Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

62. Telegram 227180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany¹ ²

Washington, December 15, 1972, 2318Z.

Subj:

• EURATOM–IAEA Safeguards

Refs:

• A. IAEA Vienna 8609; B. EC Brussels 4754; C. Bonn 16432; D. IAEA Vienna 8720

1. Delay in signature IAEA–EURATOM agreement presents serious problems for U.S. It will probably result in delaying start of ratification process and entry into force, which is important to finally remove our legal and political vulnerability for continuing fuel supply to EURATOM and to remove an obstacle to NPT adherence by Japan and others. Failure to sign the agreement before the February IAEA BG meeting would also show such a delay in progressing from where the parties stood in September as to undermine the credibility of our position that our fuel supply continues to be justified by “rule of reason”. This would lead not only to international heat at the February Board meeting (cf. reftel A) but also could present difficulties with Congress when it considers the proposed amendment to the EURATOM Cooperation Act that is a prerequisite to the entry into force of the recently negotiated amendment to the US–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation. (Questions as to legality of “rule of reason” raised in Congress and press last spring.)

2. Following attempts to summarize situation as we understand it (supplementing ref D report of background and status internal EURATOM discussions as conveyed in confidence by British):

A. Question of inspector access to Almelo centrifuge plant is apparently blocking progress. Situation has developed as follows: Tripartite countries (FRG, Netherlands, UK) presented to U.S., in discussions in Washington and in The Hague, view that inspector access to cascade area of centrifuge plants not necessary or acceptable. Argument primarily based on low inventory of cascade area and on good input-output measurement accuracy. U.S. agreed not to challenge this access limitation for IAEA purposes. EURATOM was not involved in these discussions and U.S. has had no detailed interchange of view with EURATOM.

B. At June IAEA TWG, IAEA Inspector GeneraL Rometsch accepted, with tripartite, U.S., and South African approval, access limitation as a working hypothesis. No disagreement with this was recorded. EURATOM attendees privately expressed concern to U.S. delegates over the consequences of access limitation as a precedent. The conclusion of the TWG was that safeguards equipment and procedures should be developed and considered again in 1–2 years, and that experience should be gained at Almelo without setting rigid precedents. Thus “working hypothesis” of limited access for IAEA purposes should be valid for the next few years, and it is our understanding that Agency is prepared to negotiate Almelo facility attachment on that basis. For Vienna: Mission requested to confirm this understanding.

C. EURATOM inspectors have, under the EURATOM treaty, “access to all places … to the extent necessary …” for safeguards control. The FRG and Dutch are presumably arguing that at Almelo access to the cascades is not necessary for safeguarding, and that, in view of the sensitivity of the technology, EURATOM inspectors should not be permitted inside. EURATOM is apparently resisting, and because of this dispute no EURATOM proposal for Almelo safeguards has been presented to IAEA. It would be very difficult and awkward for U.S. to become involved in this dispute between EURATOM and its members, particularly since no U.S. material or technology will be involved at Almelo.

D. The EURATOM–IAEA agreement and facility attachments will specify those EURATOM and Agency actions which will enable IAEA to reach its basic conclusions. EURATOM may decide to perform other safeguards activities in addition to those specified. EURATOM activities in areas off-limits to Agency would be unverifiable, and hence not relevant to Agency conclusions. Thus we believe that the question of EURATOM inspector access to the cascade could be decoupled from the question of inspector access provided for in the facility attachment for IAEA purposes. Since the Dutch and FRG will obtain their desired limits on Agency access for Almelo, and since further EURATOM access would not be relevant to the EURATOM–IAEA agreement, delay of signature over the access question seems to us unnecessary.

3. Even assuming general agreement can be reached on access question, we are concerned that agreement signature not be delayed until all details of the Almelo arrangements are worked out. Ref B reports EURATOM preparation of facility attachment has started but “research” remains to be done. It seems clear to us, then, that the process of EURATOM preparation and then negotiation with the IAEA is likely to take considerably more than six weeks. Rometsch, during his visit to AEC last month, guessed that six months might be necessary. Thus we believe that, if June IAEA TWG report is not sufficient reassurance for FRG and Dutch on IAEA access question, some “basic understanding” with IAEA, as suggested in refs C and D is the most that might be reached in short time.

4. We hope that the intra-EURATOM access question is soon solved or separated from the specification of IAEA access, that a “basic understanding” on IAEA access can be quickly reached without negotiating complete Almelo attachment, and that signature and start of ratification procedure could take place on basis of that “basic understanding.”

5. Addressees may draw on paras. 1, 3, and 4 in discussions with host governments/organizations on IAEA/safeguards question. Para. 2 is for posts’ background only.

6. Following occurs to us as a possibility of expediting progress. A letter might be sent by IAEA to EURATOM stating (1) IAEA readiness to start preparation of Almelo attachment; (2) IAEA intention to negotiate Almelo procedures on basis of working hypothesis of limited access; (3) need, in any case, to review procedures based on experience and data accumulated at Almelo in first year or two of IAEA safeguarding. Request Embassies Bonn and The Hague comment as to whether they believe this procedure would constitute an adequate “basic understanding” so that FRG and Dutch could proceed with signature.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 3 EURATOM. Limited Official Use. It was also sent to The Hague, and Vienna. It was repeated to EC Brussels, Paris, Luxembourg, and Rome. Drafted by Boright (ACDA); cleared in IO/SCT, EUR/GER, EUR/RPE, and USAEC/IP; and approved by Brewster (SCI/AE).
2. The telegram discussed the reasons for the delay in signature of the Euratom-IAEA safeguards agreement. Disagreements over the limitation of inspector access were of particular importance to the delay. The postponement of the signature raised “serious problems” for the United States as it would suspend the implementation of the agreement, pave the way for those nations which had not adhered to the NPT, and raise additional obstacles in the U.S. Congress.