Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

199. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 16, 1971, 1145Z.

3092. Subject: Berlin Talks—Tactics in Present Phase. For the Secretary from Ambassador Rush.

1. I would like to bring to your attention a problem concerning current tactics in the Berlin talks.

2. As you know, we have, with some recent difficulty, succeeded in maintaining the position that the FRG will not negotiate with the GDR on Berlin access and that the Senat will not negotiate on inner-Berlin improvements until the three Western allies give the signal for this after having reached agreement with the Soviets on the fundamentals applying to each situation. My British and French colleagues and I are convinced that this tactic is the best one to obtain some commitment from the Soviets on these topics.

3. This position makes it the more necessary to achieve some progress in the Four Power talks themselves. In the Four Power talks, the Soviets have adopted standstill tactics regarding consideration of the Western draft of February 5, probably because they are waiting to see whether they can split the Federal Germans off and draw them into negotiations with the GDR. But aside from this, we are on the verge of an impasse with the Soviets on the substance of our February 5 paper; we insist that the Soviets must be more forthcoming and explicit with regard to the commitments they are prepared [to give] on access before there can be any serious review of the Federal presence issue. The Soviets on the other hand are insisting that they cannot move on access until there is further clarification on the Federal presence. The limitations in the Allied position are quite genuine, being based on the CDU position and the need to encourage a nonpartisan German approach to the negotiations. Therefore we risk a complete deadlock which will bring renewed pressures for the FRG to start negotiations or on pressures from our allies to make concessions on the substance of our positions on access or Federal presence I would not consider advisable.

4. I would like to be in the position when the anticipated deadlock has been reached to suggest that we turn to discussion of Soviet interests in the Western sectors. This would be intended as a signal to the Soviets that we continue seriously interested in an agreement and as an encouragement to our allies to maintain a unified position with regard to pressing for movement on access in the Four Power framework. For this purpose, I would like to make the minimum concessions necessary to make plausible that we are discussing this subject seriously. The Bonn Group has suggested a course of action (Bonn’s 2621)² which boils down to telling the Soviets that they can add two commercial enterprises in the Western sectors and can use their property at Lietzenburgerstrasse for that purpose. I would for the current purpose be satisfied with the mention of Soyuz Pushnina and Merkuri, dropping mention of Aeroflot and permission for Soviet nationals to reside in the Western sectors.

5. I am aware that this tactic would probably mean that we might at the end of the negotiations if they are successful have to slightly expand our final position on Soviet interests to include a few more Soviet commercial enterprises. I consider such limited concessions an unavoidable part of a Berlin settlement in any event, and in that context consider them of limited political significance. What is at issue at present is how the subject matter should be played in the negotiations, whether we should be willing to discuss it now with a minor concession to show we mean business or whether we should refuse to mention it until the negotiations are further along. In my judgment as negotiator in the field, it is better to do it sooner rather than to hold back.

6. I would be grateful for your guidance on this question.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Berlin.
2. In telegram 2621 from Bonn, March 5, the Embassy reported that Audland had tabled a proposal at the Bonn Group meeting of March 2 on the Soviet presence in West Berlin. Although Lustig supported the proposal, Dean stated that “the U.S. view was that there should be no discussion of the subject with the Soviets at this time, and that the U.S. side was not prepared at this time to concur in a proposal concerning an increase in Soviet presence in the Western sectors. The proposed discussion was premature. The issue should be reserved for a later stage of the talks.” Dean agreed, however, to listen and report the views of the other allies. (Ibid.) In telegram 38634 to Bonn, March 8, the Department replied: “As we have noted before, Western side has already offered clearly defined concession in terms of FRG presence in West Berlin. Soviets on the other hand have so far offered nothing really tangible either on access or inner-Berlin matters. In effect they insist they can be more forthcoming after Western side offers more. The Department is not prepared to accommodate this tactic by offering further Soviet offices in West Berlin.” (Ibid.) See also Document 202.