224. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State1
SAUDI ARABIA-PDRY RAPPROCHEMENT
Saudi Arabia and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, in a joint statement on March 10, announced agreement to “normalize” relations. The brief communiqué accompanying the announcement declared that the two countries would refrain from intervening in one another’s internal affairs and called for an end to “foreign interference” in the Arabian Peninsula.
Under secret conditions of the PDRY-Saudi agreement, PDRY will:
—reduce PDRY forces in the Sixth Governorate (see map) and halt all artillery bombardment of Dhufar;
—move all Dhufari rebels away from the Oman-PDRY border and begin to limit gradually their use of PDRY bases; and
—begin to scale down propaganda attacks against its neighbors.
In return, Saudi Arabia has offered to give PDRY financial assistance geared to the pace of PDRY’s fulfillment of its commitments. In addition, the Saudis appear to have told Aden that the Omanis will stop reconnaissance flights over PDRY and eventually will ask for the withdrawal of Iranian troops from Dhufar.
The Egyptian Overture. For nearly two years, the Egyptians have been pressing both parties to end their hostility. Secret negotiations between the two feuding states began in Cairo in May 1975 and have continued intermittently over the past nine months. Besides demon [Page 706] strating that Egypt could assist its benefactor, Saudi Arabia, Egyptian efforts were designed to:
[Omitted here is a map of the southern Arabian Peninsula.]
—moderate PDRY’s radical policies and reduce PDRY’s export of revolution to conservative Arab states;
—end PDRY’s support for the Dhufar rebellion in neighboring Oman;
—strengthen President Ali against more ideologically committed leftists in the PDRY Government; and
—reduce Soviet influence. The Egyptians are concerned over growing Soviet dominance in the Horn of Africa and neighboring regions.
The Saudi Response. While Riyadh has now taken the lead from the Egyptians, the Saudi Royal Family is not united in its approach. Prince Fahd leads those Saudis who believe that the current PDRY leadership can be won over with Saudi goodwill and financial assistance. At the very least, they assert that the prospect of eliminating PDRY subversion merits the limited risks. With King Khalid’s concurrence, this faction has won out.
Other important Saudis, however, regard the current Marxist regime in Aden as hopelessly hostile. Prince Sultan, a dominant force in Saudi-Yemeni relations, has opposed any approach to PDRY on the grounds that the Aden regime is on the point of collapse because of its own economic and political ineptitude. Hence, a Saudi hand in friendship will only keep in power an essentially dangerous regime that will never moderate its radical views. Sultan and his colleagues argue, therefore, that confrontation is the only sensible policy toward Communist PDRY.
PDRY’s Attitude. Leaders in Aden have also been divided on the question of moderating policies and improving relations with Saudi Arabia. To many, including National Front Secretary General Isma’il, Saudi Arabia remains the core of reactionary forces in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1969, PDRY’s revolutionary zeal led to a border conflict with the Saudis, who continue to maintain a PDRY exile army on Aden’s northern border. Under such circumstances, the PDRY hardliners have opposed any rapprochement with the Saudis.
President Ali, who is the leading “moderate” on the issue, has overcome opposition and convinced a majority of the government that the survival of the regime depends upon accommodation with the Saudis. President Ali asserts that:
—without improved relations, Saudi influence and money might eventually succeed in overthrowing the PDRY Government;
—PDRY’s diplomatic isolation prevents Aden from receiving needed economic aid from the oil-producing Arab states;
—only Saudi economic assistance can breathe new life into PDRY’s stagnant economy.
Serious Problems Remain. Although the March 10 announcement was a significant first step toward the “normalization” of relations, difficult problems remain. It will not be easy to overcome deeply ingrained mutual suspicions. Moreover, it is possible that hardliners, especially in PDRY, could gain the upper hand and cancel further negotiations. Isma’il has used his position to put his supporters in important positions throughout the PDRY power structure. They can be counted on to fight a continuing rearguard action.
The greatest problem, however, is that each state has implicitly committed others whom they do not control. Although the Adenis have ended support for the Omani rebels, controlling them will be more difficult. Furthermore, the rebels’ international supporters may not be prepared to see all raids into Oman stopped. Convincing the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Libya that the Adenis are not selling out the rebels for Saudi money will be difficult. Similarly, any attempt by PDRY to reduce Soviet or other Communist presence will be met with stiff resistence.
The Saudis were even more generous than the Adenis in speaking for others. The Saudis committed the Sultan of Oman to curtail further reconnaissance flights over PDRY’s Sixth Governorate in exchange for the end of PDRY shelling of Omani territory. In addition, the Saudis implicitly agreed to the eventual withdrawal of Iranian soldiers from Oman. Neither the Omanis nor the Iranians have made any such commitments.
In the past, Sultan Qabus has complained of not having been consulted by the Saudis. Aware of Omani concerns, Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, visited Muscat to brief the Sultan on the Saudi-PDRY agreement. Qabus is unlikely to be pleased with the meager results, but he will not oppose the agreement. PDRY, however, will have to make serious efforts to reduce the Soviet and Cuban presence and to moderate its policies before the Omanis will ask the Shah to withdraw his troops.
Prospects. Saudi-PDRY rapprochement, when and if achieved, will end the last major rivalry on the Arabian Peninsula. Much remains to be accomplished, however. Serious local issues, such as the disposition of Yemeni exile armies, have yet to be addressed. If rapprochement is to evolve out of the initial efforts, PDRY must change its political orientation. Even if the current leaders in Aden are willing to make this change, the process will be slow. The result, however, would be to expand Saudi influence at the expense of the Soviets and the radical Arab regimes now supporting PDRY.
Summary: The report discussed the significance of the March 10, 1976, joint announcement by Saudi and PDRY officials of the “normalization” of mutual relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 78F118, POL 15, Government (Saudi Arabia), Classified. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by M. Graeme Bannerman (INR/DDR/RNA/NE); approved by Special Assistant George S. Harris (INR/DDR/RNA).
↩