Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

9. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

• The Berlin Crisis

I commend to you the attached comment on the state of play on the Berlin Bundesversammlung, prepared last night by the State Department (INR).² The analysis seems to me balanced and thorough, and I support the basic conclusions that (1) the GDR may be embarking on a campaign of increasing harassment directed against the FRG, which will reach a crescendo on or about March 5; (2) that in this endeavor they will enjoy the support of the Soviet Union; but (3) the Soviets will, however, steer clear of any act which implies interference with Allied rights in Berlin or suggests a danger of clear confrontation with the United States; and (4) Moscow will rein in Pankow if the latter grows overly-aggressive in its campaign of dirty tricks. On the last point, however, I would enter the caution that the momentum of the situation might become such that even if it is the Soviet intention to “rein in” the East Germans, they may have trouble doing so and hence find themselves with no option but to go into a full-fledged crisis.

The INR report was written prior to Dobrynin’s call on Secretary Rogers last evening, but the content of their conversation,³ I feel, tends to support the view that the Soviets will seek to avoid getting drawn into a major Berlin crisis at the very time they are seeking ways to get us into SALT talks. To that extent, at least, they understand the “negative” part of the interrelation that we have sought to establish between SALT and politics.

(At the same time, we must recognize that the last Administration bequeathed to us a tricky problem by its unwise insistence that⁴ the Bundesversammlung was a purely German matter;⁵ now the Soviets⁶ are playing this back to us by insisting that the pressure tactics being put in train against the FRG are in no way directed at us. I think it is important to correct this error lest, at worst, we leave the Soviets under a potentially fateful misapprehension or, at best, we give them a convenient tool to play us off against the Germans.⁷ I wish to discuss this problem with you before any decision is reached on the Soviet Ambassador’s request to see the President and on what line the President should take on that occasion.)

In view of the special indications of possible forthcoming military maneuvers in the GDR, and the scare interpretations in some press reports to the effect that the USSR was prepared to use her military force to assist the East Germans in a blockade of Berlin, I call your attention to the discussion on page 5 of the attachment covering varying interpretations of Marshal Yakubovsky’s travel to East Berlin on February 10 (he returned to Moscow about midday today).⁸ Both a TASS report yesterday and Moscow Radio in its announcement of Yakubovsky’s return today stated that he had been in Berlin for a meeting of “representatives of the armed forces of all Warsaw Pact countries,” with no special reference to the Berlin situation.⁹ This bland description should, of course, be read against the noise of rumors and reports stemming from East Berlin and other Eastern European capitals that specifically link Yakubovsky’s presence in Berlin to the Bundesversammlung issue.

On balance I suspect the visit may have been planned for some time in connection with pending Warsaw Pact matters, as suggested in the INR study. (Inter alia, Romanians rarely go to Warsaw Pact meetings these days without protracted prior haggling.) But the Soviets have now seen fit to allow the East Germans and others to make as much psychological hay out of the Marshal’s visit as possible.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. I. Secret; Noforn. Urgent; sent for action. Drafted by Lesh. A checkmark indicates that Kissinger saw the memorandum. With minor revisions and deletions, Kissinger transmitted the text of the memorandum in his written intelligence brief for the President on February 15. (Ibid., Box 2, President’s Daily Briefs, February 15–18, 1969) Several of the President’s markings on the text of the brief are noted below.
2. Attached but not printed is Intelligence Note 87 from Hughes to Rogers, February 13. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 GER W.
3. See Document 8.
4. On Kissinger’s intelligence brief, the President underlined the words “by its unwise insistence that.”
5. See Document 3.
6. The President underlined the words “purely German matter; now the Soviets.”
7. The President underlined this sentence on Kissinger’s intelligence brief.
8. On page 5 of the Intelligence Note, Hughes reported: “Soviet sources in East Berlin pointedly implied to the Western press that [Yakubovsky’s] visit was connected with the present campaign. We have no evidence one way or the other. There have been preparations under way for some kind of military maneuvers in the GDR, possibly along the Helmstedt autobahn route, and we have received other reports about exercises involving artillery demonstrations and/or parachute drops, perhaps in the corridors. Such exercises have taken place before, routinely on some occasions, although in other instances they were exploited to create a bit of tension when it suited Soviet purposes. It is conceivable that, weather permitting, some such military exercises will take place around the time of the Bundesversammlung session.” If Yakubovsky’s presence in Berlin was merely connected with “more general Warsaw Pact matters,” Hughes noted, it would “lose much of its ominous tone.”
9. This sentence is based on an attached set of INR briefing notes and a FBIS report on Yakubovsky’s return to Moscow; none printed.