223. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the Department of State1
540. Subject: YAR Arms. Ref: Sana 477.
Summary: Asnaj provides more background on YARG attitudes re arms.
1. In conversation on February 12 with YARG FonMin Abdallah al-Asnaj Chargé went over, in general way as in reftel, present stage of arms efforts by USG for YARG. Provided no details, but said I pleased we getting into details of purchases and training. Said Saudi plan was impressive evidence Saudi military professionalism and good will toward YARG.
2. Asnaj said this was good news, which paralleled news from Saudis. He said he was very pleased. He said he had heard Saudis were expediting residence of military mission here. He said Saudi policy had undergone dramatic change, from “search for weak and divided Yemen” to “support for strong and friendly government in Sanaa”. Yemenis expected no less, but were grateful and pleased. They would reciprocate.
3. Then, Asnaj said he wanted to warn USG about possibility of “setbacks”.
4. He said that Yemeni had been in present stage of discussions re arms from Saudis at least twice before, and would have “doubts about anything materializing” until new shipments began actually to arrive. Saudis, he said, moved slowly. Asnaj pointed to modern 105 mm Howitizers which now Saudis have shipped him. Asnaj nodded and said they came without ammo.
5. He also said that Hamdi, on his visit to Sudan, had been impressed with Soviet military equipment of most modern sort which is there, apparently without objection from Saudis. Hamdi, he said, would see same thing in Egypt later this month on official visit there.
6. He then spoke at some length, at first elliptically and then more bluntly, about what he regards as frailities of USG foreign policy. He [Page 703] said Congress seemed to be able to check the President, and seemed want to move to alter whole posture of US foreign policy of last two decades. Congressional effort seemed to be supported by national mood in US. Soviets, by contrast, seemed to be willing fill resulting void with redoubled efforts. What was happening in Angola, said Asnaj, was likely to happen shortly in Djibouti, after French left. Then Somali forces, well armed and claiming revolutionary and racial motives, would take over with a lot of help from Cubans, North Koreans, North Vietnamese. Cubans and Soviets were strengthening PDRY, had potential for creating trouble in YAR.
7. I said situation in Arabian Peninsula was different. USG had proved many times to be dependable friend of YARG. USG also has leading role in Middle East which has made extraordinary successes possible in last several years. Arab friend should not be deceived about debate in US. Our interests in Middle East were clear and would be prosecuted forcefully. Moreover, Saudis had, as Asnaj himself said, adopted new policy toward Yemen and were now pursuing it with great good will, tenacity and in my view all possible speed. Said that, finally, I assumed no rpt no need tell Asnaj, after his experience in South Yemen, that road to changing and improving situation there was by setting tough conditions and insisting on implementation. Any other kind of accommodation with South, or with its Soviet-supporters did not seem to me to promise anything good for YARG security.
8. Asnaj said he understood this, accepted it. What USG had to realize, he said, was that Yemen was a “liability” to us and Saudis, and would be until it could finance itself. It needed a lot of support. In meantime, it was “not a client”.
9. Asnaj then said he wanted to state once again what he had earlier told Ambassador Scotes about Soviet arms deliveries. To make sure he had not rpt not mislead Ambassador, or been mislead himself, he had “checked matter”. There was no rpt no new arms agreement with Soviets, he said firmly. Nothing had been signed. When Abdal Alim went to Moscow Marshall Grechko staged a dinner at which he, Grechko, produced an arms request which had been previously prepared by Muhsin al-Ayni. Al-Ayni, said Asnaj, was always too clever by half. He had sold YARG on idea of very long and sophisticated equipment request on grounds that Soviets would surely reject it. Grechko, however, told Abdal Alim that list was approved. There was condition: Shipments of most new equipment would begin after Hamdi visited Moscow, even for two days. Meanwhile shipments of old and some new rpt and some new equipment would begin at once.
10. When first ship arrived last month from USSR, said Asnaj, Soviets wanted to make a “big exhibition” of unloading it. YARG refused and Soviets tried get reversal. Ghashmi went down to Hodeida [Page 704] and told Soviets either to unload it or move it, as it blocking port. Finally, after things unloaded, Soviets moved ship.
11. According to UK Ambassador, who saw Asnaj immediately after me, Asnaj story was slightly different. Ship contained two cargoes, one for Yemen with old stuff and one other cargo which eventually went elsewhere but which Soviets wanted to show Yemenis (Mig–21s, T–54’s) and somehow suggested they would unload in port if Yemenis wanted. Ghashmi said unload it or move the ship. Soviets moved the ship, Asnaj thought to Aden.
12. I probably didn’t get this story because I did not rpt not inquire about MIG–21’s or other new equipment, per instructions. I did say, however, such items had double importance. First, they were symbols of Soviet role and military prowess of YARG. Friends of Yemen were interested in both. In addition, they were litmus test of YARG credibility. We had been told clearly and repeatedly that these items not rpt not now coming. If they arrived, question of confidence would be created. We hoped to be told in advance if YARG expectations changed. As potential arms supplier, we needed and wanted completely frank and clear relationship.
13. Asnaj did not demur, and said only he was reporting facts as he knew them.
14. Comment: Although talk touched frankly on some sensitive issues—“frailities” of USG policy and credibility of YARG—Asnaj was in reflective mood and was as warm and self-possessed as ever. I think he is telling us truth as he knows it.
15. However, we now have four stories about the Soviet arms deal.
16. First, as Asnaj tells it, there is no deal, and the only things coming are old things. Second, as Ghashmi tells it, the Soviets sent MIG–21’s and tanks but at last minute they refused deliver them because of suspicion and anger re Saudi military mission. Third, as Hamdi telling Saudis, (according to UK embassy here, which asked to check story) the new equipment arrived but Hamdi told them to carry it away. (UK Embassy has given Saudis very qualified indication that latter may be true.) Fourth, we have unilateral USG reports that agreements for massive shipments are signed, the equipment is on its way or scheduled for delivery, the first ship brought no more and no less than expected.
17. I have held this report in hopes that in last four days, we could come up with more or better information which would allow us make informed guess about the four stories above. So far, that still remains only a hope. I think we should ask for Saudi views.
18. In any case, Soviets are I think at least as unsure of their footing and the facts here as we are, and I am convinced that we can turn off [Page 705] or reduce flow of military equipment from them if rpt if we can mount a credible alternative.
Summary: Yemeni Foreign Minister al-Asnaj met with Chargé Ransom and explained the Soviet arms shipments of the previous month. They also discussed Saudi policy toward the Yemen Arab Republic and the future of the U.S.–YAR relationship.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Sana’a Embassy Files: Lot 79F206, DEF 19, Military Assistance/YAR Arms. Secret. No time of transmission indicated. Drafted by DCM Ransom. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait City, and Muscat. Telegram 477 from Sana’a, February 11, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760051–1144.
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