Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

349. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, undated

SUBJECT:

• Supplementary Memo: NSSM 162 Soviet Non-Use of Force, etc./SRG Meeting

The current instructions for our UN delegation are a modified version of the conclusions of the NSSM study. They include the following points:

— The US should adopt a relatively inactive stance, but not support the Soviet resolution as it now stands, nor encourage or promote amendments.

— The US will criticize the constitutional features (para. 2 of Soviet resolution) and the doubtful value of trying to restate or redefine Charter language.

— NOTE: for now we will not attack the substance of a “permanent prohibition” on use of nuclear weapons.

— We will tell other delegations that we will “consider” amendments, but give no commitment to support them.

— Pending “developments” we will consider whether to move from relatively inactive opposition to acceptance of a suitably amended resolution.

COMMENT: This instruction should keep us out of the Sino-Soviet fight, and without having to attack the substance of the non-use of force provisions. There are two further points that are not made that you may want to consider after or during the meeting.

— Rather than become engaged in a debate on the substance of the proposal, we could take the position that the key issue is for all the nuclear powers to support any resolution (as Gromyko indicated in his speech), and that failing such a unanimity, it would be better to lay the matter aside for this GA session.

— In addition, however, we could go further and suggest that the ambiguity of the Soviet resolution be clarified so that it is clearly established that renunciation of force includes renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. In this case, we could abstain on the procedural grounds that nuclear power unanimity was required, but that the substance was acceptable.

— This position would placate the Soviets but would almost certainly antagonize the Chinese, and perhaps dismay our Allies.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, SRG Meeting, NSSM 162 10/27/72. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum, unsigned, is dated October 27. (Ibid., NSSM 162)
2. The memorandum advised the U.S. delegation to the UN to take an inactive stance on the Soviet proposed UN resolution and to inform other delegations that it would continue to “consider” amendments.