95. Editorial Note
On July 9, 1970, Deputy Chief of Mission Fessenden, who was on vacation in the United States, wrote a personal letter to Ambassador Rush, reporting on his recent consultations in Washington. In his discussion of the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin, Fessenden highlighted problems with the decisionmaking process on Germany:
“I conveyed to Marty [Hillenbrand], Jim [Sutterlin], and Hal [Sonnenfeldt] your impatience with the general Washington foot-dragging. It is clear that there is a pervasive go-slow attitude in Washington, plus skepticism that anything much will come of the talks. It would be wrong to blame Marty and Jim for being the originators of this sentiment, although they share it. They are reflecting general Washington views. The main reasons for it are: (1) almost total preoccupation of the White House with other areas, Vietnam, Middle East, and SALT; (2) lack of any leadership in the State Department with the departure of Richardson; and (3) strong fear of getting out in front with the Four Power talks when the rest of Ost Politik seems to be in trouble and is in danger of slowing down. ‘Strong fear’ is perhaps not the best way to put it. The concern is rather that the only chance of getting anything out of the Soviets in the Four Power talks is through their interest in getting something out of the Germans in their bilateral FRG-Soviet negotiations. If these latter negotiations are to be made more difficult and slowed down because of internal German political difficulties, then it would be unwise to try to charge ahead too hard now on the Four Power talks. There is also strong feeling that nothing is possible on the Four Power talks themselves unless the Germans are ready to make important concessions on the political presence in Berlin issue. There is skepticism that they are able to make such concessions because of internal political troubles and general dismay over their tendency to play up the Berlin-Bonn ties. There was also dismay over Bonn’s proposal for a written statement of the linkage between the bilateral German negotiations and the Berlin agreement. By the way, your handling of this issue with Abrasimov was much applauded in Washington; this is considered just the right line for handling linkage, either with the Soviets or the Germans.
“The general attitude, therefore, is to apply brakes to the Four Power talks. Marty’s meeting with the British in London and the French in Paris, plus the convoking of Senior Group meeting in mid-September, are designed for just this purpose: to apply brakes to the talks and to provide an opportunity for all concerned to think through again all the implications. Marty thinks it is particularly important to get the Germans to do this. There is also a feeling that the present pace, one meeting every three weeks, is too fast in existing circumstances. One other point: for [Page 268] the mid-September Senior Group meeting, which by the way will not be held in Bonn; it is considered very important that Von Staden (if not Frank) participate for the Germans. There was considerable disappointment that only Van Well represented the Germans at the Rome meeting in May. This is not necessarily anything against Van Well; it is instead a question of level.
“As for your talking to someone in Washington about the slow progress in the Four Power talks, the problem is finding someone to talk to. The President and Henry Kissinger are all wrapped up in other things; in the State Department the only person to talk to is Marty. You could of course go back and see the President or Kissinger, but from what I learned I’m not sure much could be accomplished. As for seeing Marty, I’m sure he would be glad to see you in either London or Paris during his current trip, if it’s not too late. Again, though, I’m not sure that much would be accomplished. I personally think the argument about not getting out ahead of the German bilateral Ost Politik negotiations is a hard one to answer. Of course, there may be some new developments since I left which have changed things. Sorry to present such an unencouraging picture on the Four Power talks, but that seems to be the way it is.” (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 74 D 430, F Personal Correspondence File)
Fessenden also forwarded a copy of this “composite letter” to Jonathan Dean, Political Counselor at the Embassy, sending the package immediately because “the information was too important to hold until I got back.” In an apparent reference to the July 3 memorandum from Dean to Rush (Document 94), Fessenden reported that he had delivered Dean’s “basic memo” to Hillenbrand and Sutterlin. “I didn’t have a chance to get their reactions fully,” he explained, “but you can see from their general approach as set forth in the composite letter that they were not exactly in harmony with your letter. There’s a real gap between the Embassy and Washington, and ‘Washington’ is not just Marty and Jim. It’s a real problem.” (Letter from Fessenden to Dean, July 9; National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, AMB/DCM Correspondence, 1970)