Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

7. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

• East German Travel Ban and Berlin Contingency Planning

At least for the moment the limited East German (GDR) ban on Bundesversammlung-related travel to West Berlin appears to be a minimal GDR response.² This analysis has been supported by field reporting and consultation with State and CIA analysts.³ There are several intriguing aspects of the Berlin situation which are discussed below. In addition, you will find at Tab A a quick survey of applicable Berlin contingency planning; at Tab B the proposed text of our Tripartite reply to the Soviet protest of December 23 on Berlin;⁴ and at Tab C a long—but very good—background memo on Berlin.⁵

1. Degree of Soviet Support for GDR

While the timing of the February 4 Semenov/Tsarapkin⁶ visit to East Berlin to meet with Stoph and Honecker⁷ would seem to indicate that there was last-minute Soviet approval of the travel restriction, it is likely that the East Germans and Soviets have fairly basic differences over how far to press the propaganda and harassment directed against the forthcoming Bundesversammlung.

For the East Germans the issue is one of critical importance, very much bound up in questions of prestige and national pride. For the Soviets the Bundesversammlung must be seen as presenting a much wider range of options. If Moscow wanted to flex its muscles against the Western Allies, the Bundesversammlung could provide a target of opportunity. It could scarcely be more than that, since the Soviets have acquiesced in the past three Federal Assembly meetings in Berlin without making trouble.

But the best indications are that the Soviets themselves are looking forward to an “era of negotiations”⁸ not only with the US on limitation of strategic weapons systems, but with the West Germans (FRG) on civil air rights and possible broadening of commercial, cultural, and scientific ties. Furthermore, the note that Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin recently handed to Willy Brandt contained a strong Soviet pitch for West German signature of the NPT, including a suggestion of Soviet retreat on the alleged right of intervention under UN Articles 53 and 107.⁹

In short, this does not look like a time when the Soviets would want to provoke a major confrontation with the West over Berlin access rights, especially on the rather contrived issue of the Bundesversammlung.¹⁰ Our best guess is that the Soviets have agreed to the travel restriction as a concession to East German sensibilities, but will seek to avoid any serious escalation in Berlin during the weeks remaining before the March 5 Federal Assembly meeting.

The arrival in East Berlin on February 10 of Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky, Commander of Warsaw Pact Forces, was widely portrayed in the press today as evidence of Soviet saber-rattling in support of the GDR position in Berlin. There is no doubt that the East Germans would like to maintain that impression, but the best available intelligence indicates that Yakubovsky is in Berlin in connection with a joint GDR–USSR training exercise or demonstration, probably scheduled for this week.

2. New Element of Voting Rights

In the flurry of comment about the travel ban, it was generally overlooked that the East Germans had introduced a new element by challenging West Berlin voting rights at the Bundesversammlung as well. The GDR has charged that participation by West Berlin delegates in the election of a new Federal Republic president would be “illegal” as well as “provocative.”

In doing so, the East Germans are doubtless aware that they are playing on a longstanding difference between Bonn and the Western Allies. Only last year there was an FRG-Allied controversy over West German efforts to grant Bundestag voting rights to West Berliners.¹¹ The Allied position, for the record, has been very clear: we specifically deny West Berlin voting rights in the two federal legislative organs, the Bundestag and Bundesrat, but sanction participation of West Berlin delegates in the election of a new president at the Bundesversammlung because we do not consider this a legislative act.

3. GDR Not Necessarily Acting from Strength

The vehemence of the East German propaganda campaign against the Bundesversammlung and their apparent insistence on imposing the limited travel ban (certain elements of which, such as the singling out of West German military officers and staff, are obviously only for public show, since the GDR knows very well that Allied regulations already prohibit FRG military travel into Berlin) may be interpreted as an index of East German uneasiness and defensiveness about their own position in Berlin. They are keenly aware that the Western Allies, and especially the FRG, have recently been emphasizing to the Soviets that Four-Power agreements on Berlin apply to the entire city, not just to the Western Sector. The East Germans, fearing more serious future challenges to their own claims in East Berlin, may have concluded that offense is the best defense. Still, the situation is inherently unpredictable, and we cannot ignore the possibility of further East German or Soviet actions. Tab A is germane to the more likely of these.

Tab A

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON BERLIN

Berlin contingency planning is a highly specialized subject with a long and complex history. The texts of agreed Allied responses to various contingencies can, and do, fill volumes. Most attention, however, has been devoted to contingencies involving interference with various Allied rights in Berlin. The following is only a brief summary of possible next steps related to the new restrictions on FRG travel to Berlin, which so far pose no threat to Allied access to the city.

In effect we already have implemented our first contingency plan by agreeing to the February 10 Tripartite public statement (which had Bonn approval) on the Berlin situation.¹² The next steps may be divided into actions to be taken before February 15, and those that may be required after that date, when we begin to get an idea of exactly how the East Germans intend to enforce their ban. At each step, of course, there would be Allied consultation on further action, and plans would require approval at the highest level.

1. Before February 15

Our next step will be to follow up the Tripartite statement with a reinforced protest direct to the Soviet Union. The Bonn Group has recommended, and we concur, that the still-pending Allied reply to the Soviet démarche of December 23 be used for this purpose. The basic text of the reply (see Tab B) already has received Tripartite approval; it has now been somewhat sharpened, focused on the new GDR travel ban, and will be delivered to the Soviets (in Moscow by all three Allies) earlier than originally planned, preferably on February 13, the day preceding Prime Minister Wilson’s arrival in Berlin. In addition, the FRG will protest this week to the GDR through Inter-Zonal Trade channels, dropping a hint of possible reprisals against the flow of goods to the GDR, and will consider means of imposing a reciprocal ban on the entry of East German SED members into the FRG after February 15.

2. After February 15

On the basis of past experience, it appears possible that the GDR might choose to enforce its travel ban loosely, knowing full well that most movement of people and materials from West Germany into Berlin for the Bundesversammlung would be by air anyway. In that event, the ban would be revealed as basically a propaganda exercise with little practical effect, and no further coordinated Allied actions would be required or contemplated.

The earliest reports on February 10 from Berlin indicated that East German border guards had begun making a close check of the contents and documents of every fifth vehicle on the autobahn, approximately doubling normal checkpoint clearance time from a half-hour to an hour. This we regard basically as a threat of possible future action; so far there is no major interference with normal movement by road, and freight is moving normally.

There also is the possibility, however, that the GDR will apply the travel ban in the strictest possible terms, using stop-and-search techniques to cause severe rail tieups and massive traffic jams at the autobahn checkpoints. In that event, our contingency planning would call for a second and much sharper Tripartite protest to the Soviets. This would be coordinated with a more severe FRG warning to the GDR about Inter-Zonal Trade.

If the GDR were to continue severe harassment of surface travel after these protests, the next level of response would be actual imposition by the West Germans of selected Inter-Zonal Trade reductions, accompanied by parallel selective reductions in Allied trade with East Germany.

If there were complete blockage of FRG road, rail, and barge traffic into Berlin—through protracted and intentionally disruptive searches of carriers for West German officials or work materials related to the Bundesversammlung—contingency plans would call for an expanded Allied airlift into Berlin. This airlift, utilizing the three existing air corridors, would be mounted from Hannover, Frankfurt, and Munich. We are assured that the men and equipment needed for such an airlift are in place and ready to move on order. This action could be back-stopped by a complete stoppage of Inter-Zonal Trade by the West Germans, a complete Tripartite break in trade relations with East Germany, and diplomatic representations to all NATO members to induce them to suspend trade with the GDR.

If surface access to Berlin were to remain blocked for an extended period, presumably more than one week, an even more serious range of Allied actions would be contemplated. These would include augmentation of Allied military contingents in Berlin as well as a highly-publicized build-up in the emergency stockpiles maintained in the city. At present these stockpiles are adequate to meet military needs for up to six months, and civilian needs (basically food and fuel) for up to one year. Simultaneously, the Allies would ensure a substantial increase in Allied military traffic to and from Berlin over all routes.

You will note that this summary stops short of discussing the contingency of interruption of Allied air access to Berlin, since such a development would change the character of the entire confrontation. It would constitute prima facie evidence of a Soviet decision to challenge Western rights in Berlin, and as such would be regarded by the Allies as bordering on a casus belli. The range of contingency responses planned for such a crisis situation are beyond the scope of this paper. At this point, however, such a potentially catastrophic denouement in Berlin seems outside the realm of probability.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum to the President on February 11 under a note that reads: “In view of the information about Berlin, I thought you might like to take a look at the attached.” (Ibid.) The memorandum is based on one Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger on February 10. (Ibid.) According to another copy, Lesh drafted this memorandum to the President. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 285, Memoranda to the President, 1969–1974, Jan.–May 1969)
2. On February 9 the official SED newspaper Neues Deutschland published a decree issued the previous day by the East German Minister of Interior banning travel to West Berlin for the Bundesversammlung starting February 15. (Telegram 178 from Berlin, February 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–10) For text of the decree, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1027–1028.
3. At a meeting on February 9 of the Bonn Group, the standing body of British, French, U.S., and West German representatives for consultation on Berlin, Van Well reported that Duckwitz and Von Hassel “both agreed that GDR measures would not impede actual Bundesversammlung convocation in Berlin. Initial FRG reaction therefore was to play down significance of East German announcement, and keep fingers crossed there would be no further measures.” (Telegram 1768 from Bonn, February 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1969–76, POL 38–10) In a memorandum to the President on February 9, Kissinger explained that the West German Government was apparently waiting to determine whether the decree was “the beginning of a new East German propaganda offensive, or an isolated communication connected in some way with Tsarapkin’s recent presentation to Willy Brandt.” (Ibid., Nixon President Materials, NSC Files, Box 2, President’s Daily Briefs, February 9–14, 1969)
4. Tabs B and C are attached but not printed. The text of Tab B is in telegram 21914 to Bonn, February 11. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 28 GER B)
5. Tab C is an undated 24-page paper, evidently drafted by the Department of State, on the postwar role of the Allies and West Germany in Berlin.
6. Soviet diplomats. [Footnote in the original.]
7. East German leaders. [Footnote in the original.]
8. Reference is to the President’s inaugural address, in which Nixon declared that the superpowers should move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 1–4)
9. In a meeting on January 10 Tsarapkin gave Brandt a Soviet note addressing the connection between German signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Soviet abandonment of its “right” to intervene in Germany under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, February 8, as transmitted in telegram WH 1055, February 8, to Key Biscayne; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs, February 1–8, 1969) For a German record of the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 31–37. Article 107 of the UN Charter reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.” Article 53 cited this provision as an exception to the requirement of authorization from the Security Council for enforcement action by regional organizations. For full text of the Charter, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949, pp. 117–140.
10. In a January 30 memorandum, Kissinger briefed the President on recent Soviet efforts to arrange a deal with the West Germans, thereby avoiding a “major confrontation” over Berlin. According to Egon Bahr, Kissinger reported, the Soviets were offering “improvements” in bilateral relations in exchange for a decision to move the Bundesversammlung out of Berlin. Kissinger, however, added a caveat: “My experience with Bahr confirms that he is totally unreliable and never really wanted to hold the meeting in West Berlin in the first place.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 2, President’s Daily Briefs, Jan 28–31, 1969)
11. The reference is apparently in error. West German political leaders debated the issue of Berlin voting rights amongst themselves, as well as with Allied representatives, during the negotiations to form a new government in November 1966. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XV, Documents 186–189.
12. For text of the statement, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1028–1029.