Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

358. Telegram 52513 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan¹ ²

Washington, March 28, 1972, 1542Z

Subject:

• Pak-Afghan Relations

Ref:

• Kabul 1545
• Moscow 2480
• Islamabad 2144
• Kabul 1654

1. We are concerned that domestic political pressures in Pakistan and Afghanistan may be pushing both countries contrary to their own interests and desires—toward a confrontation over terrain and loyalties of Pushtun people. Afghanistan has found it expedient to reinvigorate its Pushtunistan propaganda in preparation for convening of Parliament. Bhutto government in Pakistan finds its most credible major opposition coming from Wali Khan who is coincidentially most effective spokesman for Pushtuns of NWFP. Emotional bond between latter and Pushtunistan irredentists in Afghanistan probably strong as ever in spite of ideological contradictions and conflicting objectives.

2. Recent agreement between President Bhutto and Wali Khan is hopeful sign, but we have also noted disturbing report that Bhutto harbors considerable irritation with Wali and may want another go at him later. If agreement should break down Afghanistan could react through intensified propaganda in manner which would not only be resented by GOP but could also lead Afghan Pushtuns and some of NAP followers in Pakistan to expect concrete action from RGA. in short, possibility exists for escalation from which it would be hard for RGA and GOP to withdraw. Seen from the outside, this confrontation makes no sense. We find it difficult to imagine any significant benefit to either side.

3. We see U.S. interests best served by continuation of improvement in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan which seemed to be taking place during past few years. We have major interest, therefore, in continuation Bhutto-Wali agreement, or in event of breakdown, in facilitating resumption dialogue between President Bhutto and recognized leadership of NWFP. Similarly we have interest in continuing recognition by RGA of risks in any revival of official encouragement to Pushtun claims, especially during current crisis in Pakistan. Finally we attach considerable importance to continuation of GOP-RGA dialogue initiated by Bhutto visit to Kabul.

4. For Islamabad: Charge should continue find appropriate occasion compliment Bhutto on statesmanlike agreement with Wali and to encourage Bhutto to continue cautious approach to NWFP politics. You may share with him USG assessment that RGA’s increased interest in Pushtunistan appears basically designed for domestic political purposes, and that RGA ability to restrain parliamentary Pushtuns is inverse function of Bhutto-Wali or GOP-NAP tension. You should also note with Bhutto and other GOP officials our appreciation of Bhutto’s statesmanship in visit to Kabul and our hope that GOP can follow up with concrete measures, particularly in trade and investment, designed to demonstrate that Bhutto visit had constructive substantive purpose. Discussions with Wali by consul in Peshawar or Charge should stress same positive theme: Wali-Bhutto agreement was statesmanlike and we hope continuing dialogue between two leaders will facilitate development of democratic government in Pakistan.

5. For Kabul: In discussions with RGA, suggest you continue encourage such positive elements of past couple of years as RGA thanks to GOP for continuation of wheat shipments during war and King’s courtesies to Bhutto in January. In particular, you should continue stress need for low key approach to Pushtunistan publicity. Ambassador might find ways discreetly note, that recent Moscow speech and announced revival of issue in public media could fan issue in way that could have unfortunate backlash. We hope recent public announcement will itself be sufficient for political purposes for which it was apparently designed and follow-up will be held to absolute minimum. We trust moderates in RGA aware that Pakistan political situation still very fragile. Hostile propaganda from Afghanistan could encourage foolish behavior in WFP by NAP, GOP, or both, which could contribute to instability in region and redound against RGA’s long term interests. As you find opportunity, you should encourage RGA diplomatic initiative to reassure GOP on PM’s Moscow speech and on announcement of revival of Pushtunistan coverage in press.

6. Welcome addressee comments.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFG-PAK. Confidential. Drafted on March 27 by Flaten (NEA/PAF), cleared in NEA/PAF by Peter Constable and Laingen, and with EUR/SOV, and approved by Van Hollen. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated to Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and London. The reference to a recent Moscow speech is to a speech made by Prime Minister Zahir in Moscow on March 14 in which he described the Pushtunistan issue as the only problem that existed between Afghanistan and Pakistan and called for a “solution based on Pushtunistan people’s right to determine own fate.” (Telegram 2307 from Moscow, March 15; ibid., POL 7 AFG.)
2. The Department expressed concern that domestic pressures in Afghanistan and Pakistan might be pushing both countries toward another confrontation over the Pushtunistan issue. The Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad were instructed to counsel restraint.