4. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to Vice President Agnew1
2
Washington, January 28, 1969
SUBJECT:
-
NSC Meeting, January 29, 1969
A meeting of the National Security Council will be held in the Cabinet
Room on Wednesday, January 29, 1969 at 10:00 A.M. The agenda for the
meeting is as follows:
- 1.
- Vietnam Alternatives
- 2.
- Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
There will be no additional paper for the continuation of the discussion
on Vietnam. The NPT discussion will be based on the attached paper.
The NSC Review Group, in recommending at
its meeting of January 23, 1969 that the NSC consider the attached paper on the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, agreed to call to the attention of the Council the following
points on which its members were in agreement:
- 1.
- The Review Group had to spread its net wide to develop many of
the Con arguments listed below and believes they are outweighed
by the Pros. A number of the Con arguments are listed not
because members of the Group consider them valid in the current
circumstances but only because they have been put forward by
others and the Review Group believes that the NSC should be aware of them. Many
of these arguments might have been valid two years ago but have
been overtaken by events.
- 2.
- The Review Group believes that the decision to seek Senate
consent and the decision to ratify must be made together. If
[Page 2]
the President recommends
Senate approval, the Review Group feels, he will be committing
himself to ratification.
- 3.
- The Review Group believes that a decision to seek Senate
consent and to ratify the Treaty does not require a decision to
press other countries now or at a later date to adhere to the
Treaty.
[Page 3]
Attachment
undated
Issues Paper on the NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
A prompt decision is necessary as to whether or
not the Administration will support the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).
The NPT has been signed by 85
countries since it was opened for signature on July 1, 1968;
however, it has been ratified by only seven countries including the
UK. The NPT will not go into effect until it has been ratified by
the US, UK, and USSR and forty
other countries. Moreover, it must be emphasized that many of the
key countries capable of developing nuclear weapons have not yet
signed, including the FRG, Israel,
India, Japan, Australia, South Africa, and Italy. (Italy has just
informed that it plans to sign on January 28.) A number of the key
non-signers are clearly awaiting US
ratification before they sign as are many of the signers before they
ratify.
[Page 4]
Despite the Czechoslovakian crisis, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on September 17, 1968, voted 13 to 3 (with 3 abstentions)
to recommend Senate approval of the NPT.
In these circumstances, the following questions should be examined in
determining the US position on the NPT:
- 1.
- Is the NPT in the over-all
US interest?
- 2.
- If the NPT is in the
US interest, should the
President take the lead in seeking Senate approval?
- 3.
- If the NPT is in the
US interest, should the
President ratify the NPT
immediately after Senate approval?
- 4.
- Should the US now or at a
later date press other countries go sign or ratify the
NPT?
- 5.
- If the NPT is not in the
US interest, should the
President formally seek to disengage at this time?
The pros and cons on each of these questions can be summarized along
the following lines:
-
1.
-
Is the NPT
in the over-all US
interest?
- a.
- Pro:
- (1)
- The NPT is the
best way to prevent the further spread of nuclear
weapons, which has been a policy objective of all
previous Administrations. The present treaty was
supported by all interested
[Page 5]
agencies of the government in the
previous Administration, including the JCS, who were unanimous
in their support.
- (2)
- The further spread of nuclear weapons would
increase the threat of nuclear war by putting more
and more countries in a position where they could
initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Not only
would there be the danger that some countries
would prove irresponsible in the use or control of
nuclear weapons, but there would be an increasing
number of nuclear confrontations that could
rapidly escalate local conflicts with increased
danger of great power involvement.
- (3)
- The spread of independent nuclear capabilities
would force the US
and USSR into a
nuclear competition to assist allies in developing
nuclear capabilities.
- (4)
- The treaty safeguards on nuclear materials for
peaceful purposes would provide a unique
opportunity to create a worldwide system to
monitor the vast quantities of fissionable
material suitable for nuclear weapons production
that will soon be available all over the world as
a result of the rapid spread of nuclear power
reactors.
- (5)
- The economic impact of a general nuclear arms
race would have a serious adverse effect on many
countries, such as India to which we give economic
assistance.
- (6)
- The treaty would protect our existing NATO nuclear
arrangements and does not bar succession by a new
federated European state to the nuclear status of
one of its former components.
- (7)
- The treaty, which demonstrates the ability of
the US and USSR to negotiate
complex issues of mutual interest, would set the
stage for further steps in the negotiation of a
US-Soviet detente.
Failure would probably have a serious adverse
effect on negotiations in other areas.
- (8)
- The treaty would be a stimulant to progress on
other arms control agreements. Failure would
probably set back the prospects for other serious
arms control proposals for years to come.
- b.
- Con:
- (1)
- The treaty would reduce our flexibility in
developing future arrangements that might
contribute to regional defense or unity and spread
the responsibility or cost of nuclear defenses
(e.g., MLF/ANF and
an Asian MLF).
- (2)
- The Soviets by their intervention in
Czechoslovakia, which was in violation of the
preamble of the NPT as well as the United Nations Charter
and the Warsaw Pact, have demonstrated their
disregard for treaty obligations such as those
contained in the NPT when such obligations prove contrary
to their immediate interests.
- (3)
- The treaty has had an adverse effect on our
relations with some major countries (e.g., FRG, India, Israel), who
either oppose or have strong reservations about
the treaty. US
ratification, if accompanied by further pressure,
might have additional problems in certain
countries such as the FRG.
- (4)
- The treaty may ultimately fail. For example,
certain countries (e.g., Israel, India) may
eventually decide to develop an independent
nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, the growth
of Chinese nuclear power over the longer term will
place Asian signatories in an increasingly
difficult position.
- (5)
- There is a possibility that the safeguards
provision of the treaty might have a serious
effect on the future of EURATOM.
- (6)
- Additional arguments that have been made by
some include:
- (a)
- The development of an independent nuclear
weapons capability might be desirable in some
cases, if it could spread the responsibility for
defense and enable the US to reduce involvement in the defense
of other countries (e.g., India, Japan).
- (b)
- Although the treaty does not contain any
military guarantees to non-nuclear weapons states,
it clearly would have the effect of strengthening
the moral, if not legal, US involvement through
the UN in the
collective defense of signatory non-nuclear
weapons countries against nuclear aggression. It
thereby would reduce US flexibility in disengaging militarily
in various regions of the world.
-
2.
-
If the NPT
is in the US interest, should
the President take the lead in seeking Senate approval?
- a.
- Pro:
- (1)
- This would be an effective domestic and
international symbol and signal of the President’s
deep interest in world peace and his desire to
move from confrontation to negotiation with the
Soviet Union.
- (2)
- It would in large measure pre-empt efforts by
allies and neutrals to reopen the earlier issues
on the NPT.
Failure to do this would complicate our diplomatic
negotiations on the NPT by encouraging countries to reopen
all of the issues that concern them.
- (3)
- This would give the President a significant
role in a major early Congressional action
involving strong bipartisan support.
- b.
- Con:
Withholding of the Presidential position might
be used in bargaining with the USSR on certain issues
such as the Soviet posture toward Germany.
-
3.
-
If the NPT
is in the US interest, should
the President ratify the NPT
immediately after Senate approval?
- a.
- Pro:
- (1)
- This is a key action required to regain the
impetus behind the NPT. It would immediately result in
positive actions on the
[Page 9]
signing and ratification by other
important countries that would build up the
pressure for action by other undecided countries.
Some key potential nuclear-weapons powers
(including the FRG) are clearly waiting to see whether
the United States ratifies the treaty before
facing the final decision on their own
position.
- (2)
- Failure to act promptly would encourage new
developments—such as a decision by India to
develop nuclear weapons—that would vastly
complicate or preclude regaining impetus for the
treaty.
- b.
- Con:
- (1)
- In negotiating the safeguards arrangements in
the treaty, we indicated we would take into
account the status of EURATOM’s negotiations with IAEA before
ratification. This action was taken in part to
accommodate the EURATOM concern that the US may consider itself
obligated by the treaty not to supply EURATOM with nuclear
fuel in the event a EURATOM–IAEA agreement was not successfully
negotiated. (It should be emphasized, however,
that EURATOM–IAEA consultations have not begun since
the FRG and Italy
have not yet signed the treaty and the FRG will not sign the
treaty until the US
has ratified it. This would require further
consultation with our allies before
ratification.)
- (2)
- In recommending approval of the treaty, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations urged that
the President delay depositing the US instrument of
ratification until he had received assurance that
a majority of the countries nearest to nuclear
weapons capability intend to adhere to the treaty.
(Some of these countries, however, are awaiting
US action before
signing the treaty.)
-
4.
-
Should the US press other countries to sign or ratify the
NPT?
For the last two years the US
has carried on a continuing diplomatic campaign to persuade
key countries first to support and then to sign the NPT. The key countries that
have not yet signed the treaty include the FRG, Israel, India, Pakistan,
Switzerland, Japan, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, South
Africa, and Italy. The reasons for these countries’
reservations or objections to the treaty vary widely. The
extent to which we can influence these countries or be
responsive to their concerns also varies widely from country
to country. The timing of this action should also be keyed
to domestic considerations in these countries (e.g., the
FRG elections next
October). Without resolving the specific tactic in dealing
with individual countries, the general policy question
should be faced whether we wish to continue or increase the
level of diplomatic activity in support of the NPT if we decide the treaty is
in the US interest.
[Page 11]
- a.
- Pro:
- (1)
- An active, positive diplomatic campaign in
support of the NPT
will demonstrate the continuity of US policy in this field
and thereby greatly reduce the incentive for
various countries to reintroduce previous
reservations or objections to the treaty in hopes
of changing US
policy.
- (2)
- The effectiveness of the treaty will depend in
large measure on the breadth of adherence by key
potential nuclear states.
- (3)
- Selective diplomatic pressure may be needed to
avoid actions (e.g., Israel) that would prejudice
attainment of the objectives of the treaty, or the
treaty itself.
- b.
- Con:
Our relations with our allies and the neutrals
and thereby the long-term interests of the NPT would be better
served by a minimum of diplomatic pressure at this
time. If the President now endorses the NPT and subsequently
ratifies it, this will be adequate support for the
NPT and will at
the same time permit a more general dialogue by the
new Administration with our allies on this and
related issues.
-
5.
-
If the NPT
is not in the US interest,
should the President formally seek to disengage at this
time?
This would involve a public policy statement by the President
as opposed to a long-term, quiet effort to kill the treaty
either by a
[Page 12]
behind-the-scenes effort to delay Senate approval or by a
delay of formal ratification.
- a.
- Pro:
This action would have considerable support in
the FRG and in some
circles in Italy, Japan, India, and other key
near-nuclear weapons states that either openly
oppose the treaty or simply wish it would go
away.
- b.
- Con:
In general, such an action would be very
unfavorably received in most articulate circles both
internationally and domestically. It would be looked
upon as a formal abandonment of efforts towards arms
control and negotiated settlements with the Soviet
Union and would be identified as a decision to base
US security on the
spread of nuclear weapons.
