Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

278. Memorandum From Arthur Downey and William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

• SRG Meeting: NSSM 136²—Berlin Negotiations, Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin

The response to NSSM 136³ is fairly brief, does not contain options, and is expository in style. Agency views are not revealed and there are no conclusions. In light of that, we have prepared only a brief summary of its highlights.⁴

1. What you can hope to get out of the meeting.

There should be

• —a full probing of the agency positions on the potential risks and possible benefits of acceding to the Soviets’ demands for a Consulate General;
• —an airing of possible alternative methods of handling the issue.

In addition, you should indicate that the issue will be put to the President for an early decision (presumably in memorandum form) without the necessity to schedule a full NSC meeting.

The main reason these points are important is that there seems to be an unexpressed feeling within the agencies (at least at the staff level) that either (a) the negotiators have complicated this issue by seeming to exceed their instructions during recent months, and that there has been less than satisfactory control or, (b) that in some way we have already decided to offer this to the Soviets as part of the bargain. Thus, to conduct a full airing of all possible positions, and to ensure that the President will make a decision on the issue, will serve to instill in the agencies a greater confidence in the ultimate decision.

2. The issue: context and current status.

The Soviets developed the issue of an increase in their presence in West Berlin very slowly during the course of the negotiations. Only after the first six months did they first propose an official Soviet establishment in West Berlin, and by last fall they hinted at their desire for a Consulate General, an official trade center, and commercial use of their Lietzenburger property.

More recently, the Soviets have established a linkage between the Western willingness to accept an enhanced Soviet presence and Soviet willingness to accept some form of FRG representation abroad for West Berlin. At various times, the Soviets have claimed that there can be no agreement at all unless the West satisfies their demands in West Berlin, including a Consulate General. Finally, at the last Ambassadorial meeting, Abrasimov went so far as to threaten harassment of the air corridors and Allied entry into East Berlin if Soviet desires were not satisfied.

Thus, from the Soviet viewpoint, the general issue of a significant expansion of their presence in West Berlin, and the particular issue of a Consulate General, has been offered as a virtually sine qua non of an agreement—or at least they are trying to convince us this is the case.

On the Western side, there is some diversity. Initially, all four Western parties had concluded that a Consulate General should not be permitted, but since then there has been considerable erosion. The issue is most controversial in Germany. The Federal Government has moved from a position opposed to the Consulate General to a position of acceptance. Officially, the FRG has indicated that it considers the gain of Soviet acceptance of foreign representation (especially Federal passports for Berliners) clearly outweighs the risks involved in accepting the Soviet demands. (In addition, there is a feeling among the agencies that Bahr has made a deal with the Soviets that he will deliver an Allied acceptance of a consulate in exchange for less of a reduction in Federal presence in West Berlin.) The consulate issue now has become somewhat of a cause celebre, with the CDU, as well as a significant portion of the Berlin SPD solidly against acceptance. Clearly, then, acceptance of a consulate will in most German eyes be a highly visible sign of a Soviet victory—without regard to its intrinsic value.

For the British, this has been very awkward. The UK Ambassador has been well out in front, having indicated to the Soviets rather early on that that their desires could be accommodated. London, however, has now made it clear that it considers a Consulate General undesirable, and should be granted, if at all, only in exchange for substantial Soviet concessions preferably in the form of some unspecified increase in Western presence in East Berlin.

The French have tended to move with the Germans on this. Recently, the French Ambassador told the Soviets that he had no objection to the establishment of the consulate.

Thus, we find ourselves in the position where the Soviets seem to have been led to believe that they can be successful in gaining a significantly expanded Soviet presence, including a Consulate General.

For our part, we have maintained in the negotiations that the purpose of the talks is to reach practical improvements for the Berliners— and not to alter in any way the status of Berlin nor to seek advantage for any of the Four Powers. We have also agreed with the existing offer to the Soviets—dependent on Soviet acceptance of representation abroad—of a greatly expanded presence: the utilization of the Lietzenburgerstr property (which the President in 1963 refused to grant)⁵ as well as the establishment and consolidation of some 17 Soviet trade associations in West Berlin, and a variety of more minor items of enhancement. The US has not suggested in the negotiations that a Consulate General might be acceptable. Ambassador Rush now seeks this authority.

Agency Positions

The agencies have not expressed positions in the NSSM paper. It is probable, however, that at the meeting Defense will argue strongly against accepting a Consulate General—at least unless the Soviets agree to some major concession such as a balancing Western presence in East Berlin. The CIA perhaps will avoid taking a position, although it seems generally opposed to accepting it. State may argue reluctantly that we probably ought to accept a Consulate General because otherwise there is no hope of achieving a satisfactory agreement. State is very much influenced by Ambassador Rush’s strongly held view we must agree.

3. Options

Since there is general agreement that the establishment of a Soviet Consulate General (and the other less official Soviet expansion in West Berlin) offers the West no advantage but significant risks, there seems to be no point in discussing this narrow point in any detail. The issue will have to be considered in the context of the current state of the negotiations and the implications for the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement.

There seem to be the following general approaches which might be considered:

A. Exclude from the Agreement both Soviet interests in West Berlin and FRG representation of Berlin abroad.

It may be argued that this is somewhat of a strawman, since the negotiations have proceeded too far to permit a reversion to this concept. Furthermore, it will probably be very difficult to convince our Allies, especially the Germans, to adhere to this line.

On the other hand, this resolution would be very close to our original position (improvements in access in exchange for reduced Federal presence) which excluded consideration of Soviet presence and did not put great weight on representation abroad. In addition, while this would be a minimal agreement it would avoid the controversy which will surround any significant enhancement of Soviet presence.

B. Acceptance of the increased Soviet presence, including a Consulate General, in exchange for Soviet agreement on foreign representation (including passports) and some additional Soviet concession such as some form of Western presence in East Berlin.

The major argument favoring this approach is that the inclusion of FRG passports for Berliners, plus some additional concession will be sufficient gains to justify the Soviet advances, and thus will make the agreement satisfactory to all parties in the West. This will be particularly important in avoiding German domestic political difficulties, and so ease the passage to ratification of the Moscow treaty.

On the other hand, it will be argued that it is unrealistic to hope that the Soviets will agree to accept Federal passports let alone an additional concession to the Allies. Thus, to insist on this approach will result in a substantial risk that the Germans will abort the negotiations. As a general consideration, of course, if the negotiations collapse over any issue, it will be very difficult to return to the status quo ante in Berlin—in terms of Federal presence for example.

C. Accept increased Soviet presence perhaps including a nonresident Soviet Consular Agent, in exchange for Soviet agreement to representation abroad including passports.

By reducing the consulate question to its bare minimum—a consular agent—both sides may still be able to claim victory on this symbolic and prestigious issue. The West, and the Germans in particular, can point to the exclusion of a Consulate General as a major limit on the expansion of Soviet presence, while the Soviets may still allege that their interests on securing consular services in West Berlin have been at least minimally satisfied. From the Western viewpoint, the addition of representation abroad and passports will clearly make the Agreement satisfactory.

Arguing against this approach is the assessment that the Soviets will never accept a consular agent (insulting to one of the Four Powers) nor will it agree to including passports. Also, it will be very difficult to maintain Western unity if we insist on excluding a Consulate General.

It seems clear that there is no positive reason for us to accept any increased Soviet presence in West Berlin and certainly not a Consulate General. The essential issue is how severe to us are the costs of refusing to give in to the maximum demands. (We have already made substantial concessions.) If you judge the costs are very high, then it seems necessary to either (a) secure some counterbalancing concessions of at least symbolic importance such as some increased Western activity in East Berlin, or (b) to grant an increased Soviet presence, but well short of a full Consulate General.

In our view (Hyland, Downey, Sonnenfeldt) the Soviets will not risk a collapse of the negotiations over the Consulate General. Indeed, the Chinese developments may have made it more urgent for the Soviets to achieve a Berlin Agreement (and the German treaties) even without achieving one of their major goals. Despite the prestige invested by the Soviets in the Consulate General, this is an offensive (in both senses) position in which the Soviets hope for maximum gains. We think they will settle for what we have already conceded plus some face saver.

We are strongly persuaded that the acceptance of a full Consulate General in West Berlin will be interpreted as a major defeat for the US and will be seized upon by the CDU (and perhaps the Berlin Senat) with such vigor as to block the resulting Agreement and probably the ratification of the Moscow treaty.

However the issue is decided, it will be important that Ambassador Rush receive firm and detailed instructions well in advance of the marathon negotiating session August 10–12.

1. Source: National Security Council, Senior Review Group Files, SRG Meeting 8–6–71, Berlin Negotiations (NSSM 136). Secret. Sent for information. A typed note indicates that Sonnenfeldt saw the memorandum “before he left,” apparently for summer vacation.
2. See footnote 4, Document 274.
3. In an August 4 memorandum to Kissinger, Hillenbrand forwarded the interagency response to NSSM 136, discussing the pros and cons of agreeing to a Soviet consulate general in West Berlin. “This study was prepared,” he explained, “by a special working committee of the European Interdepartmental Group, with representation from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council and the Department of State. It has been cleared by the participating agencies.” (National Security Council, NSSM Files, NSSM 136) Davis distributed the paper to the members of the Senior Review Group on August 5. (Ibid.)
4. The summary of the interagency paper and Kissinger’s talking points for the meeting are ibid., Senior Review Group Files, Box 98, SRG Meeting 8–6–71, Berlin Negotiations (NSSM 136).
5. For a brief account of this decision, see Document 202.