19. Editorial Note
On March 26, 1969, President Nixon sent a letter to Soviet Chairman Kosygin outlining his personal “thoughts on the future of relations between our two countries.” In addition to addressing such issues as the Middle East, Vietnam, and arms control, Nixon suggested [Page 56] the possibility of a settlement on Berlin, particularly in light of the recent controversy over the Bundesversammlung. He wrote:
“I believe, Mr. Chairman, that our responsibilities also require the avoidance of crises and removal of threats to peace in Europe. I was disturbed by the recent flare-up of tensions in Berlin. As I pointed out to your Ambassador, my country is committed to the integrity of West Berlin; it is committed also to fulfilling the obligations and exercising the rights stemming from four-power agreements. Here as elsewhere, unilateral attempts to change the existing situation to the advantage of one side would place obstacles on the road to peace. I believe that any change must be the result of agreement and should improve on the unsatisfactory aspects of the existing situation. If you have suggestions that would make the situation in Berlin mutually more satisfactory, I would, of course, be interested in hearing them.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 709, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. II)
On April 22, 4 days after presenting his credentials to Soviet President Podgorny, Ambassador Beam met Kosygin in Moscow to deliver Nixon’s letter. In order to facilitate the discussion, Beam had forwarded to the Foreign Ministry a copy not only of the letter but also of his oral statement, which contained the following passage:
“As regards Berlin and Germany, we would welcome any improvement in Soviet-German relations. We think German signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will assist this and we hope that the Soviets will be able to give Chancellor Kiesinger any help you may consider feasible to enable him to get the treaty adopted. Meanwhile as we have told Ambassador Dobrynin and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in Washington, we believe early completion of the ratification process by the major nuclear powers, including simultaneous deposit of instruments of ratification, would be helpful in bringing about the widest possible endorsement of the treaty which we both seek. On Berlin, we are prepared to examine any way to improve the present unsatisfactory situation, and the President believes from his recent talks with the Germans that they are prepared to do so too. But this cannot be done under pressure. Perhaps some quiet exchanges would show the way.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR)
When the two met, Kosygin, although claiming that he had not read the letter due to “preoccupation with current CEMA meeting,” conceded that he was “probably acquainted with its contents since translations were on his desk.” After an exchange on the importance of improving relations, the Soviet leader recommended that the two sides find “constructive solutions” for outstanding problems, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Middle East, Vietnam, and Europe. Kosygin insisted that the Kremlin sought to avoid tension, citing the “recent diminution of tensions in Berlin,” but would tolerate no revision of the “results of World War II.” The Soviet position on the status quo in Europe, he declared, was “sacred.” Beam declined to debate European questions, replying that, in his view, the “President’s letter [Page 57] covered subject adequately.” (Telegram 1693 from Moscow, April 22; ibid.)
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met Beam on May 27 to deliver Kosygin’s reply. (Telegram 2408 from Moscow, May 27; ibid.) The letter, dated May 24, included the following passage on Berlin, West Germany, and European security:
“We fully share the view on the necessity of averting crises and of eliminating threats to peace in Europe. In this connection we attach special importance to the understanding with the Soviet Government, expressed earlier by you Mr. President, that the foundations of the postwar system in Europe should not be changed, inasmuch as this could cause great upheavals and the danger of a clash among great powers.
“For our part, we are not interested in the creation of tension in Europe, including West Berlin. If such tension emerges from time to time, then the responsibility for it is borne by those forces in Western Germany which oppose the foundations of the post-war system in Europe, which attempt to undermine these foundations, and in particular which come out with totally unjustified claims with respect to West Berlin. There are no objections from our side to an exchange of opinions proposed by you concerning ways of improving the present unsatisfactory situation with West Berlin.
“We, Mr. President, are not at all against an improvement also of Soviet-West German relations. And the practical steps which have been undertaken by us in this direction are obviously known to you. Unfortunately, however, in the FRG the understanding still has not apparently matured that its relations with other countries, including those with the USSR, cannot be developed apart from the general foreign policy course of Bonn. And the fact that this course still is based on these which are contrary to the goals of strengthening European security and world peace is confirmed in particular by the attitude of the FRG toward the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After all, it is precisely the stubborn refusal of Western Germany to accede to the treaty—with whatever contrived pretext it fortifies itself— which greatly impedes its entry into force. We hope that the United States is using its influence in order to secure the most rapid accession to the treaty by the FRG and by a number of other countries allied with the USA. As regards the ratification of the treaty by the Soviet Union, the matter is not up to us.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 765, Presidential Correspondence File, USSR, Premier Alexei Kosygin)
For complete text of the documentation excerpted above, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Documents 28, 39, 40, and 51. For memoir accounts of the exchange, see Beam, Multiple Exposure, pages 214–221; and Kissinger, White House Years, pages 144, 146, 173, 407.