Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 21, 1970, 12:40–2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Horst Ehmke, Minister in the Office of the Chancellor of the FRG
• Rolf Pauls, Ambassador of the FRG
• Henry A. Kissinger
• Assistant Secretary of State, Martin Hillenbrand

Mr. Ehmke began the conversation by summarizing what had brought him to Washington for his one-day visit. He referred to newspaper stories about American, especially White House, unhappiness with the FRG’s Eastern Policy and especially to a conversation between the U.S. Chargé in Bonn, Mr. Fessenden, and a member of the Chancellor’s staff, Mr. Sahm, on December 16.² In that conversation, which Mr. Ehmke said had been initiated by Fessenden, the latter had expressed strong reservations concerning Germany’s eastern policy and had also manifested deep concern concerning the state of German/American relations. According to Mr. Ehmke, Fessenden had indicated that the situation was so serious that a visit to Washington by Chancellor Brandt might be required.

Mr. Ehmke went on to say that Fessenden had then seen him and State Secretary Bahr on Saturday, December 19³ concerning a forthcoming article in the New York Times discussing divergent views in Washington concerning Germany’s eastern policy and that Fessenden had also expressed concern regarding the Soviet protest about scheduled SPD readings in Berlin. Mr. Ehmke said he had asked Fessenden whether he was acting on Washington’s instructions and Fessenden had replied that he was simply reflecting the facts of life and was being frank. As regards a Brandt visit, Fessenden, according to Ehmke said on this occasion that the latter should come to Washington to see Dr. Kissinger instead of a visit by the Chancellor.

Dr. Kissinger interjected that this was a good idea since an entirely wrong impression would have been created by a sudden visit of the Chancellor.

Mr. Ehmke continued that the Germans were in fact relaxed. There was complete agreement with the allies on Berlin; indeed the FRG was ahead of the allies on the question of access and of a Berlin solution generally. He added that the US could be certain that there would be no surprises on these subjects from the German side as long as Brandt and Bahr were in charge inasmuch as both of them had spent most of their political lives in Berlin. Mr. Ehmke said he could not see why there should be any differences between the US and the FRG. He concluded that if an agreement should prove impossible we could then get together among ourselves to see what possible concessions might be offered.

Dr. Kissinger observed that Mr. Fessenden had not been talking to Mr. Sahm on instructions but had been expressing personal views. The President would have been surprised indeed if Brandt had come. Meanwhile, he, Dr. Kissinger was delighted to see Mr. Ehmke. He wanted to assure Ehmke that there was no crisis in US/German relations. We consider the FRG a staunch ally and close friend. We might have minor disagreements on tactics but there was definitely no crisis of confidence. Only last week he had asked Assistant [Secretary] Hillenbrand what conceivable basis there could be for a disagreement on Berlin and they had both agreed that none existed.⁴ He had been astonished when Joseph Kraft had said several weeks ago that Ehmke had asserted (during his October visit to Washington)⁵ that we were using Berlin to wreck the FRG’s Eastern Policy.

Mr. Ehmke stated that this was a wholly untrue assertion since he had never intimated such a thing.

Mr. Ehmke then went on to say that it would be useful to discuss with us Chancellor Brandt’s recent letters to the President,⁶ President Pompidou and Prime Minister Heath before replies were sent. What the Germans wanted with respect to Berlin was essentially an intensification of the present negotiations so that they would not be punctuated by frequent pauses. He said that there were in fact signs of movement on the Soviet side. On the other hand, events in Poland might serve to impede this movement. Moreover, the winter will be a difficult one for the GDR because of economic difficulties and the likelihood that butter and meat would have to be rationed. In addition, the problem of social democratization in the GDR would be fiercely debated. The hardliners in the GDR would undoubtedly make the argument that it was dangerous to fool around with the FRG.

Reverting to Berlin, Ehmke said the outlook was uncertain, yet everything depended on it. It was essential to get the Russians to show their hand and it was precisely for this reason that we should do away with the pauses in the negotiations so as to stop the SPD [ SED?] from using these pauses against us. Ehmke stressed that he was not advocating a hasty deal but rather continuing negotiations. In short, he said, the German proposal was for intensification, not for a speedup. He noted that in connection with the German proposal the question of the level of negotiations had been raised and that it had been suggested that Mr. Hillenbrand and his equivalent in France, the U.K. and the USSR should head the delegations. This, however, was not the business of the Germans, although they would expect that in any intensification of negotiations the present negotiators would get additional help from capitals. Ehmke concluded that the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had recently told Brandt that the USSR wanted an agreement soon.⁷ Ehmke commented that there was no reason for us to get it sooner and that it would not be easier to get agreement in February than in June.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether Mr. Ehmke was saying that forward movement was too slow. Ehmke responded that his concern was with intensification. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we could not be worse off if the intensification failed to produce results? Ehmke rejoined that in that event we would all have to stick together. In any event, he said the present method was too sporadic. Further inquiry by Dr. Kissinger as to whether the Germans felt we were moving too slowly again elicited from Ehmke the statement that he was advocating intensification.

Responding to a question from Dr. Kissinger, Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand said that the question of intensification had never come up in a practical form and that the Soviets had never suggested it. Mr. Hillenbrand noted the technical problems that would arise if negotiations were to become continuous. Dr. Kissinger asked Ehmke whether the Soviets had suggested continuous negotiations to the Germans. Ehmke responded quickly that this had not been the case and that the FRG would never talk to the Soviets about such a thing without us. Mr. Hillenbrand noted again that a continuous negotiation would be quite different from the present format since it would require agreement on a complete Western position with fallbacks, etc.

Dr. Kissinger observed that the White House did not interfere in matters of tactics and procedure. The subject of the discussions was not really a matter of principle and it was one for the State Department to consider and deal with.

Mr. Ehmke stressed that time was of the essence since we might miss the bus. The Soviets might lose interest and there may well be a general hardening in the Soviet foreign policy line. In addition, the GDR could acquire more freedom of movement.

Dr. Kissinger raised the question whether we could gain anything by delay. He thought the answer was negative. Then the question was how fast is fast. He himself had no judgment on this point and the experts should agree on it. He could foresee no problem at the level of the White House or the Secretary of State. In any event we were all agreed on what we wanted.

Mr. Ehmke then observed that Ambassador Abrasimov had made some interesting points, at the last Ambassadorial Meeting,⁸ regarding the representation of West Berlin by the FRG and the Federal presence in West Berlin. We should have the chance to press the Soviets on details in followup discussions. Ehmke cited this as an example of how and why continuous negotiations would be beneficial.

Mr. Hillenbrand commented that the real question was when do we intensify the negotiations? The British and French seemed to prefer to wait, although there was no disagreement in principle.

Mr. Ehmke said it was alright to wait but we should not wait too long. Of course the policy of intensification had its risks and we should not overplay our hand, but we should discuss all this between us.

Dr. Kissinger observed that it was wrong to imply that we were waiting. There was no objection in principle to move more rapidly. No one that he knew wanted to delay. Dr. Kissinger said that we owed it to the Germans to look at the procedures now being employed and to see if they could be speeded up. Mr. Ehmke interjected that the Germans would not go it alone and that they would stick to Four-Power positions. Dr. Kissinger concurred, noting that the former Mayor of Berlin would not be the one to give things away. At the same time we would not be responsible for any delays. Dr. Kissinger observed parenthetically that the Soviets may of course be tightening up in their attitudes. Mr. Ehmke said all of us were responsible. We have to get together to find the best way to determine Soviet intentions.

Mr. Hillenbrand then noted that even an intensification would not produce a settlement in six months since at this stage we were only in a position to intensify the first of the three phases envisioned in a Berlin package, i.e. the Four-Power phase.

Mr. Ehmke said that everything the FRG did with the East was basically a help to American policy toward the East which, of course, involved many issues beyond Berlin and Germany. There was no reason to disagree in substance. He suggested that perhaps since the US was finding the going slow on SALT, more effort should be made in other areas. Dr. Kissinger responded that SALT was going about as we expected and that perhaps some results would begin to show at the next session in Vienna. In any event there was no reason at all to slow up the German negotiations because of SALT. Mr. Ehmke asked why not make Berlin a test case. Dr. Kissinger observed that he always got “killed” with charges of creating “linkages.” Mr. Ehmke, reverting to his earlier point, stressed again that Berlin and the FRG negotiations with the East were not “German negotiations.” They were as much American as they are German. The US could no more afford a confrontation in Berlin than the Germans.

Dr. Kissinger expressed concurrence with these observations. He repeated that we should look at speeding up the procedures in the Berlin negotiations and see if revisions in position are needed. He then observed with emphasis that no one would accuse the Germans of giving away Berlin. All of us were agreed and all of us want the viability of the city. Mr. Hillenbrand agreed with Dr. Kissinger’s observations but, turning to Mr. Ehmke, observed that the Germans had been more optimistic about the prospects with regard to Berlin than we. Dr. Kissinger interjected that Bahr had been quite optimistic when he was here in August.⁹

Mr. Ehmke then noted that the Germans were often asked by the US what the effect would be for the US of a FRG/GDR agreement. Without pursuing the point, Mr. Ehmke argued that the FRG’s policy had prevented a wave of recognitions of the GDR. If, he said, we did not get a Berlin agreement, there might be no holding back of the GDR and its international recognition.

Dr. Kissinger again underlined the agreement that existed between ourselves and the Germans though he noted that we should do more to control the “cosmetics.” He said that he had talked to the Secretary of State the previous day about the problem of White House visitors who made statements concerning Germany and its Eastern Policy. Dr. Kissinger then reiterated that we would do what we could do intensify negotiations and that we would certainly treat this whole issue as a common responsibility. Mr. Ehmke stressed that that was the way Chancellor Brandt wanted it, too.

Dr. Kissinger stated we had absolutely no doubt about the FRG and its adherence to the alliance and Eastern [Western] institutions. It was essential that we should always talk frankly with each other.

Turning to “worries” that had been raised at various times about the Eastern Policy, Mr. Ehmke stressed that concern about the FRG’s economic and technical activities in Eastern Europe were unwarranted. They would, in practice, be very small. As regards expressions of concern about domestic, political polarization in the FRG, Mr. Ehmke argued that without the Eastern Policy there could be a serious danger of a “reunification frustration” particularly on the right of German politics. This would also have its anti-US overtones. Dr. Kissinger interjected that those who express the greatest concern about polarization were often the greatest polarizers themselves. In fact, Mr. Ehmke observed once the Eastern treaties were settled, the German Western Policy would be intensified. His government had concluded that it must accept some polarization now since it would be much worse if there were no eastern policy at all or if the eastern policy failed. The best course in terms of the Germans’ domestic situation was to have both an active western and eastern policy. Mr. Ehmke stressed that the Germans were not blind to the problem of polarization.

Dr. Kissinger stressed that we would not participate in domestic FRG debates. He observed that Opposition people from the FRG had been coming through town and we obviously have to see them just as we used to see people in the SPD when they were in opposition. But we do not give endorsement to the views of these Opposition personalities, and the newspapers are giving the wrong impression when they claim that we do.

Mr. Ehmke at once said that there was absolutely no problem about our seeing politicians from the Opposition. He then observed that the Opposition in Germany was of course not united and that he himself had the greatest respect for Schroeder. Dr. Kissinger observed in this connection, that when Strauss was here recently for a private dinner, which Dr. Kissinger attended, there had been no discussion of Germany at all.¹⁰ Mr. Ehmke indicated that the Strauss episode was of no consequence. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that we would not inject ourselves knowingly into German politics.

Dr. Kissinger then observed that we had to stay in close contact as policies and events evolved because the Soviets were trying to divide us. The Soviets have to be clear that they cannot be tough to one of us and soft to the other. That is a basic point and he was sure that Chancellor Brandt would agree. Agreeing with Dr. Kissinger, Assistant [Secretary]Hillenbrand noted that we had endorsed the Eastern Policy and that we were well aware that Chancellor Brandt had said that Eastern Policy begins with Western Policy.

Dr. Kissinger concluded the conversation by stressing that we needed common understanding about where we were going with respect to the East. In any case, the Germans could not jeopardize our interests in Europe without jeopardizing their own. Mr. Ehmke nodded strong assent. Dr. Kissinger stressed the value of Mr. Ehmke’s trip and the conversation that had just taken place. Close contact was essential. It was a cardinal principle of the President to maintain close relations with the Federal Republic. We will not make policy by the press or through middle-level officials. If the President is worried, Dr. Kissinger stated, the Germans would hear about it directly. The discussions then ended.¹¹

HS

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt on December 22; approved by Kissinger on January 4. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the White House. Another memorandum of the conversation, drafted by Hillenbrand, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. For Pauls’ report on the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 2305–2309. Kissinger also met Ehmke privately both before (12:05 to 12:38 p.m.) and after (4:40 to 5:11 p.m.) the meeting. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Although no record of the private discussions has been found, Ehmke published an account in his memoir, Mittendrin: Von der Groben Koalition zur Deutschen Einheit, pp. 140–142. See also Willy Brandt, People and Politics, p. 289.
2. See Document 154.
3. See Document 149.
4. Reference is presumably to the discussion in the Washington Special Actions Group on December 18; see Document 147.
5. Regarding Ehmke’s previous visit to the United States, see Document 120.
6. Document 145.
7. See Document 146 and footnote 9 thereto.
8. See Document 144.
9. See Document 108.
10. See footnote 4, Document 146.
11. In a telephone conversation that evening, Kissinger and Rogers discussed the Ehmke visit and the “crisis of confidence” in German-American relations. Kissinger reported: “I hit the Acheson point very well. I said when we have something to say the Secretary of State will say it.” “I think it’s fine,” Rogers replied, “and I wish they would quit sending so many people over here.” Kissinger noted: “He [Ehmke] claims that F[essenden] put him up to it.” “I think it’s fine,” Rogers reiterated. “We will see how the stories come out.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)