Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

357. Airgram Toaid A-71 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Agency for International Development¹ ²

Kabul, March 20, 1972

SUBJECT

• Disaster Relief Summary Report

REFERENCE

• A. State 3375
• B. M.O. 1565.1
• C. TOAID A-230

1. Country: Afghanistan

2. Type Disaster: Drought

3. Location: Drought extended throughout Afghanistan but was more severe in the southern, central and western portions of the country.

4. The most successful portion of US disaster relief thus far was the wheat provided under Titles I and II of PL 480. The US made available to the RGA 100,000 tons Title II grant wheat and 100,000 tons Title I wheat under long term credit sales. This wheat, 2/3 of all the wheat made available to the RGA from all sources, during the June 71–72 period allowed the RGA to adopt aggressive programs for meeting a critical situation. The RGA programs took two forms; first in a generally successful attempt to make wheat available throughout the country the Government is selling wheat in provincial centers at a controlled price of 52.50 Afs. per seer (1 seer = 7.16 kg.) to all who want it. The effect of this program has been to reduce the market price of wheat. In Kabul the market price dropped from 74 Afs. per seer on September 24, 1971 to 65 Afs per seer on February 17, 1972. This also relieved social and political pressures that were building up due to the critical shortage of wheat. The second program is a Food for Work project designed to make wheat available to those too poor to purchase wheat even at controlled prices. The overall success of this project has been good.

This program, still only implemented in selected provinces, has employed over 89,000 people in the first months of operation. If compared with the total problem, the contribution of the Food for Work program so far has been limited but significant.

The overall impact of the RGA’s food distribution programs by making adequate wheat available to the people is to forestall the threat of runaway prices, widespread food shortages and the development of serious areas of famine.

The least successful part of US drought relief efforts was the purchase of water pumps and animal feed with the Ambassador’s special fund.

Water pumps: Difficulties developed in utilization of the water pumps purchased for the Kandahar area when the farmers along individual irrigation ditches could not resolve the problems involved in cooperative purchase of the fuel for the pumps and distribution of the water available to their irrigation system. Because of these social problems the pumps were not utilized to anywhere near their potential.

Animal feed: Poor RGA administration has limited the distribution and sale of the animal feed made available through the special fund. As of this report only very little effective use has been made of this feed.

5. The initial reports of the disaster could be considered generally accurate except for projected livestock losses where nothing like the projected disaster, loss of up to 70% of the total herd, developed.

6. The RGA projected a need for 538,003 tons of wheat during 1970–71. Donor organizations made available approximately 300,000 tons. By the end of the 71–72 crop year it is expected the Government will have about 85,000 tons of wheat to carry over into the neat crop year, including about 25,000 tons of Title II Food for Work wheat. This is a normal carryover and in this respect the available relief supplies could be considered as excess to immediate disaster needs, but is considered a reasonable amount for RGA needs and will be used during the coming year. Reduction of the Government’s carryover stocks much below this level would be extremely dangerous. From this point of view the total stocks made available to the Government should be considered as reasonable. (Usage might well have been considerably larger if the distribution system had been more effective).

7. US personnel were effectively utilized in the Food for Work program (Peace Corps) and in a fertilizer distribution program (USAID and PC) related to the drought relief efforts of the Government.

8. There were no foreign voluntary agencies except the U.S. Peace Corps and the German volunteer service involved in relief operations. Both these agencies assisted in the Food for Work program.

9. In the early stages of the Food for Work program the number of volunteers and local personnel were too few to allow rapid implementation of the Food for Work program. A recruitment effort has since raised the number of available volunteers to an adequate level.

10. From the port of Karachi to Peshawar no special transport problems were encountered. At the height of the Indo-Pak war there was some slow down but the Pakistani railroad kept wheat moving from the port at almost a good pace. From Peshawar to Kabul a shortage of Pakistani trucks created delays. This was overcome by sending additional Afghan trucks to Peshawar. Within Afghanistan delays were encountered, especially in the Food for Work program, due to poor Afghan coordination and slow payment to truckers. USAID intervention and support, including that of the Nathan Team was only partially effective, but very useful. A protocol between the EGA agencies concerned in the allocation and transportation of the wheat was recently signed designating responsibilities for the transport of the wheat. This protocol should solve to some extent the transport problems encountered in the early stages of program implementation.

11. The Afghan Red Crescent Society served as a channel for the distribution of 15,000 tons of wheat from the Peoples Republic of China that was distributed free in especially hard hit areas of the country. The size of the drought area was so large that the local relief organizations could play no really significant role in relief operations.

12. No special problems were encountered in storage of supplies.

13. Preparedness facilities were not utilized.

14. The Mssion feels the channels of communication between itself and AID/W were good and the support given to Mission efforts outstanding.

15. Other countries and organizations providing food assistance (all wheat) were Canada 11,000 tons, Peoples Republic of China 15,990 tons, France 8,000 tons, World Food Program 30,000 tons, European Economic Community 21,640 tons, Turkey 5,090 tons, Germany 10,000 tons. In addition, Pakistan, Iran, USSR and Iraq, each provided assistance. Except for the USSR, these countries provided cash which the PGA used to purchase wheat seed or fertilizer. The USSR provided 2,000 tons of wheat seed and 10,000 tons of animal feed. Distribution of the seed and fertilizer was effective. The distribution of the animal feed from the USSR was not timely nor effective.

16. Total MI costs were in excess of $12,300,000.

17. The RGA is making imaginative attempts to meet the drought-caused disaster. For the first time, the RGA accepted as a responsibility of the Government the relief of the people suffering from effects of a drought. They made structural changes within the government to promote rapid agricultural development and to an extent never previously achieved focused resources, human and material, on meeting specific goals. Through these efforts the RGA was able to increase the use of fertilizer and improved seed throughout the country, begin a Food for Work program that could have a major immediate and long term impact on rural development and begin rethinking any structural changes that may be needed to promote continued increased agricultural production. Specific programs and their overall impact on meeting the drought-created food shortage have been successful. The country has come through the drought with a minimum amount of dislocation and hardship. The long-term effect of these relief efforts may develop an RGA with a clearer sense of development priorities, a greater sense of urgency in implementing development plans and a greater ability to focus needed resources on specific projects.

18. Continued support for the food production campaign, including support to programs reflecting a dramatically increased realization of the necessity of fertilizer, and for the RGA Food for Work program may be the only long-term assistance (3–5 years) that results from the drought. This latter assistance will be in the form of U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers and PL 480 commodities.

19. If, as described on the last part of 16 above, the RGA comes out of the period of drought with clearer development priorities and a greater will to implement programs based on these priorities, the US may find it advantageous to increase its level of support for the RGA’s development efforts.

Neumann

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Unclassified. Drafted in the AID mission by Charles L. Husick, cleared in the mission by Albert R. Baron, John R. Wilson, Alfonso D. Dominquez, and Cecil H. Uyehara; also cleared in the Embassy by David H. Cohn and Louis L. Mitchell, Jr., and approved by mission director Bartlett Harvey. A notation on the airgram indicates it was received on March 27.
2. The AID mission within the Embassy assessed U.S. efforts to help the Afghan Government deal with the impact of drought and concluded that continuing U.S support would help Afghanistan with the aftermath of the crisis.