17. Editorial Note
On February 27, 1969, 1 week before the Bundesversammlung meeting, President Nixon arrived in West Berlin to demonstrate U.S. support for the freedom and viability of the city. In an address at the Siemens factory that afternoon, the President delivered a warning to the Soviet Union and East Germany: “No unilateral move, no illegal act, no form of pressure from any source,” he declared, “will shake the resolve of the Western nations to defend their rightful status as protectors of the people of free Berlin.” Nixon, however, also offered an olive branch:
“The question before the world is not whether we shall rise to the challenge of defending Berlin—we have already demonstrated that we shall. The question is how best to end the challenge and clear the way for a peaceful solution to the problem of a divided Germany. When we say that we reject any unilateral alteration of the status quo in Berlin, we do not mean that we consider the status quo to be satisfactory. Nobody benefits from a stalemate, least of all the people of Berlin. Let us set behind us the stereotype of Berlin as a ‘provocation.’ Let us, all of us, view the situation in Berlin as an invocation, a call to end the tension of the past age here and everywhere.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pages 156–158)
In his memoirs, Willy Brandt claims that “we had persuaded President Nixon that he ought to give a sign” during his visit for negotiations on Berlin. “This he did in a constructively worded speech at the Siemens works in Berlin.” (People and Politics, pages 194, 388) For memoir accounts of Nixon’s visit to Berlin, see Kissinger, White House Years, pages 100, 407; Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pages 269–270; and Walters, Silent Missions, pages 562–563.
On March 3 Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin mentioned Nixon’s speech on Berlin during a luncheon with Kissinger. According to the memorandum of conversation, Dobrynin opened the discussion by noting that the Soviet Union had closely followed news of the President’s trip:
“Except for some phrases in Berlin, it [Soviet Union] had found nothing objectionable. He [Dobrynin] asked whether these phrases indicated any new commitment to German unification. I [Kissinger] replied that the purpose of the Berlin speech was to emphasize existing American commitments, not to undertake new ones. I also told him that we viewed any harassment of Berlin with the utmost gravity. Dobrynin replied that the only concern of the Soviet Union was to prevent a change in the status quo in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe. The Bonn government had deliberately created a provocation. I replied that a clear precedent existed so that one could hardly talk of provocation.”
After reporting a readiness to use the Kissinger channel for a “strictly confidential exchange on delicate and important matters,” Dobrynin raised matters relating to Europe, particularly Germany and Berlin. Since Kissinger had previously foresworn any “interest in undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe,” Dobrynin had been authorized to deny any “intention of undermining the status quo in Western Europe.”
“The Soviet Union was interested that the United States acted on the basis of the actual conditions in Europe. I [Kissinger] asked whether that meant that the Soviet Union did not care about formal recognition of Eastern Germany. Dobrynin replied that this was correct. I added that for us it was essential to get the access procedures to Berlin regularized. Dobrynin suggested that there had been many positive developments in the negotiations of 1963 to 1969 crisis that might be reexamined. He refused to specify what those were but said he would go over the record and give me some indication later. He urged me to do the same, indicating that Moscow’s attitude was ‘positive.’”
At the end of the meeting, Dobrynin asked whether “Soviet reassurance was enough to get German ratification” of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Kissinger replied that if the Soviets could meet German concerns on specific provisions in the treaty, “either through us or directly, it would ease the problem of signature considerably.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969 [Part 2])
[Page 50]Kissinger regularly briefed the President on developments before the Bundesversammlung convened on March 5. On March 3 he reported that the autobahn to Berlin “was not closed today as it has been the past two days.” As a result, five American convoys had tested access to the city with minimal interference. Kissinger also cited reports of “an 11th-hour move to avert a looming Berlin crisis,” including a “new offer” from Walter Ulbricht. (Ibid., Box 3, President’s Daily Briefs, March 1–10, 1969) The following day, Kissinger noted that, although the situation was “relatively quiet,” intelligence sources indicated that East Germany might impose “an almost total blockade of ground access routes from 3 to 7 March.” (Ibid.) On March 5, as delegates to the Bundesversammlung met to elect a new president, Kissinger reported that “Soviet and East German forces around and to the west of Berlin are on alert status, and have the capacity to isolate the city by land and air.” He doubted, however, that “the Soviets would risk such a challenge to Allied rights of access.” (Ibid.) In a memorandum to the President on March 6, Kissinger described the outcome as follows:
“Almost as an anticlimax the West German Federal Assembly met yesterday in Berlin and elected Minister of Justice Gustav Heinemann to succeed retiring President Heinrich Luebke. Heinemann led the first two ballots but failed to achieve the required majority; on the third ballot, when only a plurality was needed he was elected.
“During the day all three of the Berlin Autobahns were closed approximately four hours for the first time during the recent tension. There was no attempt to interfere with traffic in the air corridors, and the rumors of a complete sealing of all Berlin checkpoints proved false. Generally, the election proceeded in an atmosphere of unexpected calm.” (Ibid.)
In his memoranda to the President, Kissinger did not link developments in Berlin with events along the Ussuri River, where Soviet and Chinese forces clashed on March 2 in a dispute over Damansky or Chenpao Island. The combatants, however, did make the connection. In a report to East German leaders on March 8, the Soviets claimed that Chinese action revealed an intention to engage in “opportunistic political flirtation” with the United States and West Germany. “It is no accident,” they concluded, “that the ambush on the Soviet border unit was staged by the Chinese agencies at a time when Bonn started its provocation of holding the election of the Federal President in West Berlin.” (Christian F. Ostermann, “East German Documents on the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996 (Issues 6/7), pages 188–190)
During his secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, Kissinger heard the other side of the story from Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai. “At that time,” Chou recalled, “there was high tension over the Berlin question because the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to have elections for its Parliament in West Berlin. The Soviet authorities created [Page 51] the Chenpao incident so that all the Parliamentarians from West Germany could go to West Berlin to have the elections there, and so undo the crisis.” When Kissinger questioned his interpretation, Chou replied: “Of course, because Ulbricht found himself in a very difficult situation the Soviets made it appear that we created trouble. However, it was they who deliberately created the incident to escape responsibilities over Berlin.” See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVII, Document 141. For his published account, see Kissinger, White House Years, pages 145–146, 173.