Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, December 19, 1970, 1340Z.

14620. Subject: Quadripartite Talks: Binder Article on Alleged U.S. Government Differences Over the Berlin Negotiations and Ost Politik.²

1. New York Times correspondent David Binder told Ewing³ late last night that he had just filed a story concerning a “crisis of confidence” between the U.S. and the FRG over the Ost Politik and Berlin. The article cites well-informed circles in the German Government as the source. It states that the U.S. Government publicly affirms its support for the Ost Politik and asserts there is common position on Berlin. At the same time, however, there are many voices coming out of Washington critical of the Ost Politik. The article then proceeds to identify four different opinion circles—a first around Kissinger, a second around Hillenbrand, a third around McCloy, Clay and Acheson, and a fourth around Secretary Laird. The article concludes by saying that the German Government is becoming very impatient with the conflicting opinions on the Berlin negotiations and the Ost Politik emanating from the U.S. Government.

2. The Chargé called the Chancellor’s office’s attention to the article early this morning. The Chargé stated that such an article was extremely unhelpful and asked for any clarification which might be helpful.

3. Shortly afterwards Ehmke and Bahr called in the Chargé. They stated categorically that no one in the Chancellor’s office had given any such briefing to Binder. Ehmke and Bahr said they had just checked with the Chancellor and Sahm, the only two other than themselves who could be authorized to speak for the Chancellor’s office. None of the four had even seen Binder recently.

4. They urged that, if the article is published, both the U.S. and German Governments should take the same line with the press. They suggested something like the following:

“There exists complete unanimity on the Berlin negotiations between the U.S. and German Governments, as well as with the French and British Governments. This unanimity of position was agreed to at the NATO Ministerial meeting; no factor since that meeting has changed the situation. Any newspaper article asserting the contrary is entirely false.”⁴

5. Comment: We urge that a statement along these lines be used by Washington if the Binder article is published.

6. Ehmke and Bahr were obviously very upset by the Binder article. I am personally convinced that the Chancellor’s office was not responsible for passing this story to Binder, since it is so obviously against interest of the Chancellor’s office. Binder told Ewing, however, that the information had been given to him by someone close to the Chancellor’s office who obviously wanted it published. A finger of suspicion could point at Ahlers, who is very close to Binder and who we believe may be on the outs with the Brandt government.

Fessenden

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Berlin.
2. In a note forwarding a copy of the telegram to Kissinger, Mary Brownell of the NSC staff reported that Benjamin Welles, the New York Times Washington bureau chief, had called, offering to let Kissinger read the article before publication. No evidence has been found, however, that Kissinger called Welles. The Times published the Binder article on December 20.
3. Gordon A. Ewing, public affairs officer (USIA).
4. An unidentified handwritten message on the note from Brownell to Kissinger reads: “HAK has no problem with language in para 4 if needed.” No evidence has been found that the proposed statement was ever released.