Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

388. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 20, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Initial Contacts with East Germany

As a consequence of West Germany’s treaty with East Germany, we and our Allies are close to making our own first official contacts with East Germany (the GDR). Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum (at Tab A)² informing you of how he plans to go about this. He also points out that the British and, especially, the French want to move more rapidly than we. It is possible that the French will send a message to the GDR proposing discussions on diplomatic relations as early as December 22, the day after West Germany signs its Basic Treaty with the GDR.

The Secretary proposes in his memorandum that we use the opportunity of a courtesy call on Ambassador Bush by the GDR observer at the United Nations to indicate to him our willingness to start discussing relations. The French and possibly the British may want to send a message directly to the GDR government. The Secretary believes that our approach on this initial contact makes us look less eager since we will be utilizing an already existing channel and permitting the East Germans to talk with us without their feeling required to reply to a formal message such as the British and French want to send them. In both our approach and the British and French, however, care would be taken to make specific reference to the Quadripartite rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole so that we all three are on record in our first dealings with the GDR that our diplomatic relations with them will be within that framework.

Once the initial contact is made by us and by the British and French, there will be tripartite consultations, probably in January, to harmonize our further steps toward establishment of formal diplomatic relations and to make certain that there is tripartite agreement on how to handle issues such as claims and the practical problems connected with setting up embassies in East Berlin. Then formal negotiations will begin. A possible timetable is:

• —December 21: signature of FRG–GDR Basic Treaty;
• —December 22 or before January 1: French (and possibly British) messages to the GDR;
• —early January: our initial talks at the U.N. with the GDR observer;
• —late January: Tripartite (US, UK, France) meeting to harmonize formal approach to the GDR;
• —post-January: formal discussions, probably in Washington, London, and Paris;
• —late April: FRG parliament’s ratification of the Basic Treaty with the GDR;
• —early May: FRG “permanent representation” established in East Berlin;
• —post-May: France, UK, and US embassies established in East Berlin.

Once we make the initial contact with the GDR the path to establishment of formal relations is probably irreversible, though we can retain some control over timing.

The West Germans have agreed to this general scenario. They will be kept informed as it unfolds. Their main concern is that the three and especially the US avoid any dramatic statements in initiating contacts or establishing relations with the GDR, that we avoid saying we are “recognizing” the GDR, and that we delay sending an ambassador to East Berlin until the FRG has installed its permanent representative there.

I believe that the Secretary’s proposed approach is generally satisfactory. It is preferable for the British and French to take the lead, and there is no disadvantage to us if they use a slightly different method of making their initial contacts with the GDR. (There are domestic political pressures from the left on Pompidou to move quickly and pressures on Heath from commercial circles.)

It is essential, however, that we avoid a situation where the East Germans manage to respond to our, later, preliminary contact first, engaging us in formal talks before the British and French. It is also important that we keep in closest possible touch with the FRG on our East German policy, even if this risks delays and frictions with the British and the French. For Brandt’s government relations with the GDR remain the most sensitive and emotional of all foreign policy issues. Our interest in good relations with his government on East-West security issues generally dictates maximum accommodation to Brandt on East Germany, where our interests, except for Berlin, are minor.³

In informing the Secretary that his proposed approach is satisfactory, I have urged (a) that he take care that we not get out ahead of the British and French in talking with the GDR either in the initial or the subsequent, more formal phase, and (b) that he make sure as an overriding requirement that the West Germans are carefully consulted as we go down the road to establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR.

There is no need for action on your part at this time, unless you believe that we should adopt a different approach.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, East Germany, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. Butterfield stamped the memorandum to indicate that the President had seen it; according to a typewritten note attached to a copy, Nixon still had the memorandum as of December 26. (Ibid.) In a memorandum forwarding a draft to Kissinger on December 19, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “We have now reached the stage where the State Department is about to initiate contacts with the GDR. Steps in this direction so far have been made without overall guidance from us, except on the Four-Power Declaration, and indeed without the President having been fully informed. The contact with the GDR now proposed by State will put us on the path to diplomatic relations. I think the time has therefore come to give Secretary Rogers Presidential guidance for the steps which he proposes to take.” (Ibid.)
2. Dated December 18; attached but not printed. Butterfield stamped the memorandum to indicate that the President had seen it.
3. Nixon wrote and circled “no” at the end of this paragraph. He also wrote in the margin nearby: “K—Do absolutely nothing which plays to Brandt (regardless of his election).”
4. Nixon wrote at the end of the memorandum: “I disagree. No courtesy call. Keep it cool. K—In the future submit this type of decision to me only— Don’t leave to N.S.C. staff or State Bureaucrats—. K—the State Bureaucracy is pro-Brandt pro-Socialist—I totally disagree with their approach. From now on all decisions are to be submitted to me on German matters.” Kissinger, who initialed the memorandum to indicate he had seen these remarks, also wrote the following message to Sonnenfeldt: “Hal did you notice the P’s notes?” Nixon, however, either did not write or did not forward his instructions before December 26 (see footnote 1 above). By then, Kissinger had already replied on his behalf. In a memorandum to Rogers on December 20, Kissinger approved the proposed telegram subject to the following points: 1) the French and British should take the lead; 2) the President should review the “harmonized” approach after the tripartite meeting in January; and 3) West Germany should be consulted “on our initial contact, formal bilateral discussions, and all other aspects of our negotiations” with East Germany. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, East Germany, Vol. I) The Department sent the revised telegram to the Embassy in Germany on December 21. (Telegram 230126 to Bonn; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 GER E)