Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

198. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Bonn, March 16, 1971.

Thanks for your message of March 15,² which evidently crossed my message of yesterday to you.³

1. The tactics on which the Allies and the FRG have agreed, that until progress is made on an access agreement nothing further can be done with regard to Federal presence, is based not only on judgment but also on what appears to be political necessity. Brandt, in a recent talk with Barzel, agreed to clear in advance with Barzel any proposed concessions with regard to Federal presence and believes Barzel would accept none now. This is also true in general of the C.D.U./C.S.U. and also even of some Cabinet members such as Genscher.

Yesterday I discussed with Bahr what possible concessions might eventually be made with regard to Federal presence, and we both agreed that some means of limiting Bundestag committee and Fraktionen meetings might in time be found and that it might be possible to establish a single Federal Republic office representing the twentyodd FRG Ministerial offices of the Republic now in West Berlin. He confirmed, however, that at present this does not seem to be politically possible.

The above is in the atmosphere of the United States not expressing a desired course of negotiation. If you agree, I would like to re-explore with Brandt and Bahr the entire Federal presence issue with the objective of charting a recommended course if the present tactics produce an impasse. We could then at the proper time proceed to what I consider the preferable alternative B of your message, modified to include discussion between you and Dobrynin, as well as Abrasimov and me, to secure maximum probing benefit.

2. The Russian tactics are at present to attempt to show that the Four Powers can make no progress on access but that the FRG and the GDR can do so. Also, that the Four Powers can make no progress on inner-Berlin movements of goods and people but that the GDR and the Senat can do so. The purpose of this obviously is to confirm the sovereignty of the GDR and to undercut the position of the Four Powers. Until the Russians are convinced that these tactics cannot succeed, I do not believe any real progress can be made on the access question, irrespective of what is done with regard to Federal presence.

3. As an alternative, in order to prevent a temporary stalemate and to give the Russians a further sign of our genuine interest, I have, by cable, suggested to the State Department,⁴ and followed this with a second personal cable to Secretary Rogers today,⁵ which was sent earlier this morning before I received word of your message, urging that approval be given for the three allies to make some minor, tentative concessions for inclusion in the final agreement with regard to the Soviet presence in West Berlin. These concessions are in essence agreeing that the Soviets can add two commercial enterprises in the Western sectors and can use their property at Lietzenburgerstrasse for that purpose. Copies of these cables have, of course, been sent to the White House, and I hope you can find time to read them, particularly the personal one to Rogers. I also hope you agree with this suggestion and can therefore support it.⁶

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Top Secret. The message was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt; a handwritten note indicates that it was received in Washington at 2047Z. A typed note indicates that the text was “dictated before Ambassador Rush left on a trip to Hamburg, but not read by him in final form.”
2. Document 197.
3. Document 196.
4. In telegram 2838 from Bonn, March 10, Rush argued that the Department’s guidance on the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin did not take “sufficiently into account the tactical requirements of the present negotiating situation as I see them.” Rush, therefore, asked the Department to review its position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) In telegram 42221 to Bonn, March 12, the Department explained that, while it was giving “full consideration” to this recommendation, “we are not able to provide substantive reply since subject is dealt with in high level review of Berlin negotiating issues which has not yet been completed.” (Ibid.) The “high level review” refers to the interagency paper prepared after the Senior Review Group meeting of February 10 on NSSM 111. See Document 216.
5. Document 199. The telegram was attached to the message from Rush, presumably by a member of the NSC staff.
6. Kissinger replied via special channel on March 16: “Thank you for your message. It is well to keep in mind that any changes in our position should be given to Dobrynin through my channel first so that the President can claim some personal interest. We need this now for reasons to be mentioned when we meet. Do you think I could mention the essence of your cable on Soviet presence in Berlin to Dobrynin on Friday? I understand, of course, that you will then negotiate the matter in detail with Abrasimov. As I understand Dobrynin, they might use this as a fig leaf to move ahead on access. Let me hear from you before Friday in any event.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]) Rush sent the following reply to Kissinger on March 17: “Thank you for your message and for the helpful information that any changes in our position should be given to Dobrynin through your channel first. I shall keep this very much in mind and be alert to see that it is done. I think it would be an excellent idea for you to mention the essence of my cable on Soviet presence in Berlin to Dobrynin on Friday. This might well help move the access discussion along. While the suggestion has not been cleared in Washington, I am sure it will be favored by France, Britain and the F.R.G.” (Ibid.)