Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

94. Memorandum From the Political Counselor at the Embassy in Germany (Dean) to the Ambassador to Germany (Rush)¹

Bonn, July 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Overall Situation on East-West Negotiations

Following Abrasimov’s important presentation in Berlin on June 30, it may be useful to review the overall East-West situation as a background for the further development of our position on Berlin and Eastern policy generally.

As you know, I believe we are in practice engaged in the political equivalent of peace treaty negotiations for Germany. In the first instance, the existence of this negotiation complex rests on the position of the United States, on the view of the Nixon Administration that it wishes to move towards an era of negotiation. This position is evidenced by the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union and by the general support given by our government to the concept of a step by step improvement of East-West relations in Europe. The negotiation complex also rests on the willingness of the present German government formally to acknowledge the status quo which arose from World War II and in effect to move on from there politically. Finally, and perhaps decisively, it rests on the desire of the Soviet Union to go the route of negotiations, presumably to consolidate its hold over Eastern Europe, to gain better access to the rich economic systems of Western Europe, and to block the creation of a rival center of power in Western Europe. It is significant for Russian behaviour that the last occasion on which the Soviets appeared conciliatory about Germany was in the 1952–53 period, when another move toward European unity, the European Defense Community, was under serious discussion. It seems clear that without the willingness of each of these three main actors to negotiate, the present negotiations on the peace treaty equivalent could not take place.

It is quite clear that even given these essential preconditions the negotiating complex is a fragile structure which could come down at any time. First the situation in Southeast Asia or the Mid-East² may worsen, causing a sharp deterioration in US relations with the Soviet Union. Second, in each of the capitals of the three main European actors—the Soviet Union, Federal Germany and East Germany (Poland is less important in this context)—there are forces which favor the negotiating complex and those which oppose it. These forces are most easily identified in the Federal Republic, where they of course are the SPD–FDP government and the CDU opposition.³

In Eastern Germany, they apparently consist of a group headed by Stoph which believes that the consolidation of the East German regime can best be secured through the treaty complex and that the domestic political costs for the East German regime of such a settlement are not too large to be tolerated. The anti-negotiation group, apparently headed by Honnecker, claims in essence that the agreed goal of consolidating the GDR and advancing its international status can best be done by Soviet-East German cooperation in gaining diplomatic recognition from third countries and membership in international organizations, and that it is both unnecessary and highly dangerous in terms of domestic political attitudes to reach any negotiating agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Ulbricht plays a balancing role in this constellation.

Political forces in the Soviet Union are always less observable. I would, however, guess that there is a group within the Soviet leadership which supports negotiation complex and a second one, composed of the Soviet equivalent of the “military-industrial complex,”⁴ plus the Stalinists and the ideologists, who oppose such a settlement.

The pro-negotiation and anti-negotiation forces seem nearly even balanced in each case; this is clearly so in the case of Federal and East Germany. It seems probable that if the anti-negotiation forces should break through to a dominant position in any of the three political systems concerned, the whole negotiating complex would collapse, just as it would in the event of a marked deterioration in American-Soviet relations. The main components of the negotiating complex, either current or pending in the forseeable future, are:

1. The US-Soviet SALT negotiations, which provide the overarching evidence of political willingness to negotiation; these deal with the strategic military balance.

2. The pending negotiations on the European military balance.

3. The German negotiations with the Soviet Union, which give a framework for the territorial aspects of the quasi-peace treaty.

4. The German negotiations with Poland.

5. The Federal negotiations with East Germany.

6. The quadripartite negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin.

7. A possible Conference on European Security.

For the Soviets, the Conference on European Security has the role of confirming the whole package, improving access to the Eastern markets and, I would guess, braking the momentum of Western European unity. Objectively, in terms of the technical need of a peace treaty equivalent to deal with major outstanding questions, such a conference plays no essential role in the complex. We have little to gain from this conference if it comes last in the sequence. But we have considerable to lose if it comes earlier because politically it can make more difficult negotiated solutions in the two areas in this complex of greatest direct significance to us: Berlin and troops in Europe. If a Conference on European Security is held before we obtain satisfaction on both these points, it can on the one hand augment the status of the GDR without the Western side receiving any equivalent. It can also augment the public impression that all East-West issues have been settled and thus add greatly to downward pressures on NATO defense efforts, including American troop presence in Europe, before we have been able to stabilize this troop presence, as is my hope in a conference on the European military balance. For these reasons we should work hard to ensure that if a Conference on European Security takes place at all, it come at the end of the sequence.

We have discussed most of the other components. However, I would like to deal with two of these negotiations, the Berlin negotiations and the negotiations on the European military balance (MBFR) because they are both part of the negotiation complex in which the United States participates or would participate directly and because I do not believe that their place in the overall concept is yet seen very clearly.

As you know, I believe that the Berlin negotiations should be seen in the context of the overall negotiation complex, as part of a peace treaty settlement which can be expected to last for twenty or thirty years and possibly longer. Ideally, these negotiations should culminate in an agreed clarification of the status of Berlin, particularly the Western Sectors, in the light of changed circumstances. For tactical reasons, we have called these negotiations a search for practical improvements. This terminology is useful and should be maintained. But I believe it is misleading when used internally among ourselves because it distracts from a necessary attempt to define the ultimate objectives of the negotiations which I see as somewhat longer than practical improvements.

In the sense of defining our overall objectives, I believe we should aim for a situation in which the Soviets reaffirm the quadripartite status of Berlin, commit themselves not to interfere with its practical application by the three Western Allies in the Western sectors, explicitly accept the cultural, social and economic ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin and the Federal Republic’s representation of these ties abroad, plus an engagement on continuing Soviet responsibility for German-civilian access to Berlin and improvements in inner-German circulation. The result is what I call a two-tier or two-level structure, with a dual representation of Berlin abroad. The Allies represent Berlin “sovereignty” and security interests to the outside world. The Federal Republic represents other interests. This concept, it seems to me, provides a base from which we can in coming years observe the actual behaviour of the Soviets and East Germany in the event that the entire treaty complex goes into effect and can then decide whether to maintain, reduce, or even eliminate our actual presence in Berlin except in the most symbolic sense.⁵ Further details of this, however, are in my letter of June 25 to Jim Sutterlin⁶ which you have seen.

It may well be that other constructions can be found. But the important thing, I believe, is that the Berlin negotiations should in effect be considered an integral part of the overall complex. Consequently, whatever our nomenclature or tactics may be, we should conceive the negotiations as establishing a long-range settlement of the Berlin situation which is more tolerable for us than the simple continuation of the status quo.

Two things should perhaps be said of the Soviet position on Berlin. First, the things we are interested in will not cost the Soviets a great deal in terms of their major interests, except perhaps some friction with the GDR, whose own survival as a regime is in any case not involved in these talks as it may be in negotiations between the two parts of Germany. Second, although the Soviets are tough negotiators, they are realists. They know that the whole complex is bound together and that we consider it so. They know already that we can be relied on to oppose GDR entry into the UN, which they are committed to seek, unless there is a Berlin settlement satisfactory to us.⁷ Therefore, while we should avoid tactics which may bring the Soviets to question the existing situation even more than they now do, there seems good reason to push quite hard in Berlin both in terms of our own interests and the overall negotiating situation.

I believe negotiation on the European-military balance below the strategic level now being discussed in SALT has an integral place in this peace treaty complex. I recognize that these negotiations are not as far advanced as the others but believe they will move, and that we should back them. Negotiations on this subject, it seems to me, offer us the following potential benefits:

1. A way of controlling present domestic political pressures in the US, other than budgetary pressures, for reductions of US Forces. If negotiations on the topic are actually going on, we have an unassailable argument that our troops in Europe should not be simultaneously reduced.

2. A way of controlling future public opinion pressures in all NATO countries and especially the US for reduction of defense expenditures which might well result from exaggerated public evaluation of the significance of other portions of the negotiating complex, like the German-Soviet or Federal German-East German agreement, if these took place in isolation without such a means of stabilizing and capturing the reaction.

3. Perhaps we may assume that the strategic balance of terror between the US and the Soviet Union actually functions to prevent an all-out Soviet military attack on Western Europe and that in consequence what we are dealing with militarily is a potential range of attacks below that threshhold, that the possibility of those attacks is not great because of the risk of overall war, and that our principal problem is the psychological one of dealing with deep-rooted German sensitivities to the local military predominance of the Soviet Union in order to exclude an appeasement development. If so, these negotiations offer a way of stabilizing and if this must be, even reducing the American military presence in Europe, while limiting the adverse political consequences for German and European political opinion.

4. These negotiations provide a way of obtaining a new contractual basis from the American Senate for the essential long-term continuation of presence of US military forces in Germany.⁸ This is a central point in their favor.

It seems to me possible, evidenced by the latest Warsaw Pact statement on military balance negotiations, that the present leadership of the Soviet Union is also interested in negotiations on this topic. The Soviets, too, for the very reason of potential deteriorating relationships with Eastern governments, are seeking a new contractual basis for the retention of forces in Europe. An agreement could also give them a contractual guarantee against unilaterally desired increases in the German armed forces or in the American military forces in Europe. In view of the fact that the German armed forces are limited by the WEU treaty between Germany and its Western allies, an agreement about the military balance in Europe is in this regard comparable to the NPT treaty, which extended a Federal German obligation to the West to an obligation of the Federal Republic vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In view of these various interests, I believe it quite possible that the next two or three years could see conclusion of an agreement on this topic.

The essential question from our viewpoint is whether this overall development is in our interest. This is a complex subject. In general, the complex seems to me to have two major disadvantages for the United States. First, as briefly noted above, Western public opinion may conclude from the conclusion of only a part of the complex that the whole of the issues which led to the Cold War can be solved and the armies can all go home. Second, Soviet credibility as regards the prospects for further progress in the East would increase and, with it, Soviet capacity to influence the discussions of Western European governments on the unity issue. The first disadvantage can in part be compensated for with successful negotiations on a European arms blanace which should in practice put a floor under NATO force levels as well as a new ceiling. There is no solution in sight for the present⁹ one.

It can, however, be asked more generally whether the overall line of the development should or could be stopped. Here, it would appear, two factors predominate: First, the Germans in particular have already made a number of concessions which make it impossible to return to the original starting position. They have in the interests of getting the Soviets interested in the negotiations given away some of their negotiating points like the existence of two states, and at least theoretical willingness to sign on to present borders and have the East Germans in the UN. Since our overall position in Germany is weakened by this fact, the ensuing situation is an argument for staying in the game in order to get some payoff from the Soviets to redress the balance, particularly as regards Berlin.

Most important, the present trend of developments is in line with the domestic and foreign political developments in the US toward decreasing engagement in foreign affairs,¹⁰ tendencies which must inevitably have some effect on our posture with the Soviet Union and Europe.

This complex of negotiations with the Soviets is matched on the Western side by the Common Market negotiations with Great Britain and the other candidates for entry. These negotiations, too, should be added to the overall complex in order to have a general assessment. It seems to me that the possible outcome of this overall complex of important shifts in Europe is that, within a two or three year period, we will have Britain and the other candidates in the Common Market, and subject to the general fragility of the situation already described, the peace treaty settlement on Germany also put in effect.

The result will be a new ball game as far as the situation in Europe is concerned and also as far as the European-American relationship is concerned. Yet I would predict that, at that point, the position of Germany as a fulcrum in the East-West balance of power and the struggle over the position of Germany which has been a consequence of its importance in this regard, will continue in this new situation. But in a new framework: It will then probably take the form of a potential conflict, particularly in the minds of the political leaders of Germany of that time, between the measures necessary to build up Western Europe and their desire to expand their relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The governing factor will be their realization that the Soviet Union does not want a rival political-military entity in Western Europe and therefore will not tolerate further German or Western European penetration in Eastern Europe if such a policy leading to such an entity is energetically pursued. The contest will be between an anti-Soviet or Soviet-neutral picture of Western Europe and the concept which runs under the name of the “European Peace Order,” which envisages a high degree of association between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union.

This point is of course less a conclusion than a picture of the Europe which may emerge if the present negotiating complex goes into effect. My general conclusions are that, despite obvious difficulties, the peace treaty surrogate does have a chance of going into effect, that the changes it entails seem at least marginally to our benefit, and that in any event, it is improbable that the whole complex can be stopped short of a drastic change in the overall direction of American policy which cannot now be envisioned, or of a major shift in the Soviet government which is admittedly more possible.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 84, Bonn Post Files: Lot 72 F 81, POL–East/West Relations. Secret. Rush initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it. Dean presumably gave a copy to Fessenden, who then personally delivered it to Washington (see Document 95). Handwritten comments on that copy by Fessenden and Skoug are noted below. (National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 91 D 341, POL 39.1, 1970 Four Power Talks, July Commentary on Talks)
2. Fessenden underlined this word and wrote in the margin: “ME is the most critical threat to the structure.”
3. Fessenden marked this sentence with the comment: “This is the most serious crack in the fragile structure.”
4. Skoug questioned the use of this phrase, remarking: “Industry would favor better relations.”
5. Skoug disagreed with the conclusion of this paragraph: “5 goals, 3 of which are unattainable.”
6. In his letter to Sutterlin, Dean foresaw a Berlin agreement as the “counterpart” for agreements reached as a result of Ostpolitik: “Like them, this interim settlement would be one which does not assume better behaviour by the Eastern side as automatic merely because they have concluded an agreement. But through the act of concluding the agreement and through its content, a contractual standard by which we can measure the behaviour of the Eastern side would be established.” After a period of perhaps 5 to 15 years, the Western Allies would reevaluate Soviet conduct. “If this behaviour has been bad,” Dean explained, “I would assume we would want or be obliged to continue our full political and military presence in Berlin. If it were good, we could consider whether we could not deliberately shrink away our presence and emphasize the Federal German role.” (National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 91 D 341, POL 39.1, 1970 Four Power Talks, June Preparations for Meetings)
7. Skoug wrote in the margin at this point: “Is GDR membership in UN so important to USSR?”
8. Fessenden remarked: “Don’t see how the line could be held with Senate any better.”
9. Fessenden crossed out this word and wrote: “Second?”
10. Fessenden underlined this phrase and asked: “Does this really apply to Europe.”