Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention
259. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers
Laird recommended seeking international acceptance of an arms control treaty prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. Laird sent a similar letter to ACDA Director Smith. (Ibid.)
260. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Guhin briefed Kissinger on chemical weapons arms control discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V, 1972-. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Walsh.
261. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird
Rogers responded positively to Laird’s proposal to pursue a chemical weapons arms control agreement prohibiting production and transfer.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret.
262. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Smith indicated that ACDA was prepared to develop a draft chemical weapons arms control proposal in support of Laird’s recommendation.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-75-155, 384. Top Secret. Drafted on July 18 by McCormack (ACDA) and cleared by Leonard and Keeny. The letter is a copy that bears an indication Smith signed the original.
263. National Security Study Memorandum 157
The President directed a prompt review of the U.S. position on negotiations regarding chemical weapons at the CCD. The review was to focus on methods of verification, related procedures and their effectiveness, and their level of acceptability to the U.S.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret.
264. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Nutter forwarded the study prepared in response to NSSM 157. His covering memorandum outlined the study’s seven negotiating options regarding chemical weapons and recommended Option 2, prohibiting the production and transfer of such weapons. The detailed study analyzed each option and its supporters.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 40 NSC. Top Secret. The attachment at Tab A is not published. At Tab C is Document 259.
265. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\
Laird expressed his support for Option 2 in the NSSM 157 study calling for a treaty that prohibited the production and transfer of chemical weapons but did not limit present stockpiles.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. The memorandum at Tab A is not published.
266. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Farley believed the U.S. should seek the most comprehensive feasible controls on chemical weapons. Given this perspective, he supported Option 2 of the NSSM 157 study banning production and transfer of chemical weapons, but not placing restrictions on present stockpiles.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret.
267. Memorandum From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Moorer presented the views of the JCS on the NSSM 157 study, concluding that a treaty limiting stockpiles and prohibiting the transfer of chemical weapons would not adversely affect U.S. national security.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. Laird forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under cover of an August 18 memorandum in which he noted that the JCS position was essentially that described in his August 15 memorandum (Document 265). (Ibid.)
268. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
David expressed support for Option 1 in the NSSM 157 study, placing no ban on production and no limitation of stockpiles, and urged that the U.S. retain a chemical weapons retaliatory capability
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret.
269. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin) to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Irwin provided a detailed analysis of the reasons why the Department of State favored Option 2 in the NSSM 157 study, prohibiting the production and transfer of toxic agents, over Option 3 supported by the Department of Defense.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret.
270. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Guhin briefed Kissinger on recent developments at the CCD on the possible chemical weapons treaty, reviewed the seven treaty options outlined in the NSSM 157 study, and presented his views. He concluded with his recommendation that the issues be discussed in the NSC.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192 and Box H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote in the margin on page 3 near “Option 2,” How could we monitor?” The attachment at Tab A is not published, however for additional information see Document 273.
271. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Guhin responded to Kissinger’s handwritten query on page 3 of Document 270 [8/23] regarding how limitations on stockpiles and production of lethal chemical weapons could be monitored.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. Attached is Document 270 and, at Tab A, presumably Document 273.
272. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Guhin attached a draft memorandum for the President, prepared at Kissinger’s request but not forwarded. The draft recommended the U.S. preserve the first-use option for herbicides and tear gas by sticking to the position that the Protocol should not be interpreted as prohibiting it.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig. At the top of page one Kissinger wrote, “Hold for next session of Congress.” Neither of Guhin’s recommendations is marked as approved, and the attached memorandum is not signed nor its recommendation marked as approved or disapproved. Kissinger’s note on page one and a covering note in the file indicate that Kissinger did not forward the memorandum to the President.
273. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
The President requested a National Security Council review of the NSSM 157 study in anticipation of commenting at the February 1973 CCD meeting on proposals for a chemical weapons prohibition.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret.
274. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Guhin recommended updating three aspects of the NSSM 157 study to allow for analyses of ensuing Soviet proposals, possible shelf-life restrictions, and recent developments in the U.S. binary weapons program.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Elliot. A handwritten notation that was crossed out indicates it was also sent through Scowcroft. At Tab A is Document 275.
275. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Kissinger requested reports reflecting recent discussions on verification measures and the question of stockpiles shelf-life pertaining to the NSSM 157 study be completed by January 21, 1973.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Laird, Helms, Smith, and David.
276. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Johnson) to President Nixon
The memorandum summarized the Annual Review of the U.S. chemical warfare and biological research program. It included discussion on the issue of limiting riot control agents and herbicides in Vietnam.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Top Secret. The attached Annual Review is not published.