Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972

184. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 26, 1971, 2:15–3:51 p.m.

• SUBJECT
  • DOD Strategy and Fiscal Guidance

• PARTICIPATION
  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Under Secretary John N. Irwin
    • Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
    • Mr. Thomas Pickering
    • Mr. Seymour Weiss
    • Mr. Leslie Brown
  • CIA
    • Mr. Richard Helms
    • Mr. Bruce Clarke
  • JCS
    • Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
    • Maj. Gen. Richard Shaefer
  • DOD
    • Mr. David Packard
    • Mr. Robert Moot
    • Dr. Gardiner L. Tucker
  • ACDA
    • Mr. Philip Farley
    • Vice Admiral John M. Lee
  • CEA
    • Mr. Paul McCracken
  • OST
    • Dr. Edward David
  • OMB
    • Mr. George P. Shultz
    • Mr. Caspar Weinberger
    • Mr. James Schlesinger
  • NSC Staff
    • Mr. K. Wayne Smith
    • Mr. John Court
    • Lt. Cdr. John A. Knubel
    • Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

1. Work should proceed immediately under the auspices of the DPRC on the identification and preparation of major policy issues related to the FY 73 Defense budget for consideration by the NSC and decision by the President. This work should be related to ongoing studies, including the DPRC strategic forces review and the studies requested by NSSM 69² and NSDM 95.³

2. Pending the NSC policy review referred to in Paragraph 1, definitive status cannot be accorded to elements of the Defense Department interim strategy guidance that are inconsistent with Presidential policy.

3. In connection with the NSC review, special attention should be given to the problems posed by increasing Defense costs and the resultant requirement for trade-offs involving force size, modernization, and readiness.

4. OMB will provide by early June illustrative data on alternative tradeoffs between domestic and defense spending levels.

5. Special precautions must be taken to insure against leaks of the interim policy guidance, particularly the portion dealing with Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we might begin by having George Shultz tell us what the fiscal problems are.⁴ Then we can have a briefing from Defense.

Mr. Shultz: The budget picture as we see it now is that in FY 71 we are likely to have a deficit of more than $19 billion. Nevertheless, we think outlays will be held barely within full-employment revenues. For FY 72 we now project being in the red by somewhat over $15 billion. Congress has already carried us $3.5 billion over full employment revenue. This means a big struggle is ahead. The President said he would veto the accelerated public works bill. A budget battle is shaping up.

In FY 73, we assumed a Defense budget of $79.6 billion. (I take it that is the figure you fellows in the Defense Department have generated.) We have also assumed that we will just be carrying on the programs projected in the President’s budget. We see a full employment deficit of $6.5 billion. This is a very contingent kind of figure. Congress has hardly started work on the FY 72 budget. What work Congress has done has had the effect of increasing the budget.

The President has had three balanced full employment budgets including FY 71, and we think the FY 71 balance will hold. For FY 72 it will be more difficult to hold a full employment balance, but if it doesn’t hold, it will not be our fault. I would be very much surprised if the President were willing to send up a budget that was out of balance at full employment. Therefore, you have to start with the premise that the budget submitted will be in balance at full employment.

From our standpoint, we are trying, in the process of the spring budget review, to get as good a line as we can on the various elements that must go into the FY 73 budget. In early June we hope to have the first approximate reading on what the budget will look like. Then we can have a discussion with the President during the latter part of June and get his thinking on the basic decisions underlying the budget. These will correspond to the decisions made last July on the FY 72 budget. Those decisions turned out to be quite operative throughout the budget process.

One option that ought to be put in front of the President is a budget in balance at full employment with the current tax system. You can say this is not a feasible option. Full employment revenues under the current tax system are now estimated at $245 billion, but Congress is adding on outlays almost as fast as receipts. Nevertheless, this represents at least one option.

From what I hear about the Defense budget, the possibility of having budget higher than the current full employment revenue is certainly a possibility we will have to entertain. This would have to include a tax boost.

Dr. Kissinger: Would the tax increase have to pass next year?

Mr. Shultz: Yes, so as to be effective in FY 73. I am not saying we should rule out a budget above current full employment revenues, but everybody should have his eyes open about the implications. We have to have before the summer of 1972 something that people running for office can support.

As we have pondered the Defense budget process, it has seemed to us that the practice of having many decisions come late in the game is disruptive to the planning process. It is desirable to make these decisions as early as we can. At the same time, it is difficult to make them early. This counsels having a degree of flexibility, so that we can make effective decisions.

Everything must be related to what happens with the FY 72 budget. We know how desirable it is to have a posture of fighting for the President’s budget the way it is. We won’t know until June what the House mark-up on the FY 72 budget will be.

Thus, from an overall standpoint, the budgetary picture is very indefinite unless we are willing to go for a major tax increase. An element of flexibility in our approach is highly desirable.

Finally, our basic idea is to have the money produced for the kind of defense establishment that is in keeping with the strategy we have settled upon. The constraints we face are yours and ours. We share them.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we now get Defense’s projections? Then we can have some discussion of what these imply and can see if we can meet some of George’s [Shultz’s] concerns.

Dr. Tucker: (Dr. Tucker briefed from a series of charts.)⁵ I first want to show what our planning cycle looks like. The internal Defense planning cycle involves three steps: issuance of the fiscal and strategy guidance, program decisions, and assembly of the FY 73 budget. The starting point is a summary of the decisions made as a result of last year’s planning cycle.

The first step in the planning cycle for FY 73 has just been taken. We have issued guidance to the services for planning.⁶ The services then have to come back with proposals, which the Secretary reviews.

Dr. Kissinger: Where does the President come in?

Dr. Tucker: He dominates the whole thing. The guidance issued this year is different in several respects from what we have had previously. It includes issues that are still up for decision in the DPRC or review by the President. It is, however, just interim guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: That is my question. What is the status of this proposal that we will have no conventional forces for wars in Asia after 1977?

Mr. Packard: It is just interim guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: If this strategy leaks, we will have a foreign policy problem. The President has to decide this.

Mr. Irwin: If this is just interim guidance, I hope the DPRC Working Group will have an opportunity to look at it.

Admiral Moorer: This [the strategy and fiscal guidance] has only been out since Thursday [April 22]. The Chiefs haven’t reviewed it.

Dr. Kissinger: I am really worried about leaks. This would be a major change in our policy. (to Mr. Johnson) Don’t you think so?

Mr. Johnson: There is no question about it.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn’t there some way this can be handled prior to the time a decision is made so that the likelihood of a leak is reduced?

Dr. Tucker: It is classified top secret and labelled interim.

Mr. Packard: The only way to make sure is to keep it off a piece of paper.

Dr. Kissinger: Couldn’t you call it a working paper?

Mr. Packard: It doesn’t make any difference what you call it.

Mr. Johnson: There is a lot of dynamite in this as far as Asia is concerned, particularly as regards [less than 1 line not declassified].

Dr. Kissinger: You could express the policy contained in this as being based [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Johnson: We have to have a discussion of this. This has to be resolved by the President.

Dr. Kissinger: And by the NSC. This is a profound national issue. If it kicks around and becomes part of a public debate before the NSC can act, we will have a real problem.

It is out now as interim guidance?

Dr. Tucker: Yes.

To continue with the briefing, three processes start now that the fiscal guidance has been issued. First, some internal clean-up takes place; the Joint Staff have to comment. Second, the service force planning starts. And third, the guidance goes to the DPRC for review and selection of the issues that should go to the NSC and the President for resolution.

This is different from last year in that the guidance provided to the services is more explicit and that the services and the Joint Staff in their replies are to provide not only programs but to submit an analysis of capability, rationale, and risk. During the next two months the services and the Joint Staff will be preparing their responses. The Chiefs will propose force structure, and the services will draw up programs. All of these inputs will be received by late June or early July. Then we can conduct a review and make decisions on program issues. By then we will have DPRC and NSC decisions to crank in.

Mr. Packard: (to Mr. Shultz) George, that is when we can come down more firmly on a final [budget] figure.

Dr. Tucker: This is consistent with your schedule.

Mr. Shultz: At that date we will need to have options that we can give to the President.

Mr. Weinberger: Will there be room for changes if, for example, the President decides to change the policy you are proposing in Asia?

Dr. Tucker: In practice, such decisions would have to be ground in this region (indicates on chart).

Mr. Shultz: Can’t you get something out earlier in June?

Dr. Tucker: We will have some information available when we receive the Joint Forces Memorandum. But we will still need to have more data.

To get back to the briefing, after the program decisions are made, the services come back in thirty days with programs. Then we make the budget estimates, and this is followed by two months of working with OMB on scrubbing the budget. We come out with a final budget that is almost always lower than what we initially proposed.

Mr. Johnson: Then it is between July 14 and August 31 that the NSC and the President will need to make decisions.

Mr. Irwin: No, they can be made from now on.

Dr. Kissinger: The conceptual decisions can be made right away. However, there will be no figures much before July 28. We need to start right now to obtain the foreign policy and arms control decisions. If the President decides against a policy of no ground forces in Asia or if he decides to redefine strategic sufficiency in a certain way, he doesn’t have to wait until June 28.

Mr. Packard: Most decisions don’t affect the whole budget. We can get on with our planning in the meantime.

Dr. Tucker: There is a very important calibration point. This could be stated as the kind of strategy that we could support with a certain kind of forces with reasonable risk and within the fiscal guidance. We find out here (indicates on chart) whether a given force will implement a given strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: All we will know on July 14 is that we can afford a strategy that is laid out within our budget.

Dr. Tucker: This strategy is less demanding than others [that might be considered], but even with this strategy we are straining.

Dr. Kissinger: However, this is not the only less demanding strategy that we can conceive.

Dr. Tucker: We have underway reviews of NATO strategy and forces, strategy and forces in Asia, and theater nuclear forces.

Mr. Irwin: How do you anticipate that the results of these studies (for example, in such matters as combat/support ratios) will be ground into Defense Department planning?

Dr. Tucker: The program decisions would reflect these factors. We asked the services to do the studies in the hope that the results of the studies would be reflected in the programs which the services recommend.

Mr. Irwin: Can this type of decision have much impact on force make-up?

Mr. Packard: It all gets down to three variables: manpower levels, readiness, and modernization programs. Thus, you can change the number of people you have and the proportion of active to reserve forces. You can modify your reserve and thus affect readiness.

Mr. Irwin: If you change the number of support troops per division, does that give us a real budgetary option?

Admiral Moorer: One other factor which affects what we can do should also be mentioned. That is enemy capabilities. This is not a flexible element.

(Mr. Shultz left the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Tucker: Let’s take a look at comparative program levels. If you take out fixed costs, such as retirement pay and the Vietnam war, what remains is the discretionary budget area to which the fiscal guidance applies. However, we have further instructed the services not to make any changes in the dollar value of strategic programs because of SALT and the upcoming DPRC review. We have told them to leave out intelligence and security, which are being handled in other channels, and to omit support to other nations. We know that we may have to increase support and that the services naturally tend to cut it in order to have more money for their own activities.

Now let’s look at the relationship between manpower and improvement. Under the current five-year plan, we are figuring on 2.37 million people. To keep our modernization program, we would have to cut that to 2.27 million. On the other hand, if we wanted to maintain the manpower level, we would have to cut modernization expenditures by 12%. A part of our outlay is determined by obligations from prior years. Only 25% is subject to decisions in FY 73.

It we were to keep manpower at the five-year program level, we would have to cut modernization to 50%. If we take out 100,000 men, the modernization program could go up to 80% of the planned level.

We asked the services to give us a quick illustrative estimate of the forces that would ft the fiscal guidance. We asked them to do this on the basis of two alternative assumptions: that we keep force levels intact or that we keep modernization intact. To keep modernization intact, we would have to cut these forces indicated here [on the chart].

Dr. Kissinger: For three army divisions, you would be getting 211 attack helicopters, 34 surface-to-air batteries and 87,000 anti-tank missiles. Is that the only trade-off possible?

Dr. Tucker: This is illustrative of two extreme. We would not necessarily end up with this.

Admiral Moorer: You should put emphasis on that word “illustrative”. The last time we did this, the illustrative figures wound up in the budget.

Dr. Tucker: Here are some of the trade-offs. (indicates on chart)

Mr. Packard: The Army wants to make things look bad so they will not have to give up anything.

Dr. Tucker: This accumulates over five years. This is what you would have in FY 77 if you paid for it over a five-year period. The Army says we can’t pay for it if we sustain 3-1/2 divisions over this period.

Dr. Kissinger: This certainly shows that materiel is going up in cost. We may price ourselves out of the market both as regards men and equipment. The same sort of argument [on manpower vs. modernization trade-off] can be made for the Navy and the Air Force. If the Navy sacrifices two carriers and 19 other ships, they can have ten high speed nuclear submarines. If the Air Force cuts 1073 tactical aircraft, they can get 324 new fighters. These are sombre projections.

Mr. Packard: It is a severe problem. For instance, if you get a nuclear carrier, you not only have the cost of the carrier but also of the F–14s that go on it and that cost twice as much as the old carrier aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to get a study on this explosion in defense costs.⁷

Mr. Packard: Of course, you have to consider that the new equipment usually has more capability than the old. So you are getting more for your money.

Mr. Johnson: What about capability in a limited war situation? These weapons have more capability against the Soviets, but do they contribute much to our limited war capability?

Mr. Packard: All of this has some effect on everything.

Dr. Kissinger: It also means that losses are more costly.

Admiral Moorer: This is the result of a combination of inflation plus technology.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Packard) Are there any trade-offs that would be effective in Southeast Asia. I know that Henry [Kissinger] is interested in this question, too.

Mr. Packard: We have a missile called the Condor which can hit a bullseye at 50 miles. If we had had this missile at the time we were bombing North Vietnam, we could have done more damage with no pilot loss and less damage to civilians at about 2% of what the bombing actually cost.

You can’t go on just money costs alone. We are making some increases in capability.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s at least note that this is a problem.

Dr. Tucker: Remember that in the NSSM 84 study⁸ we found that the big problem was the tank/anti-tank imbalance. This is what we are trying to remedy by developing these anti-tank weapons.

(to Mr. Johnson) Alex, to answer your question, our first priority is NATO and we design our forces to meet NATO requirements. We then design them to meet our lesser priorities.

Mr. Packard: The real option is manpower versus capability. We need manpower.

Mr. Irwin: Is there any possibility we could take this out of support rather than combat forces?

Dr. Tucker: That is the purpose of the [NATO] study.

Mr. Irwin: This again raises the question of the desirability of the all-volunteer army. Maybe we should look at that again.

Mr. Packard: The all-volunteer army is consistent with our guidance.

Dr. Tucker: This next chart shows our reinforcement capability. That is what we can mobilize and deploy by M + 90. The effects of maintaining force levels or programmed modernization are shown.

Admiral Moorer: The FYDP [Five Year Defense Program] doesn’t necessarily reflect our requirements; it shows planned capabilities.

Dr. Tucker: Now we can take up the policy and strategy statements.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we ought to discuss strategy before we get into the fiscal statement. As I understand it, you define the sufficiency criteria to mean that we must be able to meet these criteria after a nuclear exchange with China. For that reason as well as because of SALT, you are against any cuts in strategic forces. (It would be interesting to see if we could find a projection that would require an increase in strategic forces.) You are planning to withdraw the second U.S. division from Korea in FY 73.

Dr. Tucker: It probably will be FY 74.

Dr. Kissinger: You make the assumption that no ground forces will be used for non-CPR threats after 1973 and that after 1977 no ground forces will be used against any threat. Our planning relies instead on Japanese naval and air forces and on our tactical nuclear weapons. This means we should rely on strategic deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons to restrict the level of conflict in Asia. These are assumptions that the NSC will have to discuss. This is bound to have the most profound consequences on our relations with Asia. Even if you can demonstrate by systems analysis that the Asian countries have a marginal capability to defend themselves, we have to consider whether they would want to do so, given the level of support they can expect from us.

If Japan drives as hard a bargain on rearmament as on textiles, we may find that this [proposed Asia policy] is difficult to achieve. The ideas the Japanese have about their military role may not dovetail so neatly with ours, and there is also the question of whether the countries to be defended are willing to accept Japanese protection.

Mr. Weinberger: There is a tremendous divergence between the strategic guidance and existing policy.

Dr. Tucker: This column (indicates on chart) gives the view of the Joint Staff on what our proper strategy ought to be. This is the military’s view of what is realistic.

Mr. Weinberger: Is it realistic to ask for strategic guidance that would mean taking away our capability to limit damage to the U.S. from a nuclear attack?

Mr. Packard: We have never had that capability.

Dr. Tucker: Even with the full Safeguard program, we won’t have that capability.

Mr. Packard: There are only two ways to achieve such a capability. One is to have a first strike capability to neutralize the Soviet strategic force. The other is to have a suitable defensive force. We don’t have either.

Dr. Tucker: The only way to defend our population is to deter a nuclear attack.

Dr. Kissinger: You say we do not have the forces to protect our population, but you also say that we do have the forces to deter China. That is not consistent. If we have some damage-limiting capability, we force an enemy either to go all out or not to attack at all.

Dr. Tucker: That is the argument for Safeguard.

Mr. Packard: What we are saying is that with these force levels, we will have to put more reliance on nuclear weapons in Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: How can we say at one and the same time that we have no damage-limiting capability and that we can deter a Chinese attack?

Mr. Schlesinger: This is the policy on China that is enshrined in NSDM 16.⁹

Admiral Moorer: We are not capable of preventing damage, but that is not the same thing as having no capability to limit damage. If the public thought we had no capability to reduce damage to the U.S., they would be upset.

Mr. McCracken: What do we mean by a damage-limiting capability? What is a significant limitation?

Admiral Moorer: When the phrase was first coined, it meant that we had a first-strike pre-emptive option. It used to be called counter-force.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Dr. Tucker) Your doctrine is an honest attempt to fit our concepts to the forces we have rather than to babble about what we don’t have.

Admiral Moorer: We used to have a policy that there would in no case be a first attack by the U.S.

What we should do is decide what our policy is going to be and then devise a strategy to carry it out.

Mr. McCracken: I agree that we ought to articulate our policy and then set our strategy.

Dr. Tucker: We are trying to get consistency between our force structure and our strategic and fiscal guidance. We want to find out that we can carry out a given strategy within established fiscal guidelines with a specified risk. We will know what this is in July. Meanwhile, we have to consider what our strategy should be.

Admiral Moorer: I come back to the point that we don’t have total flexibility because of the opposition.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to get this interim guidance out of circulation. Can’t we find a way to deal with this before it leaks in the newspapers?

Dr. Tucker: We will never get a valid assessment of the guidance unless we get the views of all the people who are concerned.

Dr. Kissinger: If this were the British Government, I might not worry. This [damage-limiting capability] is the sort of issue that only experts and arms controllers understand. But the NATO issues could have a major impact.

Mr. Johnson: I am trying to think of another word we could use to describe the guidance. Perhaps working paper.

Mr. Irwin: Hasn’t this been distributed too widely to pull back?

Mr. Johnson: That term “interim guidance” has too definitive a ring to it.

Mr. McCracken: One sure way to protect it would be to mark it “for immediate release.”

Dr. Kissinger: How about putting out an alternative strategy? Then this just becomes one of several.

Dr. Tucker: It wouldn’t be a very good cover unless we asked our people to prepare plans to carry out the alternative guidance, and that would just compound the chaos.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not get out a paper that puts out some alternatives?

Dr. Tucker: We could summarize the DPRC material and send it to all addressees.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem is that term “interim guidance” plus the fact that this is the only guidance extant.

Mr. Packard: We will take a look and see what we can do.

Mr. Irwin: I am interested in the rest of the budget outside the defense area. If we cut $2.4 billion from the defense budget, how would it relate to the rest of the budget?

Mr. Weinberger: In the FY 73 budget, we are including what we are now doing plus Presidential initiatives already made. Just with this, we need $16.5 billion more. There are a lot of items in the budget that are uncontrollable or close to uncontrollable. In order to have a margin to make reductions in domestic, non-defense items, we would have to cut down on income maintenance programs or abandon some of the President’s initiatives.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn’t there a little air in this?

Mr. Weinberger: No. There is only one way to keep a budget under control and that is to leave the agencies with no doubt that there are any more funds available. If they think there is some slack in the budget, they will increase their requests.

Mr. Irwin: If we get through 1972–73, is a tax increase a possibility?

Mr. Weinberger: It is an option. I don’t think it would be acceptable in January 1972.

Mr. Irwin: But in 1973?

Mr. McCracken: Then you are talking about FY 74.

Dr. Tucker: (to Mr. Weinberger) For FY 72 will you be spending at the full employment level?

Mr. Weinberger: We plan to spend the amount of revenue that would be brought in if we were at full employment.

Mr. McCracken: Gardiner’s [Tucker’s] point is that certain program expenditures would go down if we reached full employment.

Mr. Weinberger: We have taken that into account.

Dr. Kissinger: When we did the NSSM 3 study,¹⁰ we laid out on a chart various levels of defense and domestic expenditures. (to Mr. Weinberger) Could you do that for us in connection with this exercise? This group can’t judge these issues, but they need to be laid out.

Mr. Johnson: After seventy years of having ground forces in Asia, we are going to make a decision to have no ground forces in the area. The President needs to see what the trade-offs involved are.

Mr. Weinberger: Last year we gave him early in August four bands of possible reductions in expenditures on domestic programs.

Dr. Kissinger: If you could give us this information [on domestic/defense trade-offs] in early June, it would be helpful.

Mr. Weinberger: All right. The problem is that we need reductions in both defense and domestic programs in order to balance the budget at full employment. Cutting domestic programs will generate a good deal of political heat.

Mr. McCracken: A tax increase to balance the budget will also produce political heat.

Dr. Kissinger: Aren’t we doing a study on strategic forces?¹¹

Mr. Smith: We have a major study that will integrate all the previous ones. It will be ready by June.

(Mr. McCracken left the meeting.)

Mr. Irwin: If we can somehow get through 1973 with a sufficient balance of forces and modernization …

Mr. Weinberger: As regards modernization, there is another way of approaching this and that is to increase the productivity of the defense establishment.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Dr. Tucker) Can you get us a model showing an illustrative mix of modernization and force levels?

Dr. Tucker: I think we need to see what the services come up with. I would hate to do it until then.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. I am not going to insist on it.

From now on we have to give top attention in this group to the doctrinal aspects of the interim guidance so that we can put the issues before the NSC. This group can’t make the decisions; they have to go to the NSC. (to Dr. Tucker) This has made a major contribution to helping us visualize the issues.

The Asian strategy has to be protected. We cannot let that leak as interim guidance.

Mr. Packard: We will continue our planning on the basis of the fiscal guidance and will work to clarify the strategic guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: The Asia proposal has to be wrapped up in such a way that it is not the only guidance.

Mr. Johnson: Can we get the DPRC Working Group involved?

Mr. Smith: We have the strategic forces study which is due in June. The NSSM 69 study on Asia strategy and policy is already underway.¹²

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, ‘69–’73 [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets except those that indicate omitted material are in the original. In an April 23 memorandum, Wayne Smith informed Kissinger that the meeting’s purpose was to review Defense Department fiscal and strategic guidance and the economic outlook for FY 1973 and beyond. Smith advised Kissinger that his goal “should be to ensure that our strategic plans are not changed by Secretary Laird without any Presidential consideration of the issues involved and that the President is presented with a full range of alternative DOD budgets for his consideration” later that year. (Ibid., Box H–102, DPRC Meeting, Strategic and Fiscal Planning, 4/26/71)
2. Document 42. Regarding the NSSM 69 response, see Document 181.
3. NSDM 95, entitled “US Strategy and Forces for NATO,” November 25, 1970, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
4. Kissinger and Shultz discussed the meeting over the telephone the morning of April 26. According to the transcript of the conversation, Kissinger told Shultz that if the Defense budget went below $79.6 billion, “I want you to hear where we will be.” Shultz assured Kissinger that he shared the goal of having a strong national defense, but that he was concerned about the overall budget picture, which was likely to put “a squeeze on Defense budget this year.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
5. Not found.
6. Laird issued the “Planning and Programming Guidance for the FY 73–77 Defense Program” to the service secretaries and the Chairman of the JCS under a covering memorandum on April 21. The Guidance consisted of seven enclosures: Interim Defense Policy Guidance, Interim Forces and Resource Planning Guidance, Fiscal Guidance, Forces and Activity Levels for Southeast Asia, Materiel Support Planning Guidance, Outline of Guidance for POM Preparation, and Subjects for Selected Analysis. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–102, DPRC Meeting, Strategic and Fiscal Planning, 4/26/71)
7. On March 25, Wayne Smith sent Kissinger two studies about “the problem of cost escalation in weapons systems since World War II” and “the increasing costs of manpower.” Kissinger wrote “Excellent” and “What can we do?” on Smith’s covering memorandum. He instructed Smith to draft a memorandum for the President “if you can think of a remedy.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 238, Agency Files, DOD Budget)
8. NSSM 84, entitled “U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO,” November 21, 1969, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
9. Document 39.
10. Document 45.
11. An apparent reference to NSSM 64, Document 41.
12. On April 28, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Helms, Shultz, McCracken, and Moorer calling for additional studies: an analysis of the “major strategy and policy issues involved for immediate Presidential consideration;” the development of “two alternative DOD programs for the FY 73–77 period;” and an evaluation of the “economic, diplomatic, and strategic implications of these alternative DOD budgetary levels and mixes.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, 1971)