Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, July 28, 1971, 1000Z.

9190. Subject: Request for Authorization to Negotiate on the Soviet Consulate General in the Western Sectors of Berlin. Ref: State 70827.² For the Secretary.

1. Begin summary: In this message I request revision of National Security Decision Memorandum 106 to permit inclusion of a Soviet Consulate General on the list of Soviet interests we would be prepared to accept in the Western sectors of Berlin in the context of the current Berlin negotiations. On the basis of Soviet behaviour in the negotiations during recent weeks, I have concluded that conclusion of a satisfactory Berlin agreement is dependent on our willingness to take this step. My British and French colleagues are personally of the same view, as are Chancellor Brandt and other senior officials of the Federal German Government. I request that this authority be provided as soon as feasible in the near future so that we may be in a position to exploit our potential willingness to take this step as a source of leverage in the Berlin negotiations. End summary.

2. The repeated emphasis placed by Ambassador Abrasimov and by his adviser Kvitsinskiy on the issue of establishing a Soviet Consulate General in the Western sectors of Berlin in Four Power meetings during recent weeks has finally convinced me that it probably will be necessary to accede to this desire, with all necessary safeguards of Allied interests, in order to obtain a satisfactory Berlin agreement. In our meetings on July 8, 13 and 22, Abrasimov assigned top priority to this item and he has done so repeatedly on other informal occasions. The same point has been made again and again by Kvitsinskiy in the advisers’ sessions of the Berlin talks.

3. The Soviets have directly linked the issue of their interests in the Western sectors and thus that of a Consulate General with the questions of representation abroad of the Western sectors. We have told the Soviets that the Consulate General item is too big to be linked to representation abroad alone. In substance, there appears to be agreement on this, although from opposing viewpoints, on the part both of the Western negotiators and the Soviets. This means that the issue of the Consulate General has connotations for the entire Berlin agreement, including matters of primary interests to the US, like access. As matters have developed, I do not believe we can look forward to a satisfactory agreement on these other issues without willingness on our part to yield on this point. But on the other hand, our willingness to take this step could be used to improve the quality of the entire agreement in the Western sense.

4. As concerns the link made by the Soviets between a Consulate General and representation abroad, it is true that the latter issue is not a priority US interest. But it should be pointed out that, in German eyes, the United States among the three Western Allies will bear the chief responsibility for the entire content of a Berlin agreement. The reaction of the German public to the agreement we have negotiated will be an important element in the overall German-American relationship. Political opinion in the Federal Republic attaches great weight to Soviet acceptance of representation abroad of the Western sectors by the FRG. Gains in this field will serve directly to diminish criticism of limitations in the Federal presence we may be obliged to agree to. It is true that there is increasing criticism in German public opinion of a possible Soviet Consulate General. I believe it would be possible to meet this through presenting the positive content of the agreement and through making clear the limitations and conditions we have placed on the Consulate General.

5. This is also the view of Chancellor Brandt, who took the matter up with the President during his recent visit to the US, and of my co-negotiators, Ambassadors Sauvagnargues and Jackling. As pressure mounts in the final phase of negotiations, and in particular increases with regard to this item, the US would be in an increasingly difficult position if it is the only standout.

6. I believe we laid out adequate safeguards and controls over a possible Consulate General in the presentation by the Allied advisers on June 30 (Berlin 1244).³ As indicated by discussion at that time and in the advisers meeting of July 21, the Soviets have declared their general readiness to meet our conditions. Any agreement we might enter on this subject will be tightly drafted to protect our interests. These conditions would include:

A) The functions of the office would be explicitly defined in a paper agreed with the Soviets.

B) The functions would be limited to consular matters as explicitly defined.

C) Political functions would be explicitly excluded.

D) The scope of cultural and propaganda activities would have to be narrowly defined.

E) The Soviets would agree to a statement that Soviet participation in Four Power responsibilities would continue to be through Ambassador Abrasimov and his successors and not through the Consulate General.

F) The Consulate General would be accredited to the Allies.

G) It would abide by all applicable Allied laws and regulations.

H) It would abide by pertinent German legislation as specified either in the Vienna Consular Convention, which has been taken over in the Western sectors, or the German-Soviet consular agreements, if the Soviets agree to extend this to Berlin, or such appropriate combination of these instruments as may be agreed on.

I) Its title would be “the Soviet Consulate General in the Western sectors of Berlin.”

J) Its head would be a normal career official of appropriate rank, not a prominent political personality; the Allies would reserve the right to pass on him.

K) The number of personnel would be specified, limited, and individually controlled.

7. I request to be authorized as soon as feasible to begin discussion of this topic with the Allies and then with the Soviets. We should avoid a situation in which we are obliged by the situation at the very end of the negotiations to give way on this point without having been in a position, prior to that stage, to gain some negotiating advantage for ourselves out of potential willingness to take this step.⁴

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret; Exdis. According to another copy, the telegram was drafted by Dean on July 26 and approved by Rush. (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JD Telegrams and Airgrams, 1971)
2. In telegram 70827 to Bonn, April 26, the Department forwarded the text of NSDM 106 (Document 225). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
3. Dated July 1. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 138285 to Berlin, July 29, the Secretary responded to the Ambassador’s request as follows: “Taking into account the many factors involved I have decided against raising with the President at this time the possibility of revising NSDM 106 to permit a Soviet consulate general in West Berlin. If the issue becomes a breaking point in the negotiations I will be prepared to reconsider on an urgent basis raising the matter with the President. I appreciate this could come at an early date if the Ambassadorial meetings scheduled to begin on August 10 prove productive.” (Ibid., POL 17 USSR–GER B) Sonnenfeldt sent an urgent memorandum to Kissinger on July 29, asking whether to take action before Rogers sent the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. IV) In a subsequent memorandum to Kissinger the same day, Sonnenfeldt reported, however, that the telegram had already been sent. “This action by the Secretary,” he continued, “does not presumably prevent the SRG from examining the matter both as to substance and as to the timing of a possible decision to amend NSDM 106 in accordance with Ambassador Rush’s recommendations.” Sonnenfeldt, therefore, urged Kissinger to issue a NSSM on the proposed Soviet consulate general. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 29; National Security Council, NSSM Files, NSSM 136) For text of NSSM 136, see footnote 4, Document 274.