Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

71. Briefing Paper Prepared for the President¹ ²

Washington, undated

ISSUES FOR DECISION

NSC MEETING
March 12, 1969

ENDC

Following the NSC meeting, you may wish to make decisions on the following issues:

1. Test Ban

With regard to the Test Ban Treaty,

(a) Would a test ban treaty now, or in two or three years, be in our security interests? The Joint Chiefs and the AEC believe that it is not. ACDA believes that it is. The issues are extremely complex and technical. The choices are:

(1) Decide a treaty now, or in two or three years, would be in our interest.

(2) Decide that a treaty would not be in our interest.

(3) Not reach any judgment and order a careful study of the issue.

(b) Whatever decisions you make about this question, you will need to decide tactics for the ENDC. The choices are:

(1) State our support for a complete test ban and press for an agreement. (No one recommends this position.)

(2) State our support for a complete test ban but do not press.

(3) Publicly indicate that we no longer favor a test ban. (The JCS recommend this position.)

There is agreement that remaining silent or announcing that we are studying the issue are not real options since they would be taken as indicating that we no longer favor a test ban.

I believe that announcing a reversal of our position would be such a fundamental change that we should not do that now. I recommend that you announce our support for a comprehensive test ban but instruct Gerard Smith not to press for an agreement. We should then undertake a study of the basic issues.

2. Cutoff

a. Is a cutoff in our security interests? Although we have virtually ceased the production of fissionable material, the JCS feel that a cutoff is not in our security interests and the AEC points out that we might not be able to meet certain contingent requirements if there were a cutoff. The options are:

(1) Decide that a cutoff is in our security interests.

(2) Decide that a cutoff is not in our security interests.

(3) Reserve your decision and order a study.

b. Whatever you decide on this question, you will need to determine tactics for the ENDC. The choices are:

(1) Announce support for the cutoff proposal which the U.S. has advanced in the past.

(2) Introduce a new proposal which would modify the existing proposal by limiting the inspection to IAEA monitoring of peaceful production.(There is agreement that this is acceptable. The Joint Chiefs recommend two other modifications, but others object to them and the Chiefs would oppose an agreement in any case.)

(3) Announce that we no longer favor a production cutoff.

Since the Soviets do not want a cutoff and are very unlikely to change their mind, I believe it will be foolish for us to back off. I recommend that you alter the existing proposal so that the inspection is to be carried out only by the IAEA. We should then undertake a study of the issue including the changes recommended by the Joint Chiefs.

3. Arms Control of the Sea Beds

a. Would a ban on the placement of nuclear weapons on the sea beds be in our interests? We have no current plans for affixing nuclear weapons on the sea beds but the Joint Chiefs believe that we should not foreclose our future options at this time. There is general agreement that further study of this matter would not produce any understanding beyond that contained in the current paper. The options are:

(1) To decide that an agreement is in our interest.

(2) To decide that an agreement is not in our interests.

(3) To reserve a final judgment (perhaps based on looking at the details of any agreement which might be negotiated).

b. With regard to the tactics, there are two choices:

(1) The U.S. has announced a willingness to discuss the factors affecting an agreement in this area. We could begin a discussion of such factors.

(2) The U.S. could table a specific proposal. While some work on a proposal has been done, if you decide you want to table a specific proposal, we could indicate at the opening of the talks that one was forthcoming and direct its preparation in a short time.

I recommend that you direct that we continue to discuss factors vital to an agreement and not try to develop a specific proposal at this time.

4. Presentation of U.S. Position to the ENDC

The options are:

(a) A Presidential Statement. Such statements have been presented to the opening of each ENDC session since March, 1962.

(b) Have the U.S. negotiators present an opening statement.

I recommend that you issue a brief statement. We are working on a draft for your approval.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, ENDC 3/15/69. Top Secret. The paper is not signed and bears no indication of who drafted it or whether it was forwarded to the President.
2. Prepared in anticipation of the March 12 NSC meeting, the paper outlined the four key issues on which the President should be prepared to make decisions. Although the paper encouraged the President to support the comprehensive test ban, it cautioned him not to “press for an agreement.” It then recommended that the President support the cutoff and insist the inspections be the responsibility of the IAEA. It requested the issue of seabed arms control be tabled to allow for future discussions. While the meeting was scheduled for March 12, it was held, instead, on March 15.