Office of the Historian

270. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Bonn, July 23, 1971.
1.

Today’s meeting with Bahr and Falin was largely devoted to developing the tactics to be followed by our advisers at their two-day meeting next week and to the tactics for the wrapup Ambassadorial meetings to take place during the week of August 9. We also reviewed those parts of the agreement on which we have reached tentative agreement, and I submitted a number of suggestions to strengthen it from our standpoint. Falin showed considerable flexibility in discussing these and accepted most of them, at least in substance.

We have not yet discussed the issues of representation abroad or Soviet presence in West Berlin, since the advisers have not completed their preliminary drafting work on these but are expected to do so today. Bahr and I have another meeting with Falin next Tuesday, July 27, at which time we hope to reach agreement on these other outstanding unresolved issues. This will be a very difficult and critical session, since the other outstanding problems concern Federal presence, a Russian Consulate General in West Berlin, and the use of FRG passports by West Berliners in Russia.

2.
Last Saturday I invited Abrasimov in for dinner and he urgently requested me to accept an invitation to see him last Wednesday. During this time we were able to get rid of our political counsellors,2 mine being Akalovsky, who was my interpreter, and I had some time alone [Page 783] with Abrasimov and only his interpreter. We reviewed the question of how he and I could arrange a meeting alone with only his interpreter to develop our tactics for the wrapup Ambassadorial sessions and decided the better method would be for me to meet him in Potsdam for a day, something I have tried to do several times in the past but have been refused permission by Abrasimov. Ostensibly, this would be a renewal of my prior unsuccessful requests.
3.

In my private sessions with Abrasimov and Falin and in the advisers and Ambassadorial sessions it had become quite clear that the Consulate General issue has become a pivotal one for reaching a final agreement. The Russians are taking a very strong and unyielding position on this. At the same time, the State Department feels that they are strictly limited under the terms of National Security Decision Memorandum 1063 and that they are in no position to agree to any flexibility on this issue. Since the Consulate General has become a top priority item and an issue of such burning interest, I feel that it would be highly desirable for the State Department to go along with granting a Consulate General prior to my going into the final Ambassadorial session the week of August 9. My understanding is the Department is not opposed to granting the Consulate General if to do so would enable us to secure a good agreement, but feels it is bound by the NSDM. Accordingly, I should like to send a cable to the Department requesting authorization to negotiate on the Russian Consulate General in the Western sectors of Berlin as part of the overall negotiations.4 Unless you feel this is not the correct method to pursue, I will do so sometime early next week and would greatly appreciate it if you could expedite my receiving a speedy affirmative reply.

I would, of course, only agree to granting the Consulate General if we have a very strong agreement on all other issues and if the Consulate General itself were strictly limited along the following lines:

A)
The functions of the office would be explicitly defined in a paper agreed with the Soviets.
B)
The functions would be limited to consular matters as explicitly defined.
C)
Political functions would be explicitly excluded.
D)
The Soviets would agree to a statement that Soviet participation in Four Power responsibilities would continue to be through Abrasimov and his successors and not through the Consulate General.
E)
The Consulate General would be accredited to the Allies.
F)
It would abide by all applicable Allied laws and regulations.
G)
It would abide by pertinent German legislation as specified.
H)
Its title would be “The Soviet Consulate General in the Western Sectors of Berlin.”
I)
Its head would be a normal career official of appropriate rank; the Allies would reserve the right to pass on him.
J)
The number of personnel would be specified, limited, and controlled.

4.
As you know, Brandt and his government are strongly in favor of the Consulate General since they feel that otherwise no agreement can be reached. The British will only go along if a strong agreement is reached by doing so. The French, who are wooing the Russians, seem to be rather indifferent. The issue has been the subject of very avid discussion in the German press for the last few weeks, but in general this is somewhat meaningless because a Consulate General cannot be responsibly considered alone but only in the light of the overall agreement.
5.
I will keep you informed after my next meeting with Falin and will send you a copy of final draft as soon as he, Bahr, and I agree on it, if and when we do so.

Many thanks and warm regards.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt. No time of transmission is on the message; a handwritten note indicates that it was received in Washington on July 24 at 0048Z. A copy was sent to Haig.↩
  2. July 17 and 20, respectively. In telegram 1393 from Berlin, July 19, the Mission summarized the discussion on July 17: “Abrasimov pressed hard for a Soviet consulate general, claiming that recent spate of Western press stories on the subject indicated a deliberate effort to obstruct an agreement. Ambassador Rush pointed out the Western side’s difficulties with the Soviet request for a consulate general, but indicated that final decision on this item might depend on the overall content of the agreement. Stressing that any agreement would have to be acceptable to all interested parties and their public opinion, Ambassador Rush also emphasized the great importance of FRG passports for West Berliners. Abrasimov took a very negative attitude on this latter issue, asserting that acceptance of FRG passports by the Soviets would be completely contrary to their fundamental position on the status of West Berlin and that therefore this matter was not a subject for discussion. He proposed the status quo on this issue as a possible compromise.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6) The Mission subsequently reported that the conversation on July 20 was “in large part a replay of their discussion at dinner July 17.” (Telegram 1430 from Berlin, July 22; ibid.)↩
  3. Document 225.↩
  4. See Document 272.↩