Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 6, 1971, 1721Z.

11010. Subject: Ambassador Rush’s August 31 Meeting With CDU/CSU Leaders on Berlin Agreement.

1. Summary. Ambassador Rush held a luncheon meeting with CDU/CSU leaders Barzel, Schroeder, Heck, Gradl, Werner Marx and Leo Wagner on August 31 to acquaint them with US Government’s viewpoint on the Berlin quadripartite agreement and to request the cooperation of the CDU/CSU Bundestag Fraktion in dealing with this topic in the future. Judging from first reactions, the discussion was highly useful. End summary.

2. Ambassador Rush began by pointing out that President Nixon had taken the initiative to start the Berlin talks in his February 1969 speech at the Siemens plant in Berlin.² Before the talks formally began, the President had formulated the US negotiating goals. He had asked Ambassador Rush to stay close in touch with him during the entire negotiation, which the Ambassador had done on a frequent basis. The President had now approved the agreement in full and had told the Ambassador that he was highly pleased with the results.³ The President had very close ties with the CDU/CSU and would consider it unfortunate if there were conflict or controversy between the American Government and the CDU/CSU over the Berlin agreement. President Nixon had confidence in the CDU leadership, with which he had remained in close touch throughout the negotiations, particularly with CDU leaders Barzel and Schroeder.

3. Barzel replied that the CDU was very satisfied with its cooperation with President, with the Ambassador and with his staff. The talks with the President had been most helpful in maintaining a common CDU line with the Brandt government throughout the initial period of the talks. The crisis had come with the Federal Government when the Western powers advanced the February 5, 1971 draft to the Soviets without the FRG having raised the draft for previous discussion with the opposition.⁴ Nevertheless, since that time the CDU had continued to maintain a moderate position. There was no need for special thanks on either side since the CDU regarded continued close cooperation with the American Government a matter of course, but he did wish to thank the Ambassador for his very close cooperation. He could assure the Ambassador that the CDU would not criticize points in the agreement for which the Allies were primarily responsible. The points which it would criticize were those which the Federal German Government, in its rush to move for ratification of the FRG-Moscow treaty, had urged be brought into the text. The close cooperation with the US would continue during the period of inner-German negotiations on the agreement.

4. Barzel said that he thought that the concept of the final protocol would make it impossible for the Soviets to establish a reverse linkage between the signature of the protocol, and the coming into effect of the Berlin agreement, and ratification of the German-Soviet treaty. Ambassador Rush agreed that this would be most difficult. The Soviets had boxed themselves in with their continued rejection of the idea that there was any linkage between the two. Barzel said the FRG Government appeared to be hesitating about the extent in which it was willing to cooperate with the CDU/CSU in the next phase of talks. He implied that the text of the quadripartite agreement showed that the Allies had successfully rejected the concept of acknowledgment of East German visas. He said that the CDU/CSU would be carefully following the Federal Government position to see whether the FRG in the inner-German agreement acknowledged East German visas. Ambassador Rush said the visa question had been very toughly fought over. It had not been possible to gain their abolition but there was some prospect that payment of individual visa fees might be done away with in the course of inner-German talks.

5. Gradl asked Ambassador Rush whether there had been understanding with the Soviets that during the period of validity of the Berlin agreement there would be no change in the status of East Berlin. Ambassador Rush said this was the effect of the agreement. The agreement contained a provision against unilateral change in the status quo. Moreover, he himself had intervened with Abrasimov concerning the then pending East German election law to point out that if the distinction made in the previous law between the Eastern sector and the GDR were to be dropped, this would be regarded as a major unilateral change. Subsequently, the East German election law had been published and the new version maintained the previous distinction between the Eastern sector and East Germany.

6. Werner Marx asked whether, if the GDR gained international recognition and became a member of the UN, this would enable it or the Soviet Union to say that the Soviet commitment on access was no longer valid. Ambassador Rush said that the text of the quadripartite agreement bound both the Soviet Union and East Germany as regards access.

7. Barzel asked whether the Ambassador considered there were time pressures on the Soviet Union which would cause them to press the GDR to move to rapid conclusion of the inner-German agreement. Ambassador Rush said he would not be surprised to see conclusion of the inner-German agreements and signature of the final quadripartite protocol prior to the December NATO ministerial. Nonetheless, there had been frequent indications during the negotiations of differences between the Soviets and GDR; the relationship was not a simple master-servant one.

8. Marx asked the Ambassador about the practical significance of the formulation in annex III which provided that West Berliners could enter East Berlin or East Germany under conditions comparable to those in force for other persons. Ambassador Rush said that as far as he was concerned the West Berliners should receive treatment equal to that given anyone else, including East Bloc nationals.

9. Ambassador Rush stressed the general need for continued close German-American cooperation. Barzel replied that like President Nixon, the CDU wanted to retain its old friends. He had taken seriously the warning of the President to him that German political leaders should do their utmost to prevent division of the country over Eastern policy. This position had been an important component of the CDU/CSU’s willingness to cooperate on Berlin. The CDU would continue to cooperate on Berlin, but this did not mean a change in its negative position with regard to ratification of the German-Soviet treaty.

10. Barzel then asked Ambassador Rush whether he thought it would be desirable for the CDU to hold a Fraktion meeting in Berlin in September. Ambassador Rush said he did not consider it politic to do so until the quadripartite agreement had been signed. To act otherwise would merely elicit a counter reaction from the East Germans and create bad blood at the time of the inner-German negotiations. Barzel said he had committed himself to meet with the Fraktion in Berlin sometime this year. This was a political obligation he would have to honor. Ambassador Rush said he could understand if the CDU felt it would have to meet in Berlin this year. This meeting could be held on the basis of the new agreement or on the old basis.⁵

11. Dr. Gradl asked whether the Ambassador did not think that the commitment undertaken by the Western powers to the Soviet Union to the effect that Allied decisions that the Western sectors did not continue to be a constituent part of the FRG and not governed by it would not weaken the status of the Western sectors. Ambassador Rush replied that the contrary was the case. The Soviets had now explicitly acknowledged the Allied intention to remain there. This seemed to him to consolidate the protection given to the Western sectors by the Allies.

12. After the luncheon concluded, Barzel again thanked the Ambassador and offered the continued cooperation of the CDU with the USG or Berlin and on other matters of concern to the Allies.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USNATO. A copy was sent to the White House for Kissinger.
2. See Document 17.
3. See Document 324.
4. For text of the Western draft agreement of February 5, see Document 173. Regarding the failure of the government to consult the opposition on the draft, see Documents 179 and 189.
5. The CDU/CSU parliamentary party group met in Berlin on December 6 and 7.