUBA: Swiss Follow-up on Indications from Castro of Desire for Dialogue with U.S.
PARTICIPANTS:
-
Foreign:
- Felix Schnyder, Swiss Ambassador to the U.S.
- Ernest Andres, First Secretary, Swiss Embassy
-
United States:
- Under Secretary Johnson
- Viron P. Vaky, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
- Wells Stabler, Country Director, EUR/AIS
- John F. Fitzgerald, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, ARA/CCA
Ambassador Schnyder said his visit was a follow-up to the report made by Swiss Ambassador to Cuba Fischli on March 10 and 11 to the Under Secretary and Secretary respectively.
Since his return to Cuba Ambassador Fischli has been asked about the U.S. reaction to the Cuban initiative by Foreign Minister Roa and Ambassadors Neira and Melendez of the Foreign Ministry as well as by President Dorticós. Fischli told them that U.S. officials found his report interesting but that obviously a little time would be needed for the U.S. reaction. Referring to Castro’s remarks on February 1 that he hoped the U.S. could in some way discourage escapes through the Guantanamo Naval Base, Fischli reports that the Cubans have not yet made any suggestion as to how they hoped this might be accomplished. Dorticós mentioned the reduction in frequency of hijackings of U.S. planes in the last few months and thought that this was due at least in part to Cuban attitudes or actions. Dorticós drew an analogy between the U.S. problem on hijacking and the Cuban problem of escapes via Guantanamo; he implied that the GOC did not envisage any formal arrangement on either of these problems but that something might be done through informal measures.
[Page 2]Ambassador Fischli reports that in his contacts the Cubans have made no reference to the recently publicized U.S. denial of re-entry permits to certain Cuban diplomats at the UN. Fischli said that Dorticós “seemed pleased” by the way he (Fischli) had handled the matter of the Cuban initiative and Schnyder inferred that the GOC considered the Swiss a desirable channel through which to establish a dialogue. Schnyder said Fischli has the impression the Cubans will be unable to consider going so far as to return hijackers to the U.S. but that if the attitude is responsive on escapes via Guantanamo the GOC might go farther in taking its own action against hijackers. There followed some discussion of whether the Cubans were in fact ruling out any return of hijackers or would condition any such move on the U.S. practice with regard to Guantanamo. Schnyder agreed this point might be unclear; he would ask Fischli for his interpretation of the conversation without going back to the Cubans. It was also agreed that Fischli might explore on his own what the Cubans might have in mind that we should do to discourage escapes through the Naval Base, bearing in mind that Castro had said he did not want to build a “Berlin wall” around the base and did not expect that we would either. He would not, however, inquire on our behalf or make it appear to be a U.S. inquiry.
There then followed a brief discussion of ways the GOC could ease some of our current problems. Schnyder said Fischli had suggested to Dorticós the release of U.S. political prisoners in Cuba, of whom there are about 20, perhaps a few at a time. Dorticós said he would study the matter Schnyder pointed out that without waiting to be asked to do so, the GOC had just granted the Swiss Embassy permission to visit these prisoners. There was also some discussion of our problem of repatriating U.S. citizens and their alien family members at a faster rate than at present through the one flight a month chartered by the Mexican Government. Ambassador Schnyder said that Ambassador Fischli had suggested to Dorticós the possibility of using a larger plane, and Dorticós took note of this without commenting. Messrs. Vaky and Fitzgerald then suggested that another alternative would be to increase the frequency of repatriation flights. Ambassador Schnyder then recommended that through our Embassy in Mexico City we ask the Mexicans to make an approach to the GOC paralleling the Swiss efforts.
Ambassador Schnyder said he would like to ask two questions on matters recently discussed in the newspapers: a report that OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza had urged Cuba to take the initiative in returning to the OAS and the article by John Plank in the New York Times wherein he seemed to advocate a revised U.S. and OAS [Page 3] attitude toward Cuba. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that Galo Plaza had been misquoted and that what he had said was that since Cuba had been suspended from participation in the OAS by the OAS Foreign Ministers for certain reasons, only a decision by the same instrumentality could bring Cuba back. As to the Plank article, it was pointed out that although Plank used to be a Department of State official he has left government service and was expressing his personal views.
Finally, Under Secretary Johnson said that he was glad Ambassador Schnyder had called on him as he was about to convey the following tentative reply to the message brought by Ambassador Fischli:
The Under Secretary handed Ambassador Schnyder a copy of the above on plain paper and the Ambassador said he would transmit it to Ambassador Fischli. The Under Secretary said that if and when Ambassador Fischli had any further report to make to us on the subject, he might want to consider coming to Washington or to Miami to discuss the matter in person. If he preferred Miami, we would send someone down there to meet with him.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Johnson’s office. Drafted by Fitzgerald. On April 16, Nachmanoff forwarded a copy of the memorandum of conversation to Kissinger, who signed an April 18 memorandum to the President summarizing it. (Ibid.)↩
- In a meeting with Under Secretary Johnson, Swiss Ambassador Felix Schnyder reported on Ambassador Fischli’s discussions with Cuban officials, particularly concerning hijacking. According to Schnyder, the Cuban Government had indicated that the problem might be dealt with through informal measures, as opposed to a formal agreement.↩