51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, May 28, 1969.
SUBJECT
-
Kosygin’s Reply to Your
Letter of March 262
Kosygin’s letter—handed to
Ambassador Beam by Gromyko in Kosygin’s absence (he is in Afghanistan) today—is on the
whole calm and unideological in tone.3 It is clear that the Soviet leaders want to
[Page 167]
maintain a dialogue with you
and that they remain interested in keeping our relations on an even
keel.
However, while the tone is civil and constructive, I detect no
substantive concessions. But none were to be expected in this general
sort of communication, just as your own letter contained general
considerations rather than specific new offers of substance.
As was to have been expected, Kosygin argues against linking various issues too
closely, although he recognizes a certain interrelationship. In
principle, this is not too different from your position, and I see no
need for arguing this issue further with the Soviets. We should simply
continue to apply our conception in practice.
On specific issues, Kosygin’s most
important points are
- —continued relaxation on SALT, with a bare reference simply stating that they
await our views. He failed to pick up your suggestion that he
give you any substantive views he may have. This bland posture
is probably due (1) to their desire not to seem too eager and
(2) their wanting to watch the outcome of our domestic debates
to see whether we might be forced into unilateral
“restraint”;
- —a rather more demanding position on South Vietnam, with, in
effect, a proposition that we get rid of Thieu and set up a “temporary”
coalition. On the other hand, Kosygin makes no demands for US troop
withdrawals, as Zorin has been doing in talks with Lodge.
Kosygin offers to
“facilitate” a political settlement but this seems to be
contingent on the changes in South Vietnam he asks for. I see
nothing particularly hopeful in this;
- —on the Middle East, Kosygin supports the present US–Soviet talks and
the four-power conversations in New York but offers no change in
substance. (Gromyko told
Beam they are
studying Sisco’s recent
suggestions.) As was to be anticipated he urges you to use
influence on Israel. He maintains the position that arms control
in the Middle East must await a political settlement;
- —on Berlin, he insists that the FRG is to blame for any trouble but picks up your
suggestion to exchange views on improving the situation; while
we might explore the matter in a low key to Dobrynin, I doubt that this is
a good time to rush into any full-scale talks. Following the
German election, we might raise the issue with the new
government in Bonn and then consider whether and how to follow
up with Moscow;
- —on Europe, he bears down hard on the demand that the FRG sign the NPT and appears to rule out Soviet
ratification until then. He asks us to press the Germans and
other countries allied with us (presumably meaning Japan and, by
Soviet definition, Israel);
- —he takes pro forma exception to the comments in your letter
to Czechoslovakia;
- —on China, Beam had
orally told Kosygin that
we did not seek to exploit Sino-Soviet difficulties; Gromyko now replies that they
will not exploit our troubles with China either and, rather
enigmatically, suggests that in general US–Soviet relations
should be based on long-range considerations and on a whole
range of factors, rather than just China.
I believe that this exchange of letters has served your purpose of
putting on record your basic approach to our relations with the Soviet
Union and that for the moment nothing is to be gained by pursuing it
further. Other channels are open on pending issues.
A translation of Kosygin’s letter
is at Tab A; for your reference, your letter of March 26 and Beam’s oral presentation of April 22
are at Tabs B and C respectively.4
Since we gave the NATO allies the gist
of your letter of March 26, I believe we should give them a very brief
account of the reply. If you agree, I will ask the State Department to
have Ambassador Cleveland inform
the Permanent Representatives by means of the text at Tab D.5
Recommendation:6
- 1.
- That no written reply be made to Kosygin’s letter.
- 2.
- That I inform Dobrynin
that you have read Kosygin’s letter, that you believe we should now
pursue matters of common interest through existing channels,
that you do not plan at this time to make a written
reply.
- 3.
- That you approve the text at Tab D for use at NATO to inform the allies of
Kosygin’s
letter.
Tab A
Letter From Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union Kosygin to President Nixon7
Dear Mr. President:
I and my colleagues have attentively familiarized ourselves with your
message, and also the additional considerations conveyed by
Ambassador Beam.
[Page 169]
We have received with satisfaction confirmation by you of the idea of
the necessity of entering into an era of negotiations and of
readiness to examine any possible path for the settlement of
international problems, in particular of those which are connected
with the danger of a clash and of conflicts.
This accords with our opinion, already expressed earlier to you, on
the importance of achieving a situation in which negotiations would
serve first of all to avert conflicts, and not to seek for ways out
of them after peace and international security have been placed in
jeopardy.
Such a task is completely feasible if our two countries with their
resources and influence will act in the direction of maintaining and
consolidating peace, with due consideration of each other’s
fundamental interests and without setting themselves against third
countries. At the same time it is important not to permit anyone to
exert pernicious influence on Soviet-American relations.
The achievement of mutual understanding in this matter is all the
more necessary since our countries must take into account the
character and degree of influence on the international situation
also of other forces. From this point of view much that can be done
now, given mutual desire, and setting aside complicating (kon
yunturnye) questions, may turn out with the passage of time either
to be fully unattainable of much more difficult and complex.
As far as can be judged by your statements, in principle we have with
you a common understanding in this regard. It is a matter now,
perhaps, of embarking on the practical realization of such an
understanding, on a search for ways and means of resolving concrete
problems which burden international relations at the present time
and are fraught with great dangers for the future.
In this regard, it seems to us, that, taking into account the
complexity of each of these problems by itself, it is hardly
worthwhile to attempt somehow to link one with another. Although it
is indisputable that progress in solving each problem taken
individually would facilitate the solving also of other problems, it
would be unjustified in our view to draw from this a conclusion
about the advisability of making the solution of one problem
dependent on the solution of any other problem or of postponing in
general their examination until there is some sort of general
improvement in Soviet-American relations or in the international
situation as a whole. Such a posing of the question would inevitably
lead to the emergence of a vicious circle and would in no way
facilitate the solving of problems which have become ripe for
this.
We have already transmitted to you through Ambassador Dobrynin our observations on a
number of international problems and on questions of Soviet-American
bilateral relations. In connection with
[Page 170]
your message we would like in addition to
express the following thoughts.
- (1)
-
As facts show, the situation in the Near East is becoming
more and more exacerbated by virtue of the continuity lack of settlement of the conflict in
this region. Without going into a detailed discussion of
this question here, with which our representatives are now
occupied, I would only like to emphasize our conviction that
in the working out of any plans for a Near Eastern
settlement, the strict observance of the main principle is
necessary—aggression must not be rewarded. Without this
there can be no firm and lasting peace in the Near East.
As we understand it, the Government of the USA assesses
seriously the situation which has been created, and
therefore we hope that it will devote efforts to exert the
necessary influence on Israel, which stubbornly does not
wish to take a realistic position and which ignores the
dangerous consequences of its annexationist course.
For our part, we intend to continue, in the framework of a
bilateral Soviet-American exchange of views and of the
consultations of the representatives of the four powers in
New York, to use every opportunity to secure real progress
in the matter of a just settlement of the Near Eastern
conflict in conformity with the November 22, 1967, Security
Council Resolution.8
As regards the question raised by you about limiting outside
military assistance to countries of the Near East, in
principle we advocate the limitation of an unnecessary arms
race in the Near East and we assume that appropriate steps
in this direction would not contradict the interests of
countries of this region. We believe that this question
could be examined on a practical plane after the realization
of a political settlement, including the withdrawal by
Israel of its troops from occupied Arab territories.
- (2)
-
It causes regret and concern to us that real progress in the
direction of a political settlement in Vietnam still has not
been noted in the negotiations in Paris.
The Soviet Union, just as earlier, is ready to facilitate
such a settlement. However, I will say frankly: the American
side itself is complicating the possibility of rendering
this assistance by its obviously unrealistic position in
such a fundamental question as the question of the South
Vietnamese Government. If one admits the hopelessness of a
military way to the solution of the Vietnam problem and one
expresses the desire to stop the armed conflict, then it
would seem self-evident that the present Administration in
Saigon must give way to a government which reflects the
actual disposition of political forces in
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South Vietnam. Together with
the question of creating in South Vietnam a temporary
coalition government is, without question, a decisive one.
It has now become completely obvious already that if one
strives for a halt in the war in Vietnam then it is
impossible to continue to bank on the present Saigon
Administration.
- (3)
-
We fully share the view on the necessity of averting crises
and of eliminating threats to peace in Europe. In this
connection we attach special importance to the understanding
with the Soviet Government, expressed earlier by you Mr.
President, that the foundations of the postwar system in
Europe should not be changed, inasmuch as this could cause
great upheavals and the danger of a clash among great
powers.
For our part, we are not interested in the creation of
tension in Europe, including West Berlin. If such tensions
emerges from time to time, then the responsibility for it is
borne by those forces in Western Germany which oppose the
foundations of the post-war system in Europe, which attempt
to undermine these foundations, and in particular which come
out with totally unjustified claims with respect to West
Berlin. There are no objections from our side to an exchange
of opinions proposed by you concerning ways of improving the
present unsatisfactory situation with West Berlin.
We, Mr. President, are not at all against an improvement also
of Soviet-West German relations. And the practical steps
which have been undertaken by us in this direction are
obviously known to you. Unfortunately, however, in the
FRG the understanding
still has not apparently matured that its relations with
other countries, including those with the USSR, cannot be developed
apart from the general foreign policy course of Bonn. And
the fact that this course still is based on these which are
contrary to the goals of strengthening European security and
world peace is confirmed in particular by the attitude of
the FRG toward the treaty on
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After all, it is
precisely the stubborn refusal of Western Germany to accede
to the treaty—with whatever contrived pretext it fortifies
itself—which greatly impedes its entry into force. We hope
that the United States is using its influence in order to
secure the most rapid accession to the treaty by the FRG and by a number of other
countries allied with the USA. As regards the ratification
of the treaty by the Soviet Union, the matter is not up to
us (to za nami delo nye stanet).
- (4)
- With regard to concrete times for the beginning of talks on
the limitation and curtailment of strategic—both offensive as
well as defensive—armaments, we await your views on this
matter.
- (5)
-
We take note of your assurances, Mr. President, that you
fully understand our concern about our security and that the
USA does not want to complicate the relations of the USSR with its neighbors—both
Communist as well as with others. In light of your
assurances,
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the
mention in your message of events in Czechoslovakia is all
the more incomprehensible. As we have already noted earlier,
these events concern first of all Czechoslovakia itself, and
also its relations with other participating states of the
Warsaw Pact and their security, including the security of
the USSR, and they do not
in any way affect the state interests of the USA.
In conclusion, I would like once again to stress our
readiness to develop relations with the USA in a
constructive plane on the basis of mutual confidence and
frankness. In this connection, we consider useful the
practice which has developed of a confidential exchange of
views on topical international problems and on questions of
Soviet-American relations. In this regard we agree with you,
Mr. President, that in different situations—depending on the
character of the questions and on other considerations—one
must apply different forms and utilize various channels for
such an exchange of views.
With respect,
