Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

276. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)¹

Washington, August 3, 1971.

NSSM 136²—BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS

A. The Problem

NSSM 136 requests a brief paper discussing the pros and cons of agreeing to a Soviet consulate general in West Berlin. The Soviets have been increasingly insistent on obtaining Western agreement to such an office as part of a Berlin settlement, most recently resorting to threats of retaliation in the event the consulate general is denied. While this issue has thus assumed much importance in the negotiations, it is by no means the only unresolved issue. Thus the question of a Soviet consulate general has to be seen within the context of the overall negotiations, in the realization that even a positive Western decision on this issue will not necessarily open the way to resolution of other questions on which the basic value of an agreement will depend.

B. The Broad Considerations

The British Ambassador early in the talks encouraged the Soviets to think that they could obtain a substantial increase in their representation in West Berlin, not excluding a consulate general. It has become a matter of public knowledge that the German Government now favors offering this concession to the Soviets and has been seeking to persuade the United States to concur. The result is that the Soviets are now probably convinced that the Soviet consulate general can be obtained and are prepared to hold out for it, at least to the point of a threatened break down in the negotiations.

It is only realistic to assume that the Soviets wish the consulate general for far more than consular purposes. All things being equal, we would be better off without it. In our judgment it entails two main disadvantages, both political. First, the establishment of a Soviet consulate general will afford the Soviets an opportunity to increase their influence in West Berlin and it can be expected that this influence will be exerted contrary to the interests of the Western Powers. Secondly, the consulate general is the most easily understandable issue in these complex negotiations and if uncompensated by any increase in the Western presence in East Berlin, can be seized on as evidence that the Western side is giving away more than it is receiving in the negotiations. Thus the consulate general can cast a negative light on what we expect to be a generally positive settlement.

The value of a Berlin settlement will depend in the long run on the provisions for concrete improvements in access and inner-Berlin communications. If these are obtained, the presence of a Soviet consulate general in West Berlin will be generally—although not universally—accepted as justified. While it will pose problems, it is not likely to endanger the security of West Berlin. The consulate general, in brief, does not pose sufficient threat, in our view, to cause us to scuttle an agreement which offers real improvements and which does not prejudice the Western legal position. Moreover we must look forward to a substantially changed situation within the next five years which will probably include American recognition of the GDR and an American official representation in East Berlin. Under such circumstances, a Soviet consulate general in the Western sectors will be seen as relatively normal.

C. Conclusions

A consulate general in West Berlin is of obvious importance to the Soviets and entails potential disadvantages for the Western side. It should therefore under no circumstances be conceded lightly. In our judgment it would probably be possible, if Allied unity could be maintained, to obtain a reasonably satisfactory settlement without giving a consulate general since we assume the Soviets have broad and compelling reasons on their side to want a Berlin agreement. We believe, however, that this would entail disunity on the Western side, including the possibility of serious friction with the German Government, and that it would risk for the United States the major onus for a failure of the Berlin talks even if the failure derived primarily from issues other than that of the Soviet consular office.

Taking these considerations into account, we believe that the United States should be prepared to concur in a Soviet consulate general under strictly defined terms within the context, but not as a part of, a Berlin agreement. Such concurrence would be conditional on the achievement of a satisfactory agreement as defined in NSDM 106³ and which specifically would include: (a) settlement of all major outstanding issues on access to the satisfaction of the Western side; (b) at least one reference to Berlin (as opposed to West Berlin) in the body of the agreement; (c) Soviet concurrence in the utilization by West Berliners of FRG passports when travelling in the Soviet Union, and, by extrapolation, when travelling in other Eastern European countries.

There is one other issue to be considered. The optical and juridical disadvantages of a Soviet consulate general in West Berlin would be substantially reduced if the Western side could obtain Soviet agreement to an increased Western representation in East Berlin without the necessity for accreditation to the GDR. The United States has put forward the idea of the establishment of an American cultural center in East Berlin. The Germans and the French have strongly resisted this idea, contending that it would complicate negotiations and reduce Western leverage in obtaining Soviet concurrence to West Berlin’s representation abroad by the FRG. From the perspective of criticism which may be voiced in this country concerning an agreement which includes a Soviet consulate general, the idea of a compensatory increase in the US presence in East Berlin continues to deserve consideration. The British very slowly have perceived its value. Ambassador Rush, however, has recommended against it,⁴ following the same line of reasoning as the Germans and French. Our general conclusion, therefore, is that regardless of its intrinsic merit, the idea cannot be effectively pursued in the negotiations at the present time. It can, however, continue to be held in reserve, to be reconsidered in the light of further developments and the extent of criticism voiced in Germany and the United States against a Soviet consulate general, uncompensated by some enhancement of the Western position in East Berlin.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 80 D 225, Soviet Presence. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sutterlin. Fessenden initialed the memorandum for Hillenbrand.
2. See footnote 4, Document 274.
3. Document 225.
4. See Document 269 and footnotes 5 and 6 thereto.
5. In an August 4 memorandum to Rogers and Irwin, Deputy Legal Adviser Aldrich generally concurred with this conclusion but stressed “the grave implications of an official Soviet presence west of the Wall for our legal position in Berlin.” “A Soviet Consulate General,” he argued, “would constitute a significant step to alter the basis of Allied rights in the City by establishing that the Western Sectors of Berlin are the sole remaining area of applicability of the Quadripartite agreements in Berlin.” Aldrich, therefore, urged that “permission for this facility be withheld until such time as a final decision is reached by the United States Government that our refusal would seriously jeopardize the Berlin negotiations and our relations with our Allies and the Soviets.” (National Archives, RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 80 D 225, Soviet Presence)