Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

279. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, August 6, 1971, 12:13–12:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Negotiations: Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • John N. Irwin, II
  • Martin Hillenbrand
  • Joseph Neubert
  • James Sutterlin
• Defense
  • David Packard
  • Armistead Selden
  • Col. Frederick Ackerson
• JCS
  • LTG Richard T. Knowles
  • Brig. Gen. Francis J. Roberts
• CIA
  • LTG Robert E. Cushman
  • Mr. Arthur Stimson
• NSC
  • William Hyland
  • Arthur Downey
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

(1) State would prepare a memorandum which:

(a) states the issues;

(b) outlines the status of negotiations on the other key issues;

(c) indicates the three or four major concessions we should get in order to make the other parts of the agreement acceptable;

(d) states the consensus of the SRG that, if we can get concessions on a few major items in each category, and if the only way is by giving on the Consulate General, Ambassador Rush should be authorized to do so.

(2) If it appeared that we might not get all the concessions we wanted but that our allies were putting pressure on us to give in on the consulate and would blame us if we held out and the agreement failed as a result, Ambassador Rush would come back for instructions;

(3) We would put specific restrictions on the activities of the Consulate General which would be spelled out in the document which conveys the President’s decision.

(Mr. Irwin was not present at the beginning of the meeting.)

Mr. Kissinger: It appears that we have reached the ironic situation in these negotiations that some of us predicted. The German Government undertook an agreement with the Soviets. The quid pro quo to obtain German approval of the Moscow Treaty was to be an agreement on Berlin. The argument had been that the Moscow Treaty could not be ratified without obtaining the benefits of the Berlin Agreement. Now they are in the position that they need the Berlin Agreement in order to get ratification of the Moscow Treaty, and we are being asked to offer a major concession (a Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin) in order to get Soviet concessions sufficient to make the Berlin Agreement palatable to the Germans, in order to get ratification of the Moscow Treaty! In other words, the Germans are paying twice. And whatever the outcome, we will be blamed. Is that a fair statement of the situation?

Mr. Hillenbrand : A reasonably fair statement.

Mr. Kissinger: This is in the best tradition of German foreign policy. This could have been conceived only by the nation that got into World War I without wanting to.

(Mr. Irwin arrived.)

Mr. Kissinger: The basic point now is the issue of a Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin. The President wishes to decide this personally, since the issue may escalate rapidly to the Brandt level. If the President approves, the German opposition will have a field day. If he disapproves, he will have to deal with Brandt. The issue is also of some consequence in our relations with the Soviets and may, in fact, torpedo a Berlin settlement. (to Mr. Hillenbrand) Marty, what precisely are the objections to a Soviet Consulate General? I know them, but we should be sure we all agree on them. Why is this such a difficult pill to swallow?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The primary objection is that it grants a degree of Soviet presence of a formal nature in West Berlin. This could become a center for increased Soviet activity which ultimately might result in a fundamental change in the status of the Soviets in West Berlin and form the basis of expanded Soviet operations.

Mr. Kissinger: Is this your view or are you summarizing the objections?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I am giving a summary of the objections. I agree there is a real danger. But I think that if we maintain the proper controls, we can hamper the development of the Soviet presence so that it does not become a major problem. Keeping Soviet institutions under control is difficult, but we have the means to do so if we have the will. There are also some legal objections—some feeling that a concession on this would denigrate from our longstanding legal position. Also, there are some psychological factors. A Soviet Consulate would be an immediately visible condition of the agreement to the West Berliners and they would see it as a major concession. The benefits of the agreement would not be as visible.

Mr. Packard: There would be no objection if the Consulate worked under the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, but the Soviets won’t agree.

Mr. Kissinger: What if it were accredited to the three Commandants or to the Commandant of the Sector in which it was located?

Mr. Sutterlin: Technically it would be accredited to each occupying power separately since it would operate in all three Sectors.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any validity to Bahr’s argument that this would reinforce the occupation status, since accreditation of the Soviet Consulate General to the Western Commandants would constitute Soviet acknowledgement that the three Western Powers are supreme in the Western Sectors and that the Soviet Union does not share sovereignty.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Those are lawyers’ arguments.

Mr. Kissinger (to Mr. Hillenbrand): Do you think the Soviets will give up on this?

Mr. Hillenbrand: No.

Mr. Kissinger: Do you think that without the Consulate General the other parts of the agreement would collapse?

(12:21 p.m.: Mr. Kissinger was called from the meeting.)²

Mr. Packard: I don’t think we should do it; we should hold tight for a while. We don’t know what the real Soviet intentions are. Mr. Irwin: They may want to show that West Berlin is under the Four Powers and East Berlin is not.

Mr. Packard: I don’t think we should give in at this point.

Mr. Irwin: I don’t think our positions are very different. We would agree only if we get a satisfactory conclusion on the other parts of the agreement and if we have adequate safeguards.

Gen. Knowles: It’s a question of timing. When should we be ready to do this and still get all we can from them?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Ambassador Rush thinks next week may be the culmination of the Berlin negotiations. He wants authority to put this on the table to prevent a break-off of the negotiations.

Mr. Irwin: But the real crunch may not come next week, and we wouldn’t want him to use the authority prematurely. Mr. Hillenbrand: That is our judgment. Mr. Selden: Would the final assessment of when to make the move be made here or would the Ambassador make the decision? Mr. Irwin: I would feel more comfortable if it were made here. Mr. Selden: We can hold tight on it, but if it looks as though the talks may break off, the issue could be brought back here for decision.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The only difficulty with that is that, by next Wednesday evening, Ambassador Rush may conclude that we’re in a box unless he can put this concession on the table. By that time, it will be too late to come back here and get a decision. There is also the possibility that the other parties may be willing to go along, and if we hold out and the negotiations break off as a result, we will be blamed. We think there are many other outstanding issues which need to be settled, but Rush believes he could get a bunch of concessions we want in return for this one.

Mr. Packard: What are the concessions we want?

Mr. Hillenbrand: (1) Representation of the interests of Berliners abroad by the FRG, including the question of passports; (2) Soviet agreement to a degree of FRG political presence and general linkage with West Berlin; (3) most importantly, we have six or seven outstanding issues we want Soviet concessions on in the area of access. All told, there are about 15 Soviet concessions we want.

Mr. Selden: Have they made any concessions?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Some, but not enough to advance the negotiations to a successful conclusion. There are a half-dozen major concessions we want.

Mr. Packard: Then we’re not talking about the right issue. We should be discussing what concessions we think we ought to get in return for a concession on the consulate.

Mr. Irwin: We don’t want to give on the consulate unless we know we can get an overall reasonable agreement. It’s a question of how much authority to give to our negotiator to deal, if he thinks he can get the concessions we want. We want a settlement of all outstanding issues on access, at least one reference to Berlin as opposed to West Berlin, use by West Berliners of FRG passports when travelling in the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. We have eight concessions in the area of access alone.

Mr. Packard: Then we should approve a Consulate General only if we get the concessions we want.

Mr. Irwin: That’s our position.

Mr. Packard: We should agree on the list of concessions. I agree that access is important. But passports may be more a convenience.

Mr. Irwin: That’s more of a German problem.

Mr. Packard: And some acceptance of a Bonn Government presence in Berlin is important. If this is a big German issue, it may be difficult to get a satisfactory negotiation on the other points.

Mr. Irwin: The British and French are willing to go along on the consulate. (to General Cushman) Do you have any intelligence on this?

General Cushman: A consulate would give the Soviets a leg up in the intelligence race. We assume 80% of the officers assigned to a consulate would be intelligence officers and we would have no corresponding situation in East Berlin. We would also be in the peculiar situation where it would be almost impossible to PNG anyone, even if we caught him red-handed. Because of the status of the city, all the allies would have to agree in each case. [2½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Packard: The Soviets have pretty good intelligence access already, though.

Mr. Hillenbrand: This is really a political judgment and can’t be based on the legal position. There is also an economic consideration. West Berlin is not a negligible quantity economically. Their GNP is larger than that of Africa, except for South Africa and Nigeria. They have great trade potential and the Soviets would love to tap into the industrial and other resources in West Berlin.

General Cushman: They already have some trade commissions, don’t they?

Mr. Hillenbrand: They have visits, but they would be getting trade commissions under the agreement. We’ve already agreed that they may have trade organizations with small, modest headquarters in West Berlin.

(12:38 p.m.—Mr. Kissinger returned to the meeting.)

Mr. Kissinger: Is it the judgment of everyone concerned that there will be no agreement without a Soviet Consulate General?

Mr. Packard: No. There may not be an agreement, but we should think about what we would expect to get in return for a Consulate General.

Mr. Kissinger: Is the agreement that is shaping up sufficiently attractive that we want it?

Mr. Irwin: Not without satisfactory agreement on some additional issues.

Mr. Kissinger: Like what?

Mr. Irwin: On access, for example. The Soviets have allegedly agreed to unimpeded access but they want to add “in accordance with international practices or rules.” That would in fact give them the right to impede access.

Mr. Hillenbrand: This implies that access would come under the accepted rules of normal transit traffic. But Berlin is an exceptional case. Under normal transit traffic practices, passage through another country is subject to the restrictions of that country.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the concession then?

Mr. Hillenbrand: There isn’t any and we can’t accept it in that form.

Mr. Kissinger: Speaking frankly, I always did think this whole negotiation was insanity, but we’re into it now. Suppose we do have a Soviet commitment on access, and they begin to repair bridges on the access routes and they are closed to both East and West Berlin traffic. If the closure were not discriminatory we couldn’t complain.

Mr. Packard: Or they commenced spot checks on sealed cargoes.

Mr. Hillenbrand: That’s another point. We have seven or eight things under access that we want concessions on.

Mr. Packard: At least we should have a list of the things we want.

Mr. Irwin: We have it.

Mr. Kissinger: Is the situation on a Federal presence satisfactory?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Far from it.

Mr. Irwin: We have several items we want on a Federal presence too.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we sign this agreement as it stands now, without the issue of a Consulate General?

Mr. Irwin: No, not without getting the concessions we want.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me put it another way. If we can get our way on key issues having to do with a Federal presence and access, would we agree on a Consulate General? I’m just trying to get the question into shape for the President to deal with it.

Mr. Packard: We need a list of the things we have to have.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. If we can get satisfaction on the essential items, would we give in on the Consulate General?

Mr. Irwin: If the negotiations were seen likely to break up and if we were to be blamed for it.

Mr. Packard: If we got enough of our concessions, okay.

Mr. Selden: What have we got in return for the concessions we have made so far.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We haven’t given much yet.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ve given up some on the Federal presence.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes, we would be accepting the principle that the constitutional organs of the FRG could not perform as such in West Berlin, but there is some question as to how that would operate in practice.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sutterlin) Do you think the Bahr formulation [on the FRG constitutional organs]³ will fly?

Mr. Sutterlin: The Soviets won’t accept it.

Mr. Kissinger: If he can’t sell even that… I assume you don’t think you can do any better.

Mr. Sutterlin: No.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There would be an improvement in the foreign representation of West Berliners.

Mr. Kissinger: Only in the Socialist countries. They have no trouble elsewhere.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Also in international organizations. This is important for the FRG and will help compensate for derogations elsewhere.

Mr. Kissinger: The President will have to decide this by Monday evening,⁴ won’t he?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Theoretically, yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Then get me a memorandum over the weekend which: (1) states the issues; (2) outlines the status of negotiations on the other key issues; (3) indicates the three or four major concessions we should get in order to make the other parts of the agreement acceptable; (4) states what I take to be the consensus of this group that if we can get concessions on the three or four major items in each category, and if the only way to get them is by giving on the Consulate General, then Rush should be authorized to do so.

Mr. Irwin: We might get some but not all of the things we want, and under these circumstances it might be unlikely that we would want to give in on the Consulate General. But the British, French and Germans might want to give in and would put considerable pressure on us. Under these circumstances, if the agreement failed as a result, the U.S. would be blamed. We should recognize that possibility and be prepared to accept it.

Mr. Kissinger: If this situation develops, Rush can come back to us to see if we want to take the opprobrium. I assume we would put some specific restrictions on the Consulate General.

Mr. Hillenbrand: They’re spelled out in the paper.

Mr. Kissinger: Would it be all right to include those restrictions in any NSDM we might prepare on the President’ decision? To say that the President approves only with these restrictions?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

1. Source: National Security Council, Minutes Files, Box 121, SRG Minutes 1971 (Originals). Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information is apparent. Davis forwarded the minutes on August 11 to Kissinger, who, according to a stamped note, saw them on September 7. (Memorandum from Davis to Kissinger, August 11; ibid.) For a brief memoir account of the meeting from a participant, see Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, p. 139.
2. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met with the President from 12:24 to 12:38 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No evidence has been found to indicate whether the two men discussed the Berlin negotiations.
3. Brackets are in the source text.
4. August 9.