Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

275. Message From the German State Secretary for Foreign, Defense, and German Policy (Bahr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Bonn, July 30, 1971.

1) Today I will submit the results of my discussions with Rush and Falin to Brandt at his vacation place.

2) We should maintain the position that a Soviet consulate general will only be accepted if the Soviets accept Federal passports for Berliners.

3) As discussed here in detail, we should attempt to transfer the whole thing to the official level in successive meetings starting on August 10. It may be necessary for you to help overcome doubts about this in Washington.

4) The Russians have adhered to our arrangements and declared that nothing more can be accomplished at the advisors’ level. Yesterday evening, Rush very impressively prepared Sauvagnargues and Jackling on this, saying that he wanted to try to finish in successive meetings starting on August 10. The English will go along. The Frenchman supports the move to the Ambassadorial level, but is skeptical about the chance of success and critical of several Soviet formulation proposals, which are compatible with the direction set by Falin but have been sharpened for tactical reasons. The entire operation will be complicated. I will tell Rush in particular that we must be careful to avoid the suspicion that the matter has already been settled between the Russians and Americans.

5) We are agreed on the Western side that, for practical purposes, a news blackout will be imposed as of today.

6) Brandt had a private discussion with Barzel to explain the government’s position on the Berlin settlement in the most precise terms.

The points that Barzel asked be taken into account will be fully covered by the planned agreement.²

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, Box 60, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [1 of 3]. Top Secret. The message, translated here from the original German by the editor, was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt. No time of transmission or receipt appears on the message. For the German text, see also Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1971, Vol. 2, pp. 1198–99.
2. Kissinger sent the following special channel message to Bahr on July 31: “Congratulations on a good job. We shall support your position on the Consulate. The tactics of moving into a four-power context will require great skill. Luckily, you and Rush are up to the task. As for the Peking trip, I will give you an oral briefing at the earliest opportunity. We shall take great care to make clear to Moscow that we are in no sense colluding against them and that our desire for détente remains unimpaired. All the best.” (Ibid.) In his reply of August 2, Bahr informed Kissinger that Brandt had “approved the draft agreement on the whole” with several minor revisions to the text. According to Bahr, Brandt also explained to Brezhnev, presumably by letter, how important the issue of Federal passports was for the West German Government. (Ibid.)