115. Telegram 6896 from the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State1 2
Department pass White House
Subject:
- President Banzer Hopes to Visit President Nixon
1. At the end of my visit with President Banzer this morning, on the eve of my departure for consultation in Washington, he said he wished to raise a matter of great personal and official interest and importance to him. This was, he said, his deep desire to visit President Nixon in Washington. He said this was not only his personal desire, because of his admiration and respect for the President, but that it also reflected the recommendation of his closest counselors, including former President Victor Paz Estenssoro.
2. I told the President that nothing could give me greater pleasure than to see him invited to the US. I also told him that it should be clear, as we have demonstrated more than once, that the US supports his efforts in Bolivia and hopes that he will be able to lead Bolivia into a long period of peace, stability and progress, which will bring broad benefits to the Bolivian people. As for a possible invitation to Washington, I said that I could express no opinion because the whole program of official visits is a matter of great difficulty and delicacy due to the pressure of time on our President and the relatively small number of such visits which can be accommodated in any year. Nevertheless, I assured him that I would report his desire together with my personal recommendation in favor of such a visit.
3. Recommendation: As I had in any case intended while in Washington to recommend a state visit for President Banzer, I believe it appropriate here to outline some support for such a visit in view of the President’s overture:
[Page 2]A) It would be a dramatic, personal and prompt means for President Nixon, early in his second administration, to demonstrate his declared intention to emphasis interest in Latin America;
B) President Banzer is an attractive and sympathetic leader. Both he and his wife speak some English and they conduct themselves with dignity at public appearances;
C) While Banzer is a de facto President, his government, contrary to extremist accusations, is not a military dictatorship. All but four of the 19 Cabinet seats are held by civilians. In fact, since his government combines the two major political parties which are the only ones of any importance in Bolivia, the MNR and FSB, plus the private sector and the military institution, and since it has campesino support as well, it is actually the broadest-based government in recent Bolivian history;
D) Banzer’s victory over the increasingly extremist Torres regime last year was important as it represented a distinct power shift in favor of US interests in this region. It was also widely interpreted as a victory over communism and over the strong possibility that Bolivia continuing under Torres, would fall under communist domination;
E) Banzer and his civilian-military coalition government provide the best available alternative for developing in Bolivia the stable and reliable political system which is indispensable if this country is to achieve the economic development from which real social progress can grow;
F) President Banzer’s approach to me reinforces our own estimate that he would derive great domestic political benefit from such a visit. It would increase his prestige in all sectors, including the political parties, except for the extreme left, and it might also help to dampen the ambitions of officers who might be dreaming of replacing him;
G) The Banzer government is an outspoken supporter of the US in the international scene. It has supported our policy on Cuba and has co-sponsored measures of interest to the US in the UN, generally being of assistance to UN when requested:
[Page 3]H) The Banzer government is giving wholehearted support and cooperation to us on the war on narcotics;
I) A visit by President Banzer would be logical in view of the strong material support we have provided Bolivia since the successful revolution last year;
J) While it is true that pursuing its own view of necessary security, the Banzer government has taken many political prisoners, it has let most of them go after investigation, except for those who is has considered to be truly dangerous extremists. While its performance has at times seemed to be inept due more we believe to poor intelligence and a feeling of insecurity than of intent, it has attempted to pacify the country and to restrict such activities to what it believes to be the bare minimum consistent with its security; and
[Page 4]K) The Banzer government, which intends next monday to sign documents settling the Mina Matilde nationalization, has, in contrast to neighboring countries, fully lived up to its obligations under international law in providing just compensation for expropriated American assets. Since Banzer came to power final solution with compensation has given to the Gulf Oil Corp. case, the IMPC case, the bi-natical center, and expected next monday the Mina Matilde case. This record merits recognition.
L) President Banzer is a courageous leader, who has shown himself willing to make tough decisions, such as the recent devaluation.
4. Action requested: Since the President has now broached the subject of a visit to me, I would hope to be in a position when I return to Bolivia to give him an answer.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 BOL. Secret; Nodis. Although Bánzer was scheduled to visit Washington on October 16, 1973, he postponed the visit. On October 2, Bánzer informed the U.S. Ambassador that he could not leave the country during the announcement of controversial economic reforms because there might be significant unrest. The visit was never rescheduled. For documentation on Bánzer’s planned visit to the United States, see ibid., Box 911, VIP Visits, Bolivia President Bánzer Visit 10/31/73.↩
- Ambassador Siracusa informed U.S. Government officials that President Bánzer desired to meet President Nixon in Washington. Siracusa discussed how Bánzer’s government was much more pro-United States than the Torres government and that Bánzer would gain considerable domestic public support from a visit with the President.↩