Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

23. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 7, 1969, 10:50 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

• Prof. Henry Kissinger
• Harry Obst (US Interpreter)
• Hermann Kusterer (FRG Interpreter)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

• Europe and the EEC
• Southeast Asia
• Vietnam
• China
• Rumania
• Brezhnev Doctrine and East-West Relations
• European Security Conference
• SALT Talks
• FRG-Soviet Relations
• US Policy toward Soviet Union
• US Troops in Europe
• Oder-Neisse Line
• FRG Elections
• Bonn “Hot Line”

Europe and the EEC

The President asked the Chancellor to comment on the developments in Western Europe.²

The Chancellor spoke of his constant efforts, beginning in Rome in 1967, to have a summit conference of the Six convened. This had not succeeded as long as de Gaulle was in office. Mr. Pompidou, however, had now agreed, and such a conference would now take place at the end of this year. The Foreign Ministers of the Six would probably convene, with Britain’s entry into the Common Market to be the chief topic.³

The President mentioned that Mr. Kissinger had just returned from a meeting with Pompidou and it might interest the Chancellor to hear a comment from him.

Prof. Kissinger stated that his meeting with Mr. Pompidou had dealt mainly with President Nixon’s trip. Little was said on European matters. Mr. Pompidou had indicated, however, that he had an open mind on the big problems of Europe.⁴

The Chancellor said he believed that Mr. Pompidou was a different man than de Gaulle, a more pragmatic man who would make his own decisions on these matters. And he was not a weak man.

The President agreed with that evaluation and added that the good majority which Mr. Pompidou had received in the elections had strengthened his hand.⁵

Did the Chancellor believe that Britain would eventually be admitted?

The Chancellor replied, Yes, Britain would be admitted, in his opinion.

He would be very interested to hear about the President’s trip to Asia and Rumania.⁶

Southeast Asia

The President said, there were two points he had been trying to get across while in Asia:

1) The frustrations over Vietnam would not result in a US withdrawal from the Asian scene.

2) The role the US would play in Asia from now on would be a different one.

While in the past the US had rushed to the aid of any Asian country in trouble to bail it out, this help in the future would be clearly defined:

a) If a major power, like China, should make a move, a US reaction was probable. No nuclear power could move without another nuclear power becoming involved.⁷

b) In case there would not be a frontal move across a border, as in the case of internal subversion, he had outlined the US policy as follows to the Asian leaders: The US would help any Asian nation politically, economically and militarily—but not by supplying US manpower.⁸

The Asian nations would have to work more closely with each other. One day, Japan would have to assume a larger role. Already now, Japan’s production was equal to that of Communist China. The Japanese people could not be content forever being just business people. This could not happen this year or next, however, as they were still encumbered with the inheritance of WW II.

Vietnam

The President said that he made clear in Saigon that the US would stand firm by the side of South Vietnam, despite the pullout of some US troops. This had been symbolized strongly by his standing side by side with President Thieu on one platform. It had been similar to Berlin. His going to Berlin as such had had more weight than all the speeches he had made there.⁹ Did Mr. Kissinger agree with that?

Prof. Kissinger emphatically agreed. He said that Mr. Nixon’s going to Saigon had had a much stronger effect than Mr. Johnson’s stop in Cam Ranh Bay.¹⁰ Hanoi would like to see the Thieu government overthrown.¹¹ Not all the South Vietnamese politicians were very responsible people.

(The President interjected laughing, he considered this remark to be an understatement.)

It has been necessary to demonstrate to all concerned that the US would remain committed to the Thieu government and was not interested to participate in anything which might tend to undermine it. President Thieu had shown to be the ablest and most conciliatory of the South Vietnamese leaders.

At one time Tran Van Dong and Big Minh [Doung Van Minh] had been considered the liberal elements, now both of them were actually standing right of Thieu, who is now too liberal for them.

The President continued, he believed the Thieu government was stronger than ever. Forthcoming reforms would cement its position further. He was planning to pull out a larger contingent of US troops later, as it seemed that the South Vietnamese can take over more of the military burden. Casualties had shown a downward trend for a while.

It could be possible, of course, that the North Vietnamese would continue to try to keep US casualties just high enough, to keep alive the discontent of Americans about loss of life in Vietnam, as one pressure tool to get the US to withdraw. He would continue to try to de-escalate the war and come to an acceptable peaceful solution. But there was a point beyond which he could not go, if the other side should remain intransigeant. He would be patient until after November 1. If nothing had happened by then, he would have to do something about it. He did not mean by that that he would hit the North. But there were other things he would do.¹²

He would keep the Chancellor informed on any changes on Vietnam, probably through Mr. Kissinger over the new “Hot Line” telephone to be installed between Washington and Bonn.¹³

Even India did not want the US to get out of Vietnam.

The Chancellor remarked that Indira Gandhi had indicated the same feeling to him.

Prof. Kissinger added that all Asian leaders he had talked to believed the US was too conciliatory, if anything.

The President continued. If he pulled out of Vietnam without an acceptable settlement, it would give the US a brief respite but the long-range consequences would be terrible. For one, it would lead to a withdrawal from Europe as well. A strong isolationist trend would then sweep the United States. Therefore he had to achieve a satisfactory settlement. He would continue the peace talks and efforts but was preparing at the same time for what he might have to do later in case of no success.

The Chancellor voiced his agreement with the President’s views and said he would probably do the same if in the President’s place.

China

The President stressed that he was not going to entertain Mr. Brezhnev’s suggestion for a collective security pact for S.E.A., though some Asian leaders welcomed this idea for internal policy reasons (containment of communist parties).¹⁴

Any US-Soviet condominium for the containment of China would in the long run make a permanent isolated enemy of China. This was very dangerous in view of the future military might of China, ICBMs, etc.

His view was: the Soviets have a big problem with China; the US has no major problems with China. Therefore, it would be in the long-range interest of the West that the US not join in a cabale with the Soviet Union—white against yellow—but keep its options open in both directions.

What did the Chancellor think on this subject?

The Chancellor agreed that it would be dangerous to isolate China. It would develop into a major power anyhow, isolation or no isolation. Those who advocated isolation in the past had been wrong. He agreed with Mr. Nixon’s course. The FRG had not yet drawn up a firm policy on China. It was, of course, possible, though in his opinion not at all likely that the Soviet Union and China could join forces again. The Chinese seemed nationalists first and communists second.

The President added that another factor spoke against a reunion of the Soviets with the Chinese. In any totalitarian system somebody must occupy first place. It was not conceivable that China would be content with playing second fiddle to the Soviet Union or vice versa.

Rumania

The President commented briefly on his trip to Rumania. The reaction of the people here, just as during other visits of Western leaders in East European countries, had again very clearly demonstrated that the pull of the West in these countries is stronger than the pull of the East. It had been risky for Mr. Ceausescu, who is a tough, Stalinist type communist, to go through with this visit. He could not quote Mr. Ceausescu, as he had agreed not to, but he could generally say that Mr. C. wanted to continue an independent policy with regard to Western Europe and the US and particularly with regard to China. He had mentioned the political and trade ties with the FRG during his talk with the President. It had been very interesting to talk to a man who has direct contacts to Hanoi, Peking and Moscow.

Prof. Kissinger added that there had been a marked contrast between the warm emotional reception and the unemotional talks. The crowd had not been in a carnival mood but rather shown a solemn joyfulness. The people would not leave the streets after the motorcade had passed but would stand for hours, more than three hours in the rain, some even until midnight. The talks, by contrast, had been devoid of any emotion, precise and covering much substantive ground.

Brezhnev Doctrine and East-West Relations

The President stressed that he would not go into any of the countries covered by the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine by force,¹⁵ but he favored any possible improvement of existing contacts, as in the fields of trade, culture, etc., and the enlargement of such contacts, as he considered it important not to isolate those countries from the West. He would never accept any conditions in this regard at the expense of any other country.

The Chancellor recounted German efforts to improve East-West relations. After initial successes the Czech invasion had stopped the momentum. One had to be careful now not to drive a wedge between any of those countries and the Soviet Union. But the hope for the Eastern countries must be kept alive. History had not yet offered the FRG an opportunity for a successful policy towards the East.

European Security Conference

The Chancellor stated that even Willy Brandt had never believed that there would really be a European Security Conference. Yet he would talk about it all the time. This helped to demonstrate a German initiative in this area to the other countries. Not to do that would be a political mistake.

The President agreed with that view. He said that he had to talk about it at times and his government might do so at times but nobody expected anything to come from it. It was just talk.

Prof. Kissinger added that it might interest the Chancellor to know that the European Security Conference had not come up as a subject with Mr. Ceausescu, nor had any European issues been raised.

SALT Talks

The President stressed that he would move very cautiously on SALT and would consult with his allies. “Blue chips” were at stake here.

He would be guided by the principles that the US must never fall behind the Soviet Union into second place and that the US deterrent must remain credible, which was of equal importance to its allies. He had kept some items, like IRBMs, out of the SALT talks on purpose, as these had to be talked over together with the allies. Other weapons, like ABMs, MIRVs, Polaris subs and long-range bombers would be reviewed case by case, taking the East-West balance and the interests of the allies carefully into account. While he was interested in cutting the arms burden if possible, he would make sure that the US would continue to speak with “a strong voice.” That is also why he had fought so hard to get the ABM approved in the Senate.¹⁶

Would Mr. Kissinger like to add more on the subject?

Prof. Kissinger underlined that the US had kept its allies closely informed on SALT, in conformity with the President’s promise on closer consultation during his European trip. Of course, there were still some people in Washington who believed one should deal with the Soviets first and then inform the allies later. We will not do that (the President affirms, “absolutely not”).¹⁷

A cutoff of MIRV or ABM would be very complicated. Here the security of the entire West was at stake. It was difficult to determine how far the Soviets had gone in their testing. Some say one thing, others another. Any mistake here could be fatal.

The President remarked that the problem with ABM was the radar. Missiles were easy to produce but the radar takes a long time. The question was whether or not it was possible to recognize the adaptation of Soviet radar for ABMs. A secret study was under way on this matter. If the Soviets had the capability to adapt existing radars for ABMs, then they could not be included in SALT.¹⁸

FRG-Soviet Relations

The President remarked he had read a lot in the Press about the possibility of the FRG changing its policy towards the Soviet Union. With the Soviets holding East Germany and Berlin hostage, the reunification efforts having gone unrewarded and the new generation calling for fresh flexible policies there might be German sentiment in that direction. Could the Chancellor address himself to the subject.

The Chancellor replied that, notwithstanding the Press reports, the majority of the German people, though unhappy about the country’s continuing division, would not relinquish the right of self-determination. The majority does not want recognition of East Germany and knowing this, the government had continued the application of the Hallstein Doctrine.¹⁹ A number of young people and intellectuals, of course, thought otherwise as well as many in the SPD.

He had not seen any indications from the Soviet Union that they would be ready for any change in policy. They want better economic relations now, as illustrated by the gas and pipeline talks²⁰ and maybe China is in the back of their mind.

No indication of real change had been forthcoming, though, nor did he believe that the July 10 speech of Gromyko pointed up anything new of significance. This week’s sounding by the three Powers may shed more light on this.²¹

US Policy toward Soviet Union

The President asked the Chancellor his opinion of US Soviet policy. Should it be harder, softer or what? The Chancellor praised the President’s Soviet policy and called it “just right.” The German people, too, hoped that the Soviets would one day be more flexible and reasonable, but meanwhile one would have to stand on the realities. From time to time Soviet intentions would have to be probed. The German people trusted in the US and its military superiority over the Soviet Union.

He had been very happy with the President’s remarks on Asia and other subjects.

He thought the trip to Rumania had been a good thing. It had been a blow against the Brezhnev Doctrine, had shown it was not being silently accepted.

US Troops in Europe

The President cited continued Congressional sentiment for troop reductions in Europe. He said that he did not agree with it and expected to be able to defeat any Congressional move for reduction. This was another reason why he had fought so hard for the ABM vote, as a defeat there would have whetted appetites on other matters. The six divisions were a good bargaining point and for that reason alone should not be relinquished without any counter-concessions.

Prof. Kissinger remarked that the President had excluded the NATO area from his recent order for a 10% troop reduction. However, it might be advisable to have confidential talks with the FRG on a long-range policy on this matter, as the situation could change.

The President said it might be good to have such talks after the elections. Not for 69 or 70 but for the period after that, it may be advisable to agree on a fall-back line, as it was possible that US sentiment would not forever support a six division level.

The Chancellor agreed that such talks would be useful. It was better to talk these matters over in advance rather than to stumble into them later.

Oder-Neisse Line

The President asked whether the Chancellor would care to comment on the Oder-Neisse Line question. Was this a political issue in Bonn these days?

The Chancellor replied, this was still a political issue because of the many refugees from that area living in the FRG who did not want the government to give up that region. He had stated “in his government” that a solution would have to be found which is acceptable to both countries.

The President asked, “You really said that?”

The Chancellor replied, “Yes, in my government.” He may have more to say on that and go even further than that in his address to the National Press Club tomorrow (August 8). He wished he could read as much flexibility into Mr. Gomulka’s speech of May 17²² as some other people. However, he believed the Poles would continue to stick to their rigid position, so that nothing would come of the matter, even if it was discussed or negotiated.

FRG Elections

The Chancellor, in response to a question from the President, remarked that the outcome of the election could not be predicted at this stage. Most Social Democrats were resigned to losing and most Christian Democrats convinced of winning. History had shown, however, that such an advance attitude can bring surprises. A coalition of either CDU–FDP or the continuation of the CDU–SPD coalition seemed probable. The FDP contained many left-wing young members including Neo-Marxists, with most of its older members standing on the right. Many of its foreign policy concepts like on recognition of the GDR were very “muddled.” A government including the FDP may, therefore, be more difficult to run than a continuation of the Grand Coalition.

Bonn “Hot Line”

The President asked the Chancellor if he thought it was good to proceed with a telephone “Hot Line” between the White House and the Chancellor’s Office. Mr. Kissinger, for instance, might use the line to inform the Chancellor if there should be any sudden changes in US policy towards Vietnam.

The Chancellor agreed to the proposal.

(The meeting, which lasted about one hour and forty minutes, was held in a cordial atmosphere. It was interrupted briefly twice for picture-taking of the Press. The Chancellor appeared a little tired. The President seemed rested and relaxed.)

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 278, Memoranda of Conversations, Feb. 1969–Sept. 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Nodis. Drafted by Obst. The meeting was held in the White House. Kissinger revised the memorandum by hand and wrote the following instructions: “Send to Rogers with note that circulating to be confined to him & Elliott. Bracketed part to be omitted from copy for State.” A copy of the version sent to Rogers is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK Memcons. Substantive revisions to the memorandum and excisions from the State version are noted in footnotes below. Nixon and Kiesinger also met at the White House the next day from 10:45 to 11:30 a.m. A memorandum of conversation, including discussion of the National Democratic Party in Germany, problems of the young generation, space cooperation, and the future of Europe, is ibid. For German records of both meetings, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 887–898, 906–909. For text of the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 632–634.
2. In a telephone conversation at 2:45 p.m. on August 6, Kissinger briefed the President for his meeting with the German Chancellor. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “K[issinger] suggested that P[resident] give Kiesinger report on the trip, a little bit about P’s VN[Vietnam] thinking, then East-West relations. K said they have internal struggle and will want to get some idea from P what his real convictions are. K said P should say he is perfectly willing to talk as long as issues are concrete and precise—they should understand issues will focus on Germany so they should not be the ones to press it. K said Kiesinger will probably raise with P the size of our forces in Europe and something about SALT. K said the major thing here is for P to say he has been meticulous about consulting and will continue to consult—recognize this is blue chip. P said main thing is to give him reassurance, and K said right.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
3. Reference is to the summit conference of European Community members which opened at The Hague on December 1.
4. Kissinger met Pompidou in Paris on August 4. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—Dr. Kissinger and President Pompidou, August 4, 1969.
5. The French elections were held in two stages on June 1 and June 15.
6. After witnessing the splashdown of the Apollo 11 astronauts on July 24, Nixon stopped in Guam, Manila, Jakarta, Saigon, New Delhi, Lahore, Bucharest, and Mildenhall Air Force Base in England, before returning to the United States on August 3.
7. Before Kissinger revised it, this paragraph read: “If a major power, like China, should make a move, the US would come in. No nuclear power could move without another nuclear power coming in.”
8. Reference is to the so-called Nixon Doctrine, which the President first made public at an informal news conference in Guam on July 25. For text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 544–556. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. I, Document 29.
9. See Document 17.
10. Reference is to President Johnson’s brief stop at Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam on December 23, 1967.
11. This sentence originally read: “Not only the people in Hanoi but also a number of people in Saigon would love to see the Thieu government out of power.”
12. Kissinger bracketed the last four sentences of the paragraph for omission from the version sent to the Department of State.
13. In a May 21 memorandum to Kissinger, Acting Secretary of State Richardson forwarded the joint recommendation of the Departments of State and Defense to implement “the President’s proposal for a secure teletype communications link between his office and that of Chancellor Kiesinger.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 10, HAK Administrative and Staff Files, Germany, Bonn–Washington Phone Link) Kissinger approved this approach for negotiations with Germany on May 28. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Richardson; ibid.) On August 7 Eliot informed Kissinger that the negotiations had resulted in a draft exchange of letters with an attached memorandum of understanding. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; ibid.) Kissinger expressed his agreement with the result on August 13. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Eliot; ibid.)
14. In an address before the international conference of Communist Parties in Moscow on June 8, Brezhnev advocated the establishment of “a system of collective security in Asia,” a move clearly aimed at the People’s Republic of China.
15. See footnote 5, Document 16.
16. On August 6 the Senate narrowly defeated an amendment to block funding for “Safeguard” anti-ballistic missile system.
17. Kissinger bracketed this paragraph for omission from the version sent to the Department of State.
18. The previous three sentences originally read: “The question was whether or not the Soviet radar could recognize ABMs. A secret study was under way on this matter. If the Soviets had the capability to distinguish ABMs, then they could not be included in SALT.”
19. Reference is to the policy by which West Germany refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any country other than the Soviet Union that maintained diplomatic relations with East Germany. Although associated with State Secretary Walter Hallstein, the doctrine was formulated by Wilhelm Grewe, Director of the Political Division in the West German Foreign Office. See Grewe, Rückblenden, pp. 251–262.
20. Reference is to a contract signed in April 1969 to exchange Soviet natural gas for a West German pipeline; a second, far more extensive, contract was signed in February 1970.
21. Regarding the Gromyko speech and the tripartite sounding on Berlin, see Document 21.
22. In a May 17 speech at Warsaw, Gomulka proposed that West Germany conclude a separate treaty with Poland recognizing the Oder-Neisse line. For excerpts from the speech, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. XVII (1969–1970), p. 23722.