Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

218. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 14, 1971, 11:47 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between the President and Rainer Barzel

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Pauls
• Ambassador Mosbacher
• Henry A. Kissinger

The President began the meeting by saying, “We welcome you and all our friends from the Federal Republic. We are always glad to see members of what I understand is the majority party in terms of members in Parliament. Before you start saying anything, I would like to point out to you that I am aware that your area of greatest concern is Berlin. There we face two issues. We stand firm on the Fedral Presence in West Berlin. We will not accept the elimination of the Federal Presence. Second, we will not accept a recognition of East German sovereignty over access routes.”

[Note: The President said this because I had been told by Barzel before the meeting² that he needed those two statements in order to keep the CDU from going against the Ostpolitik publicly, and this did not fit into our game plan with the Soviet Union at this moment.]³

Barzel said, “Let me explain the reason why I asked for this meeting. I have sought to avoid a confrontation on the Berlin negotiations and foreign policy in general. But without this meeting there would have been the danger of an open domestic confrontation with our Government on Berlin and on the treaties. This would be unfortunate for domestic as well as foreign policy reasons. You should have no doubt that the CDU is determined to reject the Soviet Treaty above all because there is no quid pro quo.” The President interjected and asked whether this was true of the Warsaw Treaty as well, and Barzel said,“Yes there will be no CDU vote for these Treaties. Nor can there be a Berlin Agreement that Berliners will not accept. If we make an agreement that eliminates the Federal Presence from Berlin it will lead to a mass departure. The Federal Presence must include Parliamentary committees. Let me make a last point. We can’t agree to the participation of the Soviet Union in the administration of West Berlin. This is a serious moment. We must understand the seriousness of our views which will affect the future of our policy.”

The President said, “I understand this skepticism you have expressed with respect to Soviet intentions. For them, Germany and Berlin have always been the big issue. We, that is to say, I am under no illusions regarding Soviet intentions. The Soviets want to get as much as possible and give as little as possible. You should stay in close touch with Kissinger who, in turn, is in close touch with Rush, and Rush is a good man.”

(I interjected that Rush must be doing something right—the Soviets have complained about him.) The President continued, “We can’t express an opinion on a treaty with the Soviet Union, but we can express an opinion on Berlin. We will not compromise our principles. What is the German attitude?” Barzel said, “We face a dangerous situation. The old anti-Communists missed that. On the other hand, there is a profound disappointment that concessions as sweeping as Brandt’s to the USSR have not produced success on the limited issue of Berlin. This can lead to extreme nationalism of either Left or Right. I am glad that the President pointed out the need for progress in the German question in his World Report⁴ as a prelude to détente. In addition, this present Government has major economic difficulties. We face a curious situation in the world that while Moscow, Warsaw and East Berlin Marxism is dead, in West Germany there is now a renaissance of Marxism. The most dangerous situation of all would be if there were a renaissance of Marxism and nationalism concurrently, and we should not assume that they could not meet.”⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—The President and Rainer Barzel, Apr. 14, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The time of the meeting, which was held in the Oval Office, is taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) The memorandum was evidently transcribed from Kissinger’s taped dictation. A tape recording of the conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation Between Nixon and Barzel, April 14, 1971, 10:30 a.m.–12:20 p.m., Oval Office, OVAL 479–3. For his published accounts of the meeting, see Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil, pp. 119–120; and Im Streit und umstritten, p. 169.
2. Before meeting the President, Kissinger met Barzel at 11:32 a.m. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. Reference is to the “Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” delivered on February 25, 1971. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 239–345.
5. After Barzel left, Nixon told Federal Reserve Board Chairman Burns that he had just “spent some time with the opposition trying to keep them from busting Brandt at the table.” When Burns asked if Brandt was reliable, Nixon replied: “Brandt is basically a fellow with a pretty good heart but he’s somewhat emotional, and, I think, somewhat gullible, and therefore not too reliable. On the other hand, we’re sort of guiding him along. We don’t want Germany to come apart at the seams.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation Between Nixon and Burns, April 14, 1971, 12:21–12:40 p.m., Oval Office, OVAL 479–4) In a meeting with Kissinger at 1:05 p.m., Nixon raised Barzel’s point on the revival of Communism among Western intellectuals. Nixon: “What the hell is the matter with the intellectuals in the world, Henry?” Kissinger: “These are the party, this is the party that is on our side.” Nixon: “Yeah.” Kissinger: “And we musn’t discourage them.” Nixon: “Well, I think we gave him a little lift here.” Kissinger agreed and added: [1 line not declassified] (Ibid., Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger April 14, 1971, 1:05–1:15 p.m., Oval Office, OVAL 479–7) The two men again assessed German politics in a conversation on the afternoon of April 17. [2 lines not declassified] Kissinger: “And as for Berlin, they can never get it by themselves.” Nixon: “You don’t think so?” Kissinger: “No.” Nixon: “Good.” (Ibid., Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, April 17, 1971, 1:00–3:30 p.m., Oval Office, OVAL 481–7) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversations printed here specifically for this volume.