Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972

145. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 17, 1970, 10:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

• SUBJECT
  • Defense Budget

• PARTICIPATION
  • Chairman
    • Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
    • Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
    • Mr. Leon Sloss
  • Defense
    • Mr. David Packard
    • Dr. Gardiner Tucker
    • Dr. Donald Rice
  • JCS
    • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
    • Maj. Gen. Richard F. Shaefer
  • CIA
    • Mr. Richard Helms
    • Mr. Bruce Clarke
  • OMB
    • Mr. George Shultz
    • Mr. James R. Schlesinger
  • ACDA
    • Mr. Philip J. Farley
    • Vice Adm. John M. Lee
  • CEA
    • Mr. Paul W. McCracken
    • NSC Staff
    • Dr. Laurence E. Lynn
    • Mr. Keith Guthrie

Dr. Kissinger: Today we want to take a first cut at reviewing the Defense side of the budget. This meeting is an outgrowth of the President’s directive of June 2² asking the DPRC to make a full review of the implications of the defense budget and program issues raised by the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum to the President of May 31.³ I issued some additional guidance for the review on June 13.⁴ The Working Group produced some working papers that seemed to get snatched back as soon as they appeared.⁵ I understand that everyone is agreed on using the summary paper that has been prepared as a basis for discussion even though no one is committed to everything that is in the paper.⁶

The Administration faces three problems. It must define a broad economic strategy; it must decide how to allocate outlays between non-defense and defense activities; and, of primary interest to this group, it must allocate the defense budget so that our defense posture and our strategic objectives are in balance.

At San Clemente the President, George Shultz, and I discussed how to help the President make his choices concerning the budget in the most effective way.⁷ We want to avoid having the President make decisions on line items and to keep from foreclosing Presidential participation in resolving big issues because these issues get settled as a result of negotiations. We want to crystallize the broad alternative choices which the President can make within a responsible budget level and to point out the consequences of various levels of budgetary expenditure. The first choice is to consider the broad strategic choices. After decisions on these, individual line-items should come to the President for decision only if they have proved absolutely insoluble.

Today we want to start our review by considering the broad security choices—that is, what the implications for foreign and security policy are of allocating the Defense budget among different categories. This group cannot make decisions, or even recommendations, on what the domestic spending levels and strategy should be.

As I understand it, the overall economic situation has changed considerably since the time of our NSSM 3 review.⁸ NSSM 3 foresaw an $11 million margin for FY 72, inflation at 2.4% and unemployment at about 4%. Now we face a budgetary deficit of $20–26 billion, 3.6% inflation and over 5% unemployment in FY 72. As I understand it, no matter what we do we face a sizable deficit in FY 72 and must cut our currently projected budget outlays. The choice seems to be between cutting the budget less, running larger deficits, and facing fairly tight monetary policy; and cutting the budget more, running smaller deficits, and having the prospect of easier monetary policy.

Could George Shultz or Paul McCracken give us a fuller review of the economic situation?

Mr. Shultz: The budget process is like solving a set of simultaneous equations; everything is related to everything. As regards our economic choices, I do not regard the economy as necessarily placing limits on what the DPRC might recommend or the President might want to do. If hard choices are involved, we have to face up to them. We might, for example, have to look at making a large increase in taxes. However, at the present we feel this is not wise and that it is not possible to get a tax increase from Congress. That being the case, we have to consider what the budgetary limitations are, given the existing revenue system and the performance of the economy. If we let things ride along and follow the path of least resistance, I foresee substantial deficits that we can’t live with.

Right now there is a lot of evidence that the inflation is beginning to crack. The rate of price increase is coming down, and there was no change in GNP during the second quarter, compared to a previous quarter decline of 3% at an annual rate. We may be beginning to see a more healthy turn in the economy. Still, the constraints on the budgetary process look very severe to me. High appropriations seem to be in prospect for domestic programs like education and urban renewal.

Mr. McCracken: A $237 billion FY 72 budget is not too large for the US economy if we want to use our resources in such a way. But if we pay no attention to the revenue system we will produce the kind of deficit that will have significant consequences. It will, for example, scare hell out of the financial community, with a resultant adverse repercussion on trends in interest rates. In the monetary field, it would worry the Federal Reserve, which might start to pursue a policy inadequate to carry along our economic recovery at the rate we desire. Then we would get the worst of both worlds—a sluggish economy distorted by the Treasury’s dipping into the financial market to cover a deficit. There is no question what a $235 billion budget would do to the financial community and the capital market—and the resultant effect on housing.

Mr. Johnson: What would happen?

Mr. McCracken: It will rekindle fears of inflation in the financial community. Interest rates reflect the community’s expectations on inflation; thus, the rise in interest rates in 1968–69 was in part the effect of a long sustained inflation. We are just now beginning to get to the point where the financial community believes that the Administration’s policies are going to counter inflation. The interest rate is edging down; this is good for the mortgage as well as the stock market. We need to have these trends continue; whether or not they do depends on maintaining the slow recovery of confidence in the financial markets. Other factors may also help; capital expenditures by business are not likely to be so monolithically strong as in recent years. The point of all this is that if we try to fit in a $23 billion budget deficit, we have to consider the effects in all of these areas.

In New York financial circles, $10 billion is being widely used as a ballpark estimate of the likely budget deficit. These people are up on the situation, and they never believed the Administration prediction of only a $1.3 billion deficit. If, as the paper before us points out, we are talking about an FY 72 budget in excess of $235 billion, it will be difficult to keep on course with our housing programs. If we go back to a budget in the range of $225 billion, the resultant deficit, given the current slack in the economy, will probably be manageable, since it will be roughly the size of what the financial community is currently expecting. At the other extreme, if we pursue a spartan policy, you would raise the question of whether we could get private demand expanding rapidly enough to stay on target in attaining full employment by the end of next year, which I believe we should aim for.

Mr. Packard: Timing is crucial. Now is just the wrong time to announce a deficit. But we’ve got to do some planning now. It is possible that by the end of the year a $20 billion deficit might be less trouble. The situation may get better if pressure is put on wages, and inflation is coming down a little more.

Mr. McCracken: That’s right. In the view of the financial community, a $23 billion deficit would just mean that that amount of money would be taken out of the market.

Mr. Packard: Unless the Federal Reserve finances the deficit.

Mr. Shultz: We should remember that the President has criticized the Johnson Administration for running a similar-sized deficit.

Mr. Packard: But the deficit has a different meaning now. I don’t see any possibility for getting spending down below about the $230 billion level. It is not wise to go as far as cutting DOD by $6 billion. We might do this if we postponed the all-volunteer army and some other things. If we take $6 billion out of the defense forces, it will be disastrous. As far as non-defense programs are concerned, we need to get a better handle, George.

Dr. Kissinger: As a matter of legislative strategy, experience has shown that cuts in defense appropriations tend to stick while nondefense cuts can often be restored. Therefore, you can make a case for being a little more conservative in cutting the defense budget.

Mr. Shultz: That’s the same as letting Congress allocate the resources; they are going to cut DOD, raise the domestic side.

Dr. Kissinger: I also feel that we need some program analysis on the non-defense side, comparable to the defense side.

Mr. Shultz: That’s a fair comment. I am working with Ehrlichman on trying to construct something. We want to set up a procedure for examining domestic options somewhat like that used in the NSC process. We want to get it worked out right away in the hope of having some impact on Congressional spending plans in the domestic sphere.

Mr. Johnson: Where do the figures we have on non-defense expenditures come from?

Mr. Packard: From Budget.

Mr. Schlesinger: They are derived from existing programs plus Presidential requests.

Mr. McCracken: I don’t want to say that overall economic policy sets limits on what we can do. Nevertheless, within a given financial system, there is a defined range of expenditure levels which the system can handle. If we go outside that limit, we have to consider adjusting our revenue system.

Mr. Packard: We should not summarily eliminate the possibility of a tax hike. This may be the only course available.

Mr. Shultz: That is a fair comment, but we should leave it at that. We should not start out to make our plans on the assumption that we can always get more taxes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s get to the main business of this group. Last year, in NSDM 16,⁹ the President approved four criteria for strategic sufficiency to govern the design of our strategic posture. Then in NSDM 27¹⁰ he approved a world-wide strategy for general purpose forces and a five-year projection of defense outlays. At a spending level of $225–230 billion, it is clear that some reductions will be required in the Defense budget even though the existing budget is already below what is required to carry out approved policy according to the JSOP. I recognize that JCS is reluctant to change strategy on account of a one or two year shortfall. However, we should know how a continuation of the existing situation will affect our strategy.

We have looked at basically two options for making cuts. Option 1 would cut $6 billion from general purpose forces, leaving projected strategic budgets as is. Option 2 would cut about $3 billion from both general purpose forces and strategic forces.¹¹ A possible third option would be to take all the cuts from strategic forces.

Can we discuss what would be involved in cuts at alternative levels of $3 billion, $6 billion, and $9 billion?

Mr. Packard: The $79 billion figure for FY 72 in current projections is based on the $76 billion set for FY 72 by NSDM 27, with the addition of $2 billion for the all-volunteer service and $1 billion for increased costs due to inflation. Our current programs are based on NSDM 27. But there is a big range in what people think. The JCS felt that the NSDM 27 force levels were on the low side; on the other hand, in NSSM 3, there was an OSD budget and force level, but they were too low. The $79 billion figure was worked out by OSD, and I think it is the lowest practicable figure. That is what is in NSDM 27.

With regard to strategic forces we considered two alternatives: (1) maintaining the current program or (2) reductions of $3 billion. It is difficult to determine the adequacy of strategic forces. Our current concept is based on three separate pillars: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Each is on its own supposed to be adequate to provide sufficient deterrence against an enemy attack. Soviet build-ups during the next few years will bring their total strategic forces up to levels roughly comparable to ours.

A $3 billion cut would mean that we would reduce our air defense capability by about half. Our air defense is based on interceptors and surface-to-air missiles and is already at a low level.

Dr. Kissinger: What job is it supposed to do?

Mr. Packard: Defend against the Soviet strategic bomber force. Adm. Moorer: Today if an enemy aircraft succeeds in getting to the periphery of the United States, it is free to move at will.

Dr. Kissinger: What does the Soviet bomber force consist of?

Mr. Packard: It is about one-third the size of ours. They maintain a level of about 200 bombers.

Adm. Moorer: They are developing a new bomber.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a rationale for ABM; we want Safeguard to provide against accidents, a minor attack from a major country or a major attack from a minor country. Don’t we also need a rationale for continental air defense?

Mr. Packard: We can’t build a good air defense system until we develop AWACS. This is a vertical radar mounted in aircraft and needed in order to detect low-flying aircraft. We can save money on the current air defense system, which is not too good, and put the funds into technology to develop the improved system we need. It doesn’t make any difference what we decide today if we don’t develop the technology we need.

Dr. Kissinger: Still, we could try to find out what is the desirable lower limit on our current air defense system.

Mr. Packard: Perhaps that might be useful. I don’t know.

To continue with the implications of a $3 billion cut, this would mean reducing Safeguard to 7 sites rather than 12. We would reduce our bomber force (bombers are expensive to operate), and we would go ahead with developing a new bomber but on a longer range production program. We would reduce programs for Minuteman survivability; this means we would be placing more reliance on our SLBMs.

Mr. Johnson: There would be no increase in our SLBMs?

Mr. Packard: That’s right, although they would be improved through installation of Poseidon missiles. If there is a strategic arms limitation agreement, the reductions in programs for Minuteman survivability and for Safeguard would be more acceptable.

Dr. Kissinger: Tom, what do you think?

Adm. Moorer: I generally agree with what Dave has said. I think we should not look at SALT as a means to save money. It is important to keep the requirements of national security in mind. There has been a feeling that if we can’t afford our present strategy, we should get one we can afford. However, never before have the Soviets been building up their strategic and general purpose forces at such a rate. In some ways the Soviets determine the strategy we have to follow.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t change our strategy; we just say our forces have only a marginal capability.

Adm. Moorer: We are moving into a situation where the President will have no options in a confrontation with the Soviets. We have fought the Vietnam war unlike any other in our history in that we did not call up the reserves. Thus a cutback requires a reduction in our regular forces.

Dr. Kissinger: The impact of cuts depends on our strategy. We don’t have a precise definition of our strategy. Our strategy as far as bombers are concerned depends on what we think the impact of cuts would be. If our bombers are intended to provide a first-strike counterforce against China, will that capability be affected by the planned reductions?

Mr. Packard: It would not present any problem today. I don’t know about five years from now.

Dr. Kissinger: But today’s decision affects what happens five years from now.

Dr. Tucker: The reductions don’t deprive us of a capability to launch a pre-emptive strike against Chinese ICBMs. We can use Polaris for this.

Dr. Kissinger: But the bombers must do something.

Adm. Moorer: The bombers provide throw-weight. They are also part of our triad concept of three separate deterrent forces.

Mr. Packard: Each of the three forces has the capability of destroying 25% of the enemy population.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no trouble understanding that the bomber cuts will not affect our capability for destruction of population. But to the extent we rely on bomber forces against China, B–52s do play a role. I need to know what the impact would be on our strategy of deterring a first strike.

Adm. Moorer: That is a problem primarily associated with the USSR.

Dr. Tucker: We could still use our bombers against China but this would require us to use forces we now rely on against the Soviets. Thus our security with respect to the Soviets would be reduced.

Dr. Kissinger: What does “reduced security” mean?

Dr. Tucker: It means we would be changing the triad concept. We would not have an independent capability with each of three forces; instead, our capability would be based on a combination of three forces.

Dr. Kissinger: I am just playing the devil’s advocate. I don’t have any position on this.

Another item on the list is a cutback in programs to insure Minuteman survivability. This means that the Minutemen become extremely vulnerable, and we are left to rely on submarine-launched missiles. Is that a fair statement?

Dr. Tucker: Yes. If Minuteman becomes vulnerable, crisis stability will be affected, since there will be a greater temptation for the Soviets to strike first.

Mr. Packard: If a strategic arms agreement limits large missiles, we can stand the loss in Minuteman survivability.

Dr. Kissinger: I want a paper that will tell the President: “If you do this, these are the consequences.”¹²

Mr. Johnson: According to the way the SIOP is structured, we have up to now assumed we had the capability to deal simultaneously with China and the Soviet Union. If the President decides a simultaneous defense is not required, what effect would this have on the forces we need?

Mr. Packard: That is a complex issue. Right now we do not have enough warheads to cover all targets; we never have had. The question is how we find a rational basis to deal with this problem. One thing we are doing is to install Poseidon missiles in our submarines. This does not increase destructive power but it does increase our flexibility. We are also putting multiple-warheads on Minuteman and developing SRAM to improve the penetrability of our bombers. Thus, we are taking steps to improve our capabilities, although this progress has to be evaluated against the Soviet build-up. I think it is all more a matter of the psychological impact. It depends on what the Soviets think of our capabilities.

Adm. Moorer: The answer to Alex’s question is that there would be no difference in force requirements.

Mr. Schlesinger: The SIOP is a single integrated plan. If we want to deter the Soviets while mopping up the Chinese, bombers would be useful.

Adm. Moorer: We must remember that many of the targets in China are covered by tactical aircraft.

Mr. Packard: There is a good deal of flexibility.

Mr. Farley: On the subject of Minuteman survivability, it is worth pointing out that if we fail to get a strategic arms agreement, the conclusion would not be automatic that we would want to put money into survivability measures.

Mr. Packard: That is one of the problems. Increased hardening can easily be offset by improved accuracy. We could try to improve the mobility of Minuteman.

Adm. Moorer: What we are looking for is two or three budget levels and a clear statement of the impact of each. We can prepare that.

Dr. Kissinger: If the conclusion is that it makes no difference whether we cut $3 billion (we only uncover another third of the Soviet strategic force), then let’s go on to another subject.

However, I think we need to know what the shortfall in the existing projections means and what are the implications of a $3 billion cut. We are not trying to allocate Defense funds for you, and we don’t want to second-guess on war plans. The question is whether the differences we are speaking of are strategically and politically significant.

The NAC consultation on SALT has shown that the Europeans are living in a never-never land. They are concerned because we might be uncovering additional targets, when all targets have never been covered. It is a tremendous charade.

Mr. Johnson: The $3 billion cut does not involve strategic forces?

Mr. Packard: Yes, it is a strategic force reduction.

Dr. Tucker: You can define separate cuts in strategic and general purpose forces, and you can combine them.

Dr. Kissinger: What is involved if the entire $3 billion reduction comes out of strategic forces?

Mr. Packard: The specific reductions are outlined in Table 6 of the summary paper.¹³ The $3 billion cut would involve reductions below current force planning in bombers, interceptors, surface-to-air missiles, and Safeguard sites.

Mr. Spiers: Why is there such a small cut in surface-to-air missiles and a large cut in interceptors?

Dr. Tucker: With interceptors you get more money out.

Mr. Packard: In relation to strategic forces, the big issue is Safeguard. Budget cuts may mean giving up the area defense. If we also give up hardpoint defense as a result of a strategic arms agreement, in my view we might as well limit the whole Safeguard program to research and development.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t have to decide that now. Safeguard is a card we need during SALT. It is the program of greatest interest to the Soviets.

Mr. Farley: That’s right. Gerry Smith agrees.

(Mr. Shultz left the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Kissinger: The Working Group should prepare an assessment of a $3 billion cut giving both strategic and political implications. This would not necessarily mean changing the allocation proposed by Defense within the limitations established by such a cut. The Working Group should accept the Defense proposals and see what they mean.

The President says he does not want to make defense decisions on budget considerations alone. On the question of whether to cut surface-to-air missiles or interceptors, he would not like to get the answer that we can get more money out by cutting one rather than the other.

Mr. Packard: That is not the only reason. The surface-to-air missiles have a greater capability.

Dr. Kissinger: If you reduce Minuteman survivability and the bomber force, you are putting a lot of chips on submarines.

I think I have now posed the question that needs to be answered by the time of the budget review. The table in the summary paper is an excellent one.

Mr. Schlesinger: The discussion on page 11 of the summary paper needs to be made consistent with the data presented in Table 6.¹⁴

Dr. Kissinger: Larry Lynn can take care of that.

Now we should take up general purpose forces.

Mr. Packard: There are two problems: (1) determining long-term levels and (2) the problem of making the transition to them. The transition problem has several aspects. For example, if a cut is to be made during FY 72, it will be necessary to focus on personnel reductions. In Vietnam if forces are cut back to 220,000 rather than 260,000 in 1971, $400 million could be saved. Cutting tactical air sorties by 3,000 per month would lop off another $400 million. If the end-of-1972 troop level were reduced from 130,000 to 120,000, another $200 million could be saved.

Illustrative packages of general purpose forces reductions are shown in Table 6 of the summary report. The individual items can, of course, be combined in various ways.

Dr. Kissinger: The reductions in divisions would get us down to pre-Korean War levels.

Mr. Packard: The cuts in escort vessels are particularly severe.

Adm. Moorer: We will be down to the 1930 level.

Mr. Packard: The Chief of Naval Operations says a $6 billion general purpose forces reduction will cut his ability to maintain control of the seas in the event of a US-Soviet confrontation from 55% to 20%.¹⁵

Dr. Kissinger: What does that mean?

Adm. Moorer: In World War II we kept graphs of the amount of enemy and allied shipping destroyed. At first our losses were greater than theirs. When the curves crossed, we reached the turning point. The CNO’s estimate measures the chances of reaching this turning point in the event of a US-Soviet conflict.

Dr. Kissinger: Would there be any chance at all of reaching it?

Mr. Packard: We can get a definition for you.

Dr. Tucker: In considering this, we need to take into account the significant anti-submarine capability of some of our European allies.

Adm. Moorer: They don’t have a significant capability. And they won’t be defending US coasts.

The reductions involved mean a cut from 794 to 514 in the number of ships.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard) Obviously the Air Force got to you. Mr. Packard: The impact of large defense budget reductions is just too great to be seriously considered. We just have to find alternatives to taking such reductions.

Mr. Schlesinger: At a $230 billion overall budget level, it won’t be necessary to make large cuts.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we make cuts of $3 billion each in strategic and general purpose forces?

Mr. Packard: I believe that by allocating our funds a little differently, we can make a maximum cut of $3 billion.

Dr. Kissinger: This would mean reductions in both strategic and general purpose forces?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I know nobody here wants to recommend a $9 billion cut. Should we even present such an option to the President?

Mr. Packard: It might be useful in order to show him what a drastic step it would be in case he were forced to cut back by that amount.

Dr. Kissinger: In the 1950’s we talked about a superiority that didn’t exist; we didn’t appreciate our margin. A situation is developing under which there is no rational reason to be found for going to general nuclear war. The situation we talked of in the 1950’s is coming true with a vengeance. With 400 Soviet targets uncovered, it simply can’t be done. At the same time, we are cutting our general purpose forces and getting out of places like Korea. How are we going to defend these areas? This question has to be put to the President. He must know what we are heading into.

Mr. Packard: We have to figure out how to make the best allocation of the cuts we will be forced to make. For example, I believe we should cut manpower levels, while maintaining the Air Force and Navy.

Mr. Johnson: The point is that if we cut general purpose forces, we are more dependent on massive retaliation; yet, massive retaliation is not adequate.

Dr. Kissinger: At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets did not blockade Berlin because they were afraid of a pre-emptive attack by us. They now know this can’t happen. If we attack with our entire force, they would have several hundred missiles left to clobber us. With cuts in general purpose forces, this could create a nightmare by 1974.

Mr. Packard: There are various alternatives. One is to cut ground forces. We need the Navy to supply the ground forces and keep the sea lanes open.

Dr. Kissinger: I detect in the Government a predisposition to bring forces out of Europe. These issues must be presented clearly to the President.

Mr. Packard: A faster withdrawal from Vietnam would help.

Dr. Kissinger: Everything that comes out of Vietnam is to be disbanded. The President may get out of Vietnam faster than presently planned, but if so, it will not be for budgetary reasons.

Let’s put together an assessment of the implications of a $3 billion total cut, a $3 billion general purpose forces cut, and a $6 billion general purpose forces cut. We can then present it to the President, along with some suggestions on remedial measures.

Mr. Packard: I think we should come up with a Defense Department recommended program.

Dr. Kissinger: This Committee will not make up a program. The options should be presented to the President. After we get Presidential guidance, we will ask the Defense Department to come up with a recommended program.

Mr. McCracken: A $9 billion cut will not be included.

Dr. Kissinger: A $9 billion cut would be a combination of a $3 billion strategic and $6 billion general purpose forces cut.

Mr. McCracken: The “in” thing at the present is to take all budget cuts out of defense funds. I think we may be going too far. We have to know what the successive levels of insecurity are.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes Originals ‘69–’73. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House.
2. See footnote 6, Document 143.
3. Laird’s memorandum is dated May 30, Document 143.
4. On June 13, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Richardson, Packard, Helms, Wheeler, McCracken, and Mayo specifying that the DPRC’s review of the defense budget should include analyses of available resources, trade-offs between defense and non-defense expenditures, and alternative defense postures and their effect on the United States’ capabilities and its ability to meet its commitments and its strategic objectives. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, 1969–Feb. 1970)
5. In preparation for the Committee’s meeting scheduled for the following day, the DPRC Working Group met on July 16 to discuss four papers: two prepared by the Defense Department, “Defense Planning, 1971–1976” and “Defense Alternatives;” one by the State Department, “An Analysis of Possible Reductions in U.S. Defense Programs and Their Effect on U.S. Foreign Policy;” and one by the CEA, “Economic and Fiscal Implications of the Defense Budget.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–100, DPRC Meeting 7–17–70)
6. The Committee based its discussion of the defense budget on a draft summary paper, accepted during the previous day’s DPRC Working Group meeting and entitled “Summary: Defense Planning 1971–76.” The 17-page paper included the following sections: Introduction, Economic Analysis, Defense Options, and Combined Options. (Ibid.) The final version of the paper is Document 152.
7. The President’s Daily Diary does not record a formal meeting among Nixon, Kissinger, and Shultz during the President’s stay in San Clemente from May 28 to June 1. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)
8. See Documents 2, 45, and 48.
9. Document 39.
10. Document 56.
11. Table 5 of the summary of “Defense Planning 1971–76” lists several possibilities. Alternative A was to maintain the current strategic forces and general purpose forces programs. Alternative B included two options: the first reduced strategic programs by $3 billion; the other also reduced GPF programs by the same amount. Alternative C also included two options: either “low” GPF programs cut by $6 billion or “reduced” GPF and strategic programs resulting in the same savings. Alternative D slashed $8 billion from the defense budget, resulting in “reduced” strategic forces and “low” GPF.
12. No such paper was found.
13. Table 6 of the summary of “Defense Planning 1971–76” outlines the costs and risks of alternative strategic and general purpose forces postures.
14. Page 11 of the summary paper dealt with “Additional Impacts on National Security” of various reductions in strategic and general purpose forces.
15. In a July 15 memorandum to Laird, Zumwalt wrote, “an approximate 10% budget reduction for FY 72 has reduced my confidence in any confrontation vis-à-vis the Russian Navy from 55% to about 20%.” A stamped note on the memorandum indicates that Packard saw it. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–076, 110.01, Budget)