Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

67. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 25, 1970, 1514Z.

3278. Subj: FRG State Secretary Bahr on Quadripartite Negotiations on Berlin.

1. Following his report to the US, UK and French Ambassadors concerning the present status of the FRG-Soviet talks (septel),² State Secretary Bahr said he would like to make a few observations on the pending Four-Power talks on Berlin.

2. Bahr said he was pleased to note from the preparatory work that all of those involved on the Western side—the US, UK, France and the FRG—were of the view that the talks could not be confined to the topic of West Berlin alone. All four desired to see the continuation of the Four-Power status of Berlin, which should be the basis for the talks and for the future. Bahr said that one possible goal of the talks would be to say that they were intended to describe the present status of Berlin and to interpret it. As was known, the Soviet view was that only West Berlin was the appropriate subject of the talks and that there was nothing to say about East Berlin. It was possible that confrontation between the Western desire to discuss all of Berlin and the presumed Soviet position could result in deadlock early in the talks.

3. Bahr said that it was for this reason that he had introduced his formula that both sides should confirm their understanding of the attributes of the Berlin status at present, and it should be agreed that each power was competent to act as he considered right in his own sector insofar as there was not agreement on common action. This principle could be agreed on as a part of the overall agreed status of Berlin. The formula could also be used as a basis of parity of discussion to talk about all of Berlin, including East Berlin.

4. Bahr said to take the other possible tack and to insist in effect that the Four-Power status of Berlin should actually be applied in full in all parts of the city would be to attempt to undo the entire past and would be wholly unsuccessful.

5. Ambassador Rush noted that Bahr’s formula was interesting and deserved serious study. It did have one weakness in that if one adhered to the view that each was wholly competent in his own sector then, in theory, it could be legitimate for the Soviets to take action in their own sector which in fact violated the Four-Power status of Berlin. UK Ambassador Jackling said that there was much in Bahr’s formula which he liked, like the concept of the authority of each power in its own sector. But this exercise of authority was always subject to an overall responsibility to Berlin as a whole. This Four-Power responsibility was a legal fiction, but it had to be observed in order to maintain the rest of the structure. French Ambassador Seydoux was concerned that if each were supreme in his own sector, there would be no Four-Power status left. Allied protests about events in the East sector might be ineffective at present, but if they were wholly abandoned, the Soviets and the East Germans might draw the wrong conclusion about the Four-Power status of Berlin.

6. Bahr agreed. He said the Four-Power status of the whole city had to be maintained by all, but that beyond this, the viability of the Western sectors represented for him a higher interest than the effort, for example, to reattach East Berlin to the West sectors. He said he believed it was more important for the viability of the city to achieve unrestricted free access to Berlin, un-harassed by Ulbricht, than the question of on what modalities a few Allied soldiers could go into East Berlin.

7. Ambassador Rush said one could compare Bahr’s concept to the situation of a federal government and its component states. A federal government could have a narrow range of competence and its component states a much broader one, but all the rights of both levels would be derived from one source. Applied to Berlin, this would mean the rights of the sector powers would be considered to have been derived from the original assumption of power and Four-Power status. The area of common Four-Power action might be limited as all would have to agree on each action: in the component sectors, each would interpret his own responsibilities in terms of overall status.

8. UK Ambassador Jackling said that he did not intrinsically object to the Bahr formula and the other versions which had been advanced, but if it came to the point of advancing it in the talks, this should be in return for something worth having from the other side.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. Document 68.