Office of the Historian

74. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, October 9, 1969.
  • SUBJECT
    • Items to Discuss with the President, October 10

1. Inform the President that you have instructed Defense to proceed with the alert measures he approved yesterday.2 (At Tab A is a list of pros and cons of each of the measures listed in the memo. Those which are being implemented and for which detailed plans are being prepared with a submission date of October 10, are checked.)

[Omitted here are points 2 through 5, which deal with unrelated matters.]

[Page 262]

Tab A

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense3

Initial Evaluation of Possible Military Actions

1.
Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands, e.g., in SAC and Polaris forces.4
a.
Pros:
  • —low cost.
  • —easily detected.
  • —unusual U.S. action.
  • —high initial impact; possibly alarming in significance.
  • —could be puzzling for long period.
  • —low public exposure.
  • —feasible for early execution.
b.
Cons:
  • —very restricting to normal operational and administrative requirements.
  • —will gradually lose significance.
  • —may be shown up as a sham as Soviet reconnaissance/surveillance fails to turn up complementing activity, such as alerting or movement of forces.
2.
Stand-down of flying combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, e.g., for 48 hours in SAC and EUCOM.
a.
Pros:
  • —rather easily detected in perhaps one day.
  • —would be considered both unusual and significant if event includes sizeable forces.
  • —feasible of early execution.
  • —negative cost.
b.
Cons:
  • —moderately visible to public.
  • —difficult to extend beyond several days without disrupting training proficiency and administrative schedule.
  • —lack of supporting actions, such as recall of personnel on leave and dispersal of forces, might expose overall action as sham.
3.
Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.
a.
Pros.
  • —low cost.
  • —easily detected by ship and promptly reported.
  • —significant departure from current operations.
  • —no direct public exposure.
  • —feasible of early execution.
  • —implies significant U.S. interest in Soviet actions.
  • —can be continued for long period.
b.
Cons:
  • —diverts destroyer, helicopter and patrol aircraft from other important tasks.
  • —could provoke Soviet charges of interference with shipping on high seas, with attendant public exposure.
  • —increases chance of collision at sea.
  • —could encourage counterharassment of U.S. shipping.
4.
Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union.
a.
Pros:
  • —easily detected, perhaps over period of one week.
  • —no public exposure in U.S. unless Soviets take hostile action.
  • —can be integrated into over-all U.S. surveillance program.
  • —can be continued over long period.
  • —would be considered very significant, though not necessarily unusual.
b.
Cons:
  • —will divert limited resources from other high priority tasks.
  • —increased risk of shoot-down by Soviets.
  • —risk of Soviet-sponsored initiatives by other Red countries against U.S. surveillance craft.
5.
Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.
a.
Pros:
  • —rather easily detected over several days.
  • —particularly significant when coupled with nuclear weapon loading.
  • —low public exposure.
  • —feasible of early execution.
  • —low cost.
b.
Cons:
  • —difficult to maintain for weeks without strain on air crews.
6.
Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons to only military dispersal bases.
a.
Pros:
  • —easily detected.
  • —highly significant to Soviets.
  • —low or negative costs after several days.
  • —can be executed quickly.
  • —can be sustained over long period.
b.
Cons:
  • —could be publicly alarming, depending on situation and interpretation.
7.
Alerting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or alongside tender.
a.
Pros:
  • —easily detected by Soviet shore spotters, and promptly reported.
  • —recognized by Soviets as departure from scheduled operations.
  • —feasible of early execution for submarines not undergoing extensive repairs.
  • —absence from port can be maintained for long duration.
  • —Soviets cannot determine destination or mission.
b.
Cons:
  • —stimulates speculation by dependents and results in positive public exposure in U.S.
  • —delays or interrupts repair and upkeep periods.
  • —degrades long-term readiness.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13–12/30/69. Secret.↩
  2. Nixon approved on October 9. See Document 73 and footnote 3 thereto.↩
  3. Pursley sent the paper to Haig under a covering memorandum, October 9, which reads as follows: “Yesterday, October 8, 1969, I provided a list of a number of possible military actions which the Soviet Union would consider as unusual and significant. Attached is an initial evaluation of possible advantages and disadvantages of such actions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 352, Subject Files, Schedule of Significant Military Exercises, Vol. I [Feb. 69–Oct. 70])↩
  4. Haig placed checkmarks next to options 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6.↩