Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

68. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 25, 1970, 1523Z.

3279. Subj: FRG State Secretary Bahr on the Gromyko–Bahr Talks.

1. State Secretary Bahr invited Ambassador Rush and the UK and French Ambassadors to come to the Chancellor’s office March 24 to give them a report on the most recent phase of his talks with Gromyko.² State Secretary Duckwitz was present.

2. Bahr said he would give a brief report on the latest talks with Gromyko and make a few remarks on the pending Berlin negotiations (septel)³ because the two subjects were related. With regard to his most recent talks with Gromyko, he could state that they had not advanced “a fraction of a millimeter.” There had been no closing of the gap on a series of points which had been discussed again and again during the talks. Agreement had been reached on exchange of consulates between Hamburg and Leningrad but this agreement should by no means be overvalued in a political context.

3. Bahr said he would like to mention one point in particular confidence. He had raised with Gromyko a hardcore group of humanitarian cases involving Germans where reunion of family members was at stake. The cases mostly involved mixed marriages with a German wife or husband and a Russian spouse. Bahr said he gave the Soviets details on 50 of the most tragic cases of this kind, of which the Soviets had agreed to resolve 40. About 100 persons were involved. The Soviets did not want this topic discussed in public and it was very much in the German interest not to do so, because there were other cases of reunification of families they wished to pursue.

4. As regards the negotiation points where there was still no agreement, a main one was the pressure from the Soviet side for the FRG to accept a definition of its relationship with East Germany not distinguishable from recognition. The Soviet formulation had been very slightly less adamant than in the past in that they did not explicitly demand that the FRG “recognize” East Germany, but said that the relationship between the two German states should be one on the basis of international law. Bahr said he had mentioned to Gromyko the Erfurt formula used by Brandt to the effect that, provided the GDR was willing to acknowledge that it was not a foreign country as far as the FRG was concerned, the FRG was prepared to conclude treaties with it that would have binding force in international law.

5. Bahr said the second point the Soviets pushed was for change in the FRG position concerning GDR relations with third countries. Bahr had told the Soviets flatly that he was not in a position to say anything positive on this point.

6. Bahr said there had been little progress on a third point. The Soviets had indicated that they were ready to respect the FRG view that the FRG could not enter into treaties with it or other countries which violated commitments it had already made with other parties, i.e., in this regard, the London and Paris agreements with the three Western powers.⁴ Bahr pointed out to Gromyko that this naturally included the status of Berlin. The Berlin topic had not otherwise been discussed.

7. Bahr said that, finally, an important point he had raised with the Soviets was that the FRG wanted other countries as well as the GDR to recognize the requirement in the FRG Basic Law that Germans should have the right to self-determination. The Soviets had made absolutely clear in return that they were not in a position to discuss this topic or to agree to it in any form. Bahr said that he was not permitted this indulgence, but he did have a certain degree of understanding for the Soviet position on this specific point. Bahr’s implication was that explicit Soviet acceptance of the self-determination point would mean formal Soviet recognition of the German intention to change the status quo at some later time even if by peaceful means.

8. Bahr noted that it would be impossible to discuss the topic of the continuation of his talks with Gromyko within the German Government in any conclusive way for several weeks. Foreign Minister Scheel was absent and would have to participate. Scheel’s absence would be followed by the Chancellor’s visit to the U.S. It would be the third week of April before the Cabinet could come to grips with this issue. Bahr reported that he and Gromyko had not agreed on any new day for a further meeting. Neither side considered itself under any time pressure. However, the Germans would want to continue their exchanges prior to the Kassel meeting of Brandt and Stoph on May 21.

9. Bahr made a side remark that he had several indications in his March 21 talk with Gromyko that at the time Bahr talked with him, the latter had not yet received any confidential reports of the afternoon plenary or tete-a-tete sessions between Brandt and Stoph. Gromyko had been fully informed on the details of public speeches made by both Brandt and Stoph but made some remarks which argued ignorance of the later sessions. Brandt said that this might indicate that the East Germans had been rather slow in reporting on the talks to the Soviets. In reply to a question from Ambassador Rush, Bahr stated that no documents had been exchanged with the Soviets in the renunciation-of-force negotiations.

10. Comment: The hard realism of Bahr’s overall assessment of the negotiations strikes us as a conscious and deliberate tone-setter for Brandt’s presentations on Eastern policy in his forthcoming Washington visit.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. In a memorandum of March 23, McManis briefed Kissinger as follows: “Bahr reported to the FRG Cabinet on March 19 on the status of his talks with Gromyko. Agreement was reached, Bahr reported, that the FRG would support a GDR application for UN membership with the objective of getting both German states accepted as members. Secondly, there was agreement that both the USSR and the FRG would work toward bringing about a conference on European security. Bahr and Gromyko did not agree to formulations on the renunciation of force agreement because of Soviet insistence that the FRG recognize GDR borders, nor did they agree on the question of the relationship between the FRG and the GDR and reunification.” The report went to the President who circled “Bahr” in the text and wrote in the margin: “He gave them everything!” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 20, President’s Daily Briefs, March 21–March 31, 1970)
3. Document 67.
4. Reference is evidently to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, signed in London on October 3, 1954; and the Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in Germany, signed in Paris on October 23, 1954. For text of the two agreements, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 419–438.