Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980

59. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting¹

Washington, May 1, 1975, 8:13–9 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

Secretary Kissinger: Tom, do you want to say something about the IEA?²

Mr. Enders: I think it’s basically a hard line, Mr. Secretary, the two countries—Japan and Sweden—both—took this week. The alternative sources and conservation policy showed some signs of withdrawal symptoms after the failure of the prep.con. The other countries, however, took quite firmly and directly the line that we must now go ahead and make sure that we implement the substantive policies that we have adopted in the past and that we keep the goal of a producer-consumer dialogue perhaps also—if possible, a consumer-producer meeting—and at the forefront of the organization try to develop a new means of achieving it, but recognizing that this is going to be much more difficult in the future.

They would be looking, of course, very carefully to see what success the United States has in putting across its own energy program. Assuming that we have some, I think it will hold all right.

Much of the next month will be spent in preparations for the Ministerial. There was very strong sentiment towards trying to deal with the raw materials-energy link by having the OECD take the lead in the raw-materials issue—allowing, eventually, for a separate conference, or series of conferences, on raw materials, first, rather than the link of a raw materials-energy conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Whose sentiment was that? Yours?

Mr. Enders: I joined it, but it was basically others.

Secretary Kissinger: Like who—Luxembourg? (Laughter.) Whom did you line up your support to? (Laughter.)

Mr. Eagleburger: Liechtenstein. (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: I just don’t believe that it’s going to go that way. I think the Europeans are going to edge up, step by step, towards linking them one way or the other.

Mr. Enders: Well, this—

Secretary Kissinger: They have a compulsive fear of confrontation and, therefore, thinking that the producers, say, will cause a confrontation—in their mind sooner or later produce one.

Mr. Enders: Well, this was not a proposal which I made or led. In fact, it was by the Europeans. And I think it gives us something to go with now.

Mr. Hartman: That was not the experience of that last conference. They were tougher than we were. I think it will last; but it was a pretty good performance at the last meeting, I think. Don’t you? (Addresses Mr. Robinson.)

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but it won’t last.

Mr. Robinson: Germany has apparently reversed their position, or appears to be reversing their position a hundred-eighty degrees on that issue.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s exactly right. That’s my view. And so will the others.

Mr. Enders: That may be, Mr. Secretary, but I don’t think we should predict now and write them off, it seems to me—

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think we should write them off. But I think we should take a position that’s realistic and that meets our objectives, instead of being the only ones left screaming for energy when they’re all going the other way. All the more so, when they have never understood what we have to gain at an energy conference. And we’re against the energy conference, to begin with. It would be sort of absurd for us to sort of wind up as the last defense of an energy conference that everybody else has abandoned. (Laughter.)

Mr. Enders: It was very clear at the IEA meeting that nobody there wanted to have an energy conference. As a matter of politics, they thought they had to be all for it and would continue to work in that direction.

Secretary Kissinger: Like the European Security Conference. For years everyone has just said it was a matter of politics, and suddenly they were stuck with it.

Mr. Enders: There was no early action or movement in this direction, other than in the case of Japanese.

Secretary Kissinger: We’ve got to get a strategy that we can sustain, and we haven’t got it now. What happens if the OECD people put it into raw materials and OECD and Treasury insists on putting it into the Five or Ten?

Mr. Enders: Do both.

Secretary Kissinger: What?

Mr. Enders: Do both.

Secretary Kissinger: But what will happen, in effect?

Mr. Enders: Both will do. Both will do it.

Secretary Kissinger: Both will do it?

Mr. Hartman: 20 has the less developed countries in there. If you turn that into a debate, you won’t get anything.

The main thing I think the less developed countries have to decide is what kind of proposals they want to have.

Mr. Robinson: We feel very strongly about the OECD as a vehicle for bringing in the Industrialized Nations. Simon feels equally strongly, maybe more. We’ll have a paper outlining the issues.³

Secretary Kissinger: O.K. Well, thank you.

(Whereupon at 9:00 a.m., the Secretary’s Staff Meeting was concluded.)

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 3, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger presided over the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. A table of contents and list of attendees are not printed.
2. The IEA Governing Board met April 28–29; see footnote 11, Document 56.
3. Not found.