Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, March 23, 1971, 1526Z.

48299. Subj: Berlin Talks—Soviet Presence in Western Sectors. Ref: Bonn 3092.² For Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. The question of whether the US should agree to offer the Soviets an additional presence in West Berlin as part of a Berlin settlement has been studied extensively in Washington during the preparation of an interagency paper on the Berlin talks for the Senior Review Group. It is also dealt with in a subsequent memorandum which has just been sent to the White House with my approval.³ In this memorandum it is recommended that the President agree to the following relevant paragraph for inclusion in NSDM 91:⁴ “If a settlement, which would be in the Western interest because of Soviet concessions in other areas becomes dependent on this issue, the US could agree to a limited increase in the number of Soviet offices in West Berlin as long as they would not have the status of an official Soviet representation. Similarly an increased Soviet presence can be accepted if compensated by an increased Western presence in East Berlin. In either case, however, this should be arranged under a separate understanding and not as part of the Four Power Berlin agreement.”

2. In the way of background, you will recall that the basic US position paper⁵ provides that we can agree to minor increases in the Soviet presence in West Berlin, but only in return for an increased Allied presence in East Berlin. In order to maintain Western unity we accepted language in the Agreed Basis for a Possible Four-Power Agreement according to which limited Soviet offices might be accepted in West Berlin “subject to appropriate counter concessions.” We continued to interpret this to mean a commensurate increase in the Allied presence in East Berlin. We realize, however, that the prospects of achieving an increased Allied presence in East Berlin under acceptable conditions would not be promising even if the British, French and Germans would agree to the tabling of our proposal for a US cultural center. We would not wish the effort to reach a Berlin agreement to fail seemingly because of US refusal to concur in limited additional Soviet offices in West Berlin. It is for this reason that we are seeking the President’s approval for the language I have quoted, since it will give us some flexibility in dealing with this question.

3. The new language, as you will have noted, would not, if approved, rule out the kind of offer you have in mind, under all circumstances. I do feel, however, that an offer which is not tied to an increased Western presence in East Berlin would not be warranted at this point for the following reasons:

(a) If there is an impasse in the Berlin negotiations at the present time it results from three causes (1) the Soviet and GDR tactic of seeking agreement between German authorities rather than among Four Powers in order to enhance the GDR’s status; (2) Soviet refusal to make any clearly defined concessions until the Western side offers a greater reduction in the Federal political presence in West Berlin than is covered by the Constitutional organs formula; and (3) Soviet immobility prior to the CPSU Congress. An offer of limited additional Soviet offices in West Berlin is not likely to break an impasse resulting from any or all of the above causes.

(b) Under the circumstances the likelihood exists that anything offered on the Soviet presence at this point in the negotiations would be pocketed by the Soviets without any Soviet concessions in return.

(c) The USSR is not likely to let negotiations founder because of the absence of a firm Western offer on Soviet presence at this point. It may for other reasons, but insofar as additional offices in West Berlin are concerned Abrasimov—rightly or wrongly—probably assumes from remarks already made by the British Ambassador that some increase can be achieved as part of an overall understanding.

(d) At present we do not know whether the Soviets are prepared to make any substantial concessions in the interest of reaching agreement. The chances of a worthwhile agreement can only be assessed on the basis of offers made by the USSR, not on Soviet willingness to keep talking because of offers the Western side makes.

(e) At a later stage, when and if some progress has been made on the major issue of access, concurrence in additional Soviet offices could conceivably be necessary in gaining other objectives, the achievement of which would add materially to the value of the agreement.

4. I realize that there is a tendency on the part of our Allies to interpret the US position on an increased Soviet presence as indicative of a negative US attitude toward the talks. As you know, this is not our attitude. We wish to achieve a worthwhile agreement and to ensure that such leverage as we have is used effectively to this end. If you believe it useful, you are authorized to inform your colleagues of the reasoning outlined in this message without, of course, reference to the current memorandum to the President. You may also emphasize the point made in State 38634⁶ that we will carefully weigh the Soviet presence issue against the value of an agreement as a whole, if the Soviet position develops in a way to suggest that an agreement can be reached.

5. I will inform you further as soon as the President has considered the memorandum.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sutterlin on March 19; cleared by Hillenbrand, Dubs, Brower, Sonnenfeldt, and Rich; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Berlin. In a March 20 memorandum forwarding the draft telegram to Rogers, Hillenbrand explained: “Ambassador Rush considers that it would be desirable for the Western side to table a proposal for a minimal increase in Soviet offices in West Berlin at this point in order to avoid a complete impasse in the Berlin negotiations.” “While it may in time be necessary to agree to a limited increase in the Soviet presence,” he continued, “we do not believe this is warranted now.” (Ibid.)
2. Document 199.
3. See Document 216 and footnote 4 thereto.
4. Document 136.
5. See Document 63.
6. See footnote 2, Document 199.