Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

219. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Dr. Kissinger’s Conversation with Dr. Rainer Barzel
• April 14, 1971, 12:15 p.m.

After his talk with the President, Barzel, accompanied by Ambassador Pauls, stopped briefly for a talk with Dr. Kissinger.

Barzel’s reaction to his talk with the President was very positive. He said that in dealing with the press he would confine himself to referring to the President’s Report to the Congress² whose formulations on Berlin and Germany he welcomed.

In the subsequent exchange Barzel stressed his need for assurance that there was a clear limit below which we would not go in the Berlin talks and he indicated that what he had heard in the Oval Office was satisfactory to him. He noted the restiveness in the CDU/CSU and his difficulty in keeping it from forcing the Berlin/Ostpolitik issues on the floor of the Bundestag.

Dr. Kissinger stressed that we were guided in our Berlin position, particularly as regards Federal presence, by the position of the German government. We could not be more German than the Germans although we were frequently under pressure to be just that. Barzel argued that US interests were affected by what the Germans did in their Ostpolitik and on Berlin. Dr. Kissinger noted that we could not interfere in tactics or get involved in German domestic politics. As regards Berlin, one had to be precise about details. Hypothetically—although no one had ever suggested it—if the Germans wanted to withdraw their presence in Berlin it would be difficult for us to stop them from doing so. No US rights would be involved. On the other hand, as regards access we clearly have rights and intend to maintain them.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the CDU/CSU would vote for the Eastern treaties if there were a Berlin arrangement. Barzel said it would not do so even then because the treaties were deficient. Ambassador Pauls asked if there was a difference as between the Soviet and Polish treaties. Barzel said that there used to be but the Poles could not now separate them. While in Warsaw he himself had received all sorts of welcome assurances from the Poles about the general state of Polish-German relations which, if acted on, could have made ratification of the Polish treaty feasible and indeed desirable. The treaty would have been the result of reconciliation (“Vertrag kommt von vertragen”). But this tack now seems impossible in view of Gierek’s weak position.

Barzel, switching back to Berlin and the treaties, gave his prognosis that we (the US) and the Allies would remain firm on the conditions for a Berlin arrangement while the treaties would remain on the table. He said he had made a statement on this the previous week, with Scheel’s prior knowledge, and this had cleared the air. Some in the Federal Government had been trying to untie the treaties from Berlin. This would have resulted in a constructive no-confidence motion in the Bundestag which “I” would have won. But Barzel said he wanted to avoid this sort of confrontation and, despite the desires of some around Brandt, the matter seems now to be well in hand.

Dr. Kissinger asked if Barzel thought there might be an agreement in Berlin in less than two years. Barzel said he doubted it; he thought negotiations should continue as they had for years on the Austrian treaty.³ Dr. Kissinger said our life would not be unfulfilled if there were no Berlin agreement. It remains to be seen what the Soviets may do now that Brezhnev appears to hve strengthened his position. Possibly he might want some foreign policy “success,” and there might conceivably be some new Soviet formulations. But the latest formal Soviet proposal was wholly unacceptable. Dr. Kissinger added he had heard of no German who thought it was acceptable.

Barzel said he had tried three times to get Brandt to tell him what the limits were below which he would not go on Berlin but he never responded. One simply could not tell what the people around Brandt would do. Dr. Kissinger said as a practical matter we must operate on the assumption that the Germans will protect their own interests. (Barzel then made some derogatory comments about the state of knowledge in the present Cabinet on Eastern questions. In essence, Bahr knew everything and Ehmke most things while Wehner set the basic direction. No one else, including the Chancellor, was fully informed.)

Toward the end of the conversation, Dr. Kissinger asked Barzel’s assessment of the internal situation in the FRG. Barzel thought the election in Schleswig-Holstein next week was uncertain.⁴ He thought Stoltenberg could make it, but if not—which was possible because of the unique circumstances in the Land—the momentum of recent CDU gains would be interrupted. Barzel thought that on the economic front the Government was in serious trouble because of inflationary pressures and the difficulty if not impossibility of raising the tax rate.

Barzel reverted to his basic theme of the Government’s untrustworthiness, citing in this regard the history of its handling of the question of the continued validity of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter.⁵ Reciting the history, as he saw it, his point was that rather than having obtained Soviet agreement to the Articles’ invalidity the Government had merely obtained a formula that placed them backstage (“ueberlagert”). Apart from the Government’s “dishonest” handling of the issue, it demonstrated that when an unclear matter came up for interpretation between a weak and a strong power, the strong power would always win. Barzel said he could now understand why the Danes had never wanted to sign a treaty on minorities with the FRG. Barzel’s conclusion was that all the murky points, as he saw them, in the Moscow treaty would always be interpreted as the Soviets wanted.

Dr. Kissinger, in the course of this exchange, asked what the CDU/CSU would do if there were a Berlin agreement in two years, i.e., before the next German election. Noting that the basic agreement would not be a German one, Barzel stressed that if the deal involved also an FRG/GDR agreement or treaty conceding GDR sovereignty, his party would not accept it under any circumstances. There could be a modus vivendi with the GDR but no “final” solution. This was also his party’s basic reservation to the Moscow treaty.

Barzel, in conclusion, expressed his gratitude for the reception he had had. He said he deliberately had come over the Easter holiday to avoid extensive Congressional contacts and confine himself to a single day’s talks in the Executive.

HS

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. IX. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger. An attached form indicates that the memorandum was “noted by HAK.”
2. See footnote 4, Document 218.
3. Reference is to the Austrian State Treaty signed by the Four Powers on May 15, 1955, which reestablished Austria’s sovereignty on the basis of permanent neutrality.
4. The CDU, led by Minister President candidate Gerhard Stoltenberg, won the state election in Schleswig-Holstein on April 25 by absolute majority (51.9 percent). An INR analyst concluded: “The CDU’s clear majority victory in the April 25 state election in Schleswig-Holstein, though somewhat more solid than expected and accompanied by the exclusion of the FDP from the Landtag, is not likely to create serious trouble for the SPD–FDP coalition in Bonn.” (Intelligence Note REUN–26, April 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 GER W)
5. For Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, see footnote 9, Document 7.