14. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
2
Washington, March 19, 1969
Subject:
- Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, March 11, 1969
Dobrynin called me about 7:00
p.m. to ask whether I could see him that evening or the next morning. I
agreed to drop by the Soviet Embassy about 9:00 p.m. Dobrynin was
extremely cordial. He met me together with Mrs. Dobrynin and, after some social
conversation about their daughter, they both mentioned that Mrs.
Dobrynin was hoping to call on Mrs. Nixon soon.
Dobrynin then handed me a brief
message from Kosygin to the
President acknowledging his good wishes on his birthday. He also handed
me a copy of a note which the Soviet Union proposed to hand to the
Germans the next day, designed to meet some of the German concerns about
the NPT. Dobrynin said that the note had been influenced by some
of our suggestions and was given to us simply for our information and as
a token of their good faith. (An analysis of the note is attached at Tab
A.)
[Omitted here is material on other issues.]
[Page 2]
Tab A
undated
SUBJECT: FRG-Soviet Exchanges on
NPT
The texts of the Soviet memorandum to the FRG of February 6 and the FRG’s amendments to that memorandum of February 24 are
at Tab 1. The Germans had given us their amendments before conveying
them to Tsarapkin and subsequently made a formal presentation of the
text to the Department on February 27.
You will note from the Soviet rejoinder at Tab 2 that there are in it
some four changes as compared to the Soviet text of February 6. They
are marked and numbered in red, 1 through 4.
The Soviet changes
As a whole, the Soviet changes go some slight way toward meeting the
rather far-reaching German propositions of February 24.
- — change #1 appears to be rhetorical and does nothing for the
Germans;
- — change #2 uses the words “enjoy in full measure” in place of
the previous “could make use of” the rights flowing from the
NPT. Allowing for possible
variations in translation, the new formulation gives the Germans
somewhat more fulsome recognition of their rights.
- — change #3 falls short of the FRG’s explicit reference to rights “and positions”
in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy; but it gives
them assurance that rights inherent in “all provisions” of the
NPT will be enjoyed by the
FRG. It is thus a step in the FRG’s direction.
- — change #4 ignores the German request that the Soviets
acknowledge the applicability of the three power declaration of
intent in support of UN
Resolution 255 (on assurances) to non-nuclear signatories in
case of threat or attack with nuclear weapons on them; instead
it now tells the Germans that Resolution 255 neither gives them
special rights nor discriminates against them. The
non-discrimination assurance goes some way toward the German
position, although it does not, as requested by the Germans, go
so far as to acknowledge the
[Page 3]
applicability of Article 2 of the Charter
to the FRG. (The Germans hit
upon this device as a means of getting the Soviets to renounce,
in exchange for German signature of the NPT, their claimed
rights of intervention under Articles 53 and 107 of the
Charter.)
Next Steps
The question now is whether Kiesinger regards these Soviet changes as
sufficient to convince enough of the NPT’s detractors in the CDU/CSU that he has succeeded
in getting Soviet claims under 53 and 107 overridden. He will make
some converts, but holdouts will remain.
In any event, probably we should not take any steps with the Soviets
until it is clear how Kiesinger assesses the new Soviet language and
whether he considers it politically necessary to try another round
of bargaining.
The German Foreign Office had a fall-back position for the event of a
Soviet rejection of the maximum demands made to them on February 24.
This would involve a formulation calling for the applicability of
Article 2 in the NPT context only,
rather than for Soviet relations with the FRG as a whole. Such a fall-back might entail the
drawback that it could be construed as conceding the
non-applicability of Article 2 in matters other than the NPT.
We should not give the Germans any advice one way or the other at
this stage since the matter is wholly one of internal German
politics. (Nothing the Soviets say will objectively add to or
detract from German security.) If Kiesinger feels that another round is required, we
should not stand in his way; if he then asks us to speak to the
Soviets we should do so. But we should not do or say anything that
gives the Germans reason to allege that we approve of their
non-signature in the event there is no further give in the Soviet
position.
Soviet Calculations
The Soviets apparently very much want a German signature. The Germans
could probably squeeze a few more words out of them. But Moscow is
probably nearing the end of its flexibility; the Soviets would not
regard German refusal to sign as an unmitigated disaster since they
could exploit it propagandistically, and use it against the FRG in Eastern Europe and to fish in
German electoral waters.
[Page 4]
Beyond the election, the matter becomes more speculative and complex.
The Soviets might calculate that a Social Democratic (SPD)/Free
Democratic (FDP) coalition would sign on the terms as they now
stand; but they cannot of course be sure of the outcome of the
election. They might try to influence the outcome in favor of the
SPD, but this is highly tricky and unpredictable business for them.
If they find themselves facing a CDU government—with increased power
for Strauss—it is conceivable that they might make the concessions
they are now unwilling to grant the Grand Coalition. But this is far
down the road—much farther than the Soviet bureaucracy has yet
played through the game.
[Page 5]
Tab 1
[February 6,
1969]
Tsarapkin Statement of February 6, 1969
The non-proliferation treaty which has been signed already by more
than eighty states plays an important part in the efforts of the
governments and the peoples with respect to the strengthening of
peace and the prevention of a nuclear war. The entry into force of
this treaty will, without any doubt, contribute to achieve progress
in the field of disarmament and to contain the arms race. A signing
and ratification of the treaty as speedily as possible on the part
of the Federal Republic of Germany would have a positive effect on
the situation in Europe and on the development of the relations
between the states of this region.
The Soviet Government proceeds, of course, from the fact that the
Federal Republic of Germany as a party to the NPT could make use of the rights which
flow from the treaty equally for all signatory non nuclear states.
The Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations No. 255
would also apply to the Federal Republic as a party to the
treaty.
German Revisions* of
Soviet Statement given Tsarapkin by Duckwitz, Feb. 24, 1969
The Soviet Government proceeds, of course, from the fact that the
Federal Republic of Germany as a party to the NPT could make full use of the rights
and positions, especially in the field of
peaceful uses of atomic energy which flow from the treaty
equally for all signatory non-nuclear states and that the treaty
will be applied in the same manner to all signatories.
Regardless of the fact that no peace treaty has
yet been concluded, the Soviet Union declares that in its
relations with the Federal Republic of Germany the principles of
Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the UN Charter apply without reservation or
restriction.
The Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations. No. 255
and the declarations of intent of the three
nuclear weapons states in support of it, would also apply
in an unrestricted manner to the
Federal Republic as a party to the treaty.
[Page 6]
Tab 2
undated
In connection with the Memorandum which was handed by State-Secretary
Dukwits to Ambassador Tsarapkin on February 24, 1969, the Soviet
side would like to state the following.
The Soviet side already gave on February 6 a comprehensive reply to
the questions of interest to the West German side. As it was pointed
out, the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that as a party to the
Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons the Federal Republic
of Germany would together with the obligations taken on itself,
enjoy in full measure the rights provided for in the Treaty equally
to all non-nuclear states signatures to the Treaty. This naturally
concerns all the provisions contained in the nonproliferation
Treaty.
While working out the Treaty and the Security Council Resolution No.
255 no additional provisions were formulated concerning some
individual states, the Federal Republic of Germany included, which
would give them some special rights or, to the contrary, would place
them in position of discrimination.
