Bolivia
106. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Bolivia (Siracusa) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer)
Fearing the repercussions if U.S. covert assistance to President Torres’s opponents was revealed, Ambassador Siracusa argued against such assistance. Instead, he thought overt U.S. Government military and economic assistance would maintain U.S. influence with Torres.
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 19, Bolivia, 1973–1980. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Siracusa sent a letter with a similar argument to Meyer on July 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, POL 23–9 BOL)
107. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Nachmanoff informed Kissinger that certain U.S. actions in La Paz could be interpreted there as U.S. support for a coup. On August 21, General Hugo Bánzer Suárez overthrew President Torres.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information; Outside the System. Kissinger wrote on the first page of the memorandum: “Let’s just relax and see what happens. HK.” Attached was a transmittal indicating that the memorandum was sent to Kissinger, who was in San Clemente. Although Nachmanoff said Flannery acted prematurely in passing funds to the opposition, Helms told Kissinger on August 24 the 40 Committee had ordered the passing of the funds. See Document 108.
108. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, DCI Helms, Job 80–B01285A, Box 13, Folder 8, DCI HELMS, 1 July–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
109. Telegram 265 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Ambassador Siracusa concluded that compared to a year before, Bolivia was more politically stable and economically vibrant. However, budget woes and the threat of terrorism by guerrillas clouded the current situation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 BOL. Confidential. Repeated to Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Asunción, Santiago, and USCINCSO.
110. Memorandum From Ashley Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Hewitt summarized a study of the situation in Bolivia to ensure that the United States was doing all it could to support new President Hugo Bánzer Suárez.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, NSDM Files, NSDM 160. Secret. Sent for action. Kennedy and Hormats concurred. Kissinger wrote “see notes, see me” on the first page. In the margin of the “Issues and Recommendations” section, Kissinger wrote, “Why are we always so tough with friends?” Next to the paragraph that begins, “The study recommends,” Kissinger wrote, “Within limits.” Attached but not published at Tab A is a proposed version of National Security Decision Memorandum 160 (Document 111) and at Tab B is the February 14 paper, “The Situation and Outlook in Bolivia.”
111. National Security Decision Memorandum 160
President Nixon approved $20 million of U.S. AID funds for additional economic assistance for Bolivia without its acceptance of an IMF standby agreement. He also approved the 3- to 4-year MAP.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, NSDM Files, NSDM 160. A copy was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury. The recommendations of the Bolivian request for modern military aircraft are in Tab B of Document 112. The progress report has not been found.
112. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
In order to prevent over-burdening the Government of Bolivia’s finances, and to stay within congressional ceilings, Jorden recommended selling Bolivia three A–37Bs in the current fiscal year, three more the next fiscal year, and defer action on the more expensive C–130s.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. Kennedy cleared in a draft. Attached but not published at Tab A is Kissinger’s signed April 20 memorandum to the Departments of State and Defense and at Tab B is an April 6 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. Tab C is Document 111. The interagency report submitted in February is Tab B of Document 110.
113. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)
Jorden argued that financial support for President Bánzer was important, but feared that direct financial support for the Government of Bolivia might get lost in the bureaucracy, and would not be immediately channeled into productive enterprises. Jorden informed Haig that he would ask National Security Council staff member Hewitt to come up with options for financial help for Bolivia if the U.S. Government decided to increase its assistance to the nation.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information; Outside the System. Haig wrote on the bottom of the memorandum, “Let’s get into regular channels—too much for black bag—see Kennedy and CIA Staff Liaison [illegible] Ratliff to see how we can move it.” Attached but not published at Tab A is a May 19 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger. On May 31, Haig informed Helms that Bánzer needed to make his request for assistance to the Embassy. (Ibid.)
114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
President Nixon agreed with Secretary of the Treasury Connally that Bolivia should receive a $20 million loan before the end of FY 1972 without the stipulation of devaluation.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. II, 1970–1974. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. In a June 14 covering memorandum, Jorden and Kennedy recommended Kissinger send the memorandum to the President. The President underlined the last paragraph of the memorandum, and wrote at the bottom “Haig—Cable Connally from RN—my decision—plus send him the underlined portion as the summary of the reaction we have had from our embassies and other sources—to date.” Haig wrote “done” and initialed next to Nixon’s note. Nixon wrote “OK” next to Haig’s initials. The cable to Connally is ibid.
115. Telegram 6896 from the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Ambassador Siracusa informed U.S. Government officials that President Bánzer desired to meet President Nixon in Washington. Siracusa discussed how Bánzer’s government was much more pro-United States than the Torres government and that Bánzer would gain considerable domestic public support from a visit with the President.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 BOL. Secret; Nodis. Although Bánzer was scheduled to visit Washington on October 16, 1973, he postponed the visit. On October 2, Bánzer informed the U.S. Ambassador that he could not leave the country during the announcement of controversial economic reforms because there might be significant unrest. The visit was never rescheduled. For documentation on Bánzer’s planned visit to the United States, see ibid., Box 911, VIP Visits, Bolivia President Bánzer Visit 10/31/73.